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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
Reputational Considerations within Prosocial Behavior  
by 
Rachel Gershon 
Doctor of Philosophy in Business Administration 
Washington University in St. Louis, 2019 
Professor Cynthia Cryder, Chair 
 
Consumers and companies often consider the welfare of others when making decisions. 
Consumers might spend their money donating to meaningful causes or choose to purchase from 
socially responsible companies. Companies must also choose whether and how to prioritize behaving 
Prosocially or “giving back”. One reason that both companies and individuals behave prosocially is 
to be viewed positively by others, or in other words, to gain charitable credit. In my research, I 
explore this impression management motivation behind prosocial behavior. 
In Chapter one, I show that low-warmth actors are often assumed to lack communal (or 
other-oriented) intentions, even when acting generously. Low-warmth donors must therefore send 
stronger signals of their communal intent when donating to receive the same amount of charitable 
credit as high-warmth donors. Because goods are linked with communal norms, we find that 
donating goods allows low-warmth donors to signal communal intent and increase charitable credit 
received. Study 1 establishes that low-warmth donors receive less credit for unspecified donations 
than their high-warmth counterparts. Studies 2A and 2B show that goods donations, compared to 
equally valued monetary or unspecified donations, increase charitable credit for low-warmth donors. 
Studies 3A and 3B show that donating goods boosts charitable credit for low-warmth donors in 
particular; high-warmth donors are assumed to have communal intentions, and receive large amounts 
ix 
 
of credit, regardless of donation type. Finally, study 4 shows that low-warmth donors can increase 
charitable credit for monetary donations by describing the donation in communal terms, specifically, 
as a gift. This research has clear practical implications, for example, many corporations are viewed as 
low-warmth, and most corporate donations are monetary. Yet, companies always have the option to 
donate goods instead.  
While Chapter One examined the reputational benefits, or “charitable credit” companies and 
other low-warmth donors receive for making donations, Chapter Two goes on to study the 
reputational benefits involved in another common consumer behavior: customer referrals. In Chapter 
Two, I show that while selfish incentives typically outperform prosocial incentives, in the context 
of customer referral rewards, prosocial incentives can be more effective. Companies frequently 
offer “selfish” (i.e., sender-benefiting) referral incentives, offering customers financial incentive 
for recruiting new customers. However, companies can alternatively offer “prosocial” (i.e., 
recipient-benefiting) referral incentives. In two field experiments and an incentive-compatible 
lab experiment, we find that recipient-benefiting referrals, relative to sender-benefiting referrals, 
result in more new customers. In five subsequent experiments, we explain why this effect occurs. 
Specifically, we provide evidence of a two-stage process account that invokes two counter-
vailing forces: reputational benefits versus action costs. First, at the referral stage, senders expect 
reputational benefits when making a recipient-benefiting referral: senders expect the people 
whom they refer to view them more favorably for providing an opportunity to earn a reward. At 
the same time, the task of referring someone is relatively easy, often amounting to entering an 
email address. As a result, recipient-benefiting referral programs are just as effective as sender-
benefiting programs at inducing referrals. Then, at the uptake stage, recipient-benefiting referrals 
are more effective than sender-benefiting referrals. This is because recipient-benefiting referrals 
directly incent what is typically the more effortful action in referral programs: uptake (i.e., 
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signing up for a new product or service), as opposed to referral, thereby providing impetus for 
recipients to act. The relative prevalence of sender-benefiting referral offers in the marketplace 
suggests these forces play out in ways that are unanticipated by marketers who design incentive 
schemes.  
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Chapter 1: Goods Donations Increase 
Charitable Credit for Low-Warmth Donors1 
 
1.1 Introduction 
In 2012, the devastation of Hurricane Sandy prompted over $380 million in charitable 
donations (Lawrence et al. 2014). All types of donors gave, often donating in different forms. 
American Express contributed a $1,000,000 monetary donation. Ikea donated in-kind goods, 
giving more than 40,000 blankets, pillows, and towels (BCLC 2015). A teacher and her 5th grade 
class raised funds to make a monetary donation (Graham 2012). Meanwhile, a hedge fund 
manager from the Upper West Side donated goods such as canned food and medical supplies 
(Rampell 2012). While all of these donations provided valuable resources to displaced victims, 
both the traits of the donors and the types of donations varied substantially. In this research, we 
propose that such variations in both donor traits and donation type can alter how people award 
charitable credit to those who give.   
People who engage in prosocial behavior are often rewarded with higher status and 
reputation benefits (Berman et al. 2015; Flynn 2003; Flynn et al. 2006); in other words, people 
grant donors “charitable credit” for their generous acts (Lin-Healy and Small 2012). However, 
the charitable credit that a donor receives does not correspond perfectly with the donation’s 
impact. Instead, judgments of a donor’s intentions for donating also play a significant role 
(Barasch et al. 2014; Lin-Healy and Small 2012), and can be even more important than the 
donation’s actual impact for earning charitable credit (Newman and Cain 2014).   
                                                 
1 The paper based on the first chapter of my dissertation is published in the Journal of Consumer Research:  
 
Gershon, R., & Cryder, C. (2018). Goods donations increase charitable credit for low-warmth donors. Journal of 
Consumer Research, 45, 451–469. https://doi.org/10.1093/jcr/ucx126 
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Because presumed intentions are a critical component of the credit a donor receives, this 
research proposes that two factors that influence intention judgments will affect charitable credit 
as well. First, trait warmth, a central dimension on which people assess others, is closely linked 
with perceptions of others’ good intentions (Fiske, Cuddy, and Glick 2007). Whereas high-
warmth actors are assumed to be well-intentioned, previous research suggests that even when 
low-warmth actors behave prosocially, observers may assume they possess ulterior motives 
(Cuddy, Glick, and Beninger 2011).  
Second, donation type has potential to influence intention judgments. Giving goods is 
often the norm within social or communal relationships (Cheal 1987; Douglas and Isherwood 
1979; Heyman and Ariely 2004; Webley, Lea, and Portalska 1983). Accordingly, goods 
donations (compared to monetary donations) may signal that a donor has donated for communal, 
or other-focused, reasons.  
  In this research, we specifically predict that donor warmth and donation type will 
interact to influence the judgments about donors’ communal intentions, ultimately influencing 
charitable credit received. High-warmth actors are typically assumed to have communal or other-
focused intentions (Fiske et al. 2007) and therefore may receive high charitable credit regardless 
of donation type; any prosocial act reinforces prior beliefs that high-warmth givers act with 
others’ welfare in mind. By contrast, low-warmth actors are typically assumed to act in 
accordance with their own interests, and such suspicion surrounding intent may result in lower 
charitable credit for donating. Therefore, low-warmth donors may need to send additional signals 
of communal intent to gain equal levels of charitable credit. We show that donations of goods, 
because of their link with communality, allow low-warmth donors to strengthen their signal of 
communal intent and earn more credit for their charitable acts. 
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1.2 Conceptual Background  
1.2.1  The Link between Trait Warmth and Communal Intent 
 Warmth refers to the extent to which an individual (or organization; Aaker, Vohs, and 
Mogilner 2010) is friendly, good-natured, and trustworthy (Fiske et al. 2007), and is central to 
the way that people assess one another. People make warmth judgments before judgments of 
intelligence or competence when forming impressions, and warmth judgments receive greater 
attention and weight in impression formation than other interpersonal judgments (Wojciszke, 
Bazinska, and Jaworski 1998; Wojciszke and Abele 2008). Being judged as low-warmth can 
have negative repercussions, for example, low-warmth individuals are often feared or resented 
(Fiske et al. 2002), and tend to receive less social support (Cuddy, Fiske, and Glick 2007). 
Warmth judgments and their consequences also extend beyond individuals, for example, low-
warmth companies inspire less customer loyalty than their high-warmth counterparts (Kervyn, 
Fiske, and Malone 2012). Due to the fundamental importance of warmth in social judgments, 
warmth has been studied in a wide range of contexts including romantic partner decisions 
(Sinclair and Fehr 2005), hiring decisions (Casciaro and Lobo 2008), purchase decisions (Aaker 
et al. 2010), and customer satisfaction (Andrzejewski and Mooney 2016).  
Warmth may be particularly relevant to the prosocial domain because people rely on 
warmth judgments to predict whether or not someone is well-intentioned (Fiske et al. 2002).  
Indeed, judgments of low-warmth are linked with competitive and exploitative intentions rather 
than cooperative and well-meaning intentions (Fiske et al. 2007; Fournier and Alvarez 2012; 
Kervyn et al. 2012). This association extends to the realm of corporate social responsibility; 
consumers typically perceive for-profit companies as low in warmth (Aaker et al. 2010) and they 
tend to be suspicious of companies’ motives for engaging in prosocial behavior (Vlachos et al. 
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2009). Multiple studies find that the reputational benefits of donating are attenuated, or even 
reversed, when consumers believe that charitable giving was motivated by profit or was 
inauthentic in any way (Koschate-Fischer, Stefan, and Hoyer 2012; Wagner, Lutz, and Weitz 
2009; Yoon, Gürhan-Canli, and Schwarz 2006).  
In this research, we hypothesize that low-warmth donors’ intentions are viewed 
specifically as less “communal” than high-warmth donors’ intentions. Research in social 
psychology distinguishes between two categories of social relationships: communal and 
exchange-based relationships. In communal relationships, benefits are given to others non-
contingently and with the recipient’s welfare in mind. Relationships between parents and 
children or romantic partners typically follow communal norms (Clark and Mills 1979; 2011), 
such as when parents provide food and shelter for their children without the expectation of being 
paid back. By contrast, business transactions and most interactions with strangers and 
acquaintances typically follow exchange norms common in exchange-based relationships; 
benefits are given to others with the expectation that the giver will receive comparable benefits 
in return (Clark and Mills 1979; 2011). For example, when selling a car, both the salesperson and 
the customer give something and expect to receive something of comparable value in return. 
Although the communal versus exchange distinction was originally conceptualized to describe 
human relationships (Clark and Mills 1979), consumers also interpret their interactions with 
companies through the lens of communal or exchange norms, judging some companies to behave 
more consistently with communal norms and others to behave more consistently with exchange 
norms (Aggarwal 2004; Aggarwal and Law 2005).  
We conducted a correlational study as an initial investigation into the relationship 
between donor warmth and judgments of communal intentions. We asked 96 Mechanical Turk 
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participants about each company on Interbrand’s list of the 10 most valuable global brands from 
2016 (Apple, Google, Coca-Cola, Microsoft, Toyota, IBM, Samsung, Amazon, Mercedes-Benz, 
or General Electric; Interbrand 2017). Participants rated each company on trait warmth (that is, 
to what extent do the following traits describe the company in general:” friendly, well-
intentioned, trustworthy, warm, good-natured, sincere; Fiske et al. 2002; (α = .96)). Next, 
participants imagined that the company had behaved prosocially in a generalized context 
(“Imagine that some people needed help and Coca-Cola helped them. How would you interpret 
this action by Coca-Cola?”). They then rated the company's intentions on a five item measure of 
communal intentions: 1) The company did not expect to receive any benefits from helping, 2) 
The company helped to respond to others' needs, 3) The company has a genuine desire to help 
others, 4) The company helped with hopes of benefiting themselves (reverse-coded), and 5) The 
company helped in order to get ahead (reverse coded; α = .80). Results showed that, as expected, 
trait warmth and communal intentions were significantly positively correlated (r = 0.35, p < 
.001; full details in appendix A). 
We propose that such connections between trait warmth and communal, or other-
oriented, intentions have the potential to influence the amount of charitable credit that donors 
receive. Donations that are perceived as communal in nature, that is, motivated by recipients’ 
needs, tend to be evaluated positively whereas similar donations that are viewed as self-serving 
or exchange-based are typically evaluated more negatively (Lin-Healy and Small 2013; Newman 
and Cain 2014). When judging charitable behavior, people balance the information that the 
donor has done something good with signals about whether or not the donor truly cared about the 
recipient’s welfare to arrive at a final judgment of how favorably the good deed should be 
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perceived (Berman et al. 2015); in short, judgments of donors’ communal intentions can be a key 
factor in determining charitable credit received. 
Although people may assume that low-warmth donors have self-interested motives, links 
between goods and communality may allow low-warmth donors who donate goods (compared to 
money or an unspecified donation) to more effectively signal communal intent, and ultimately, 
improve charitable credit. 
1.2.2 Goods Signal Communal Intent 
While the prosocial consumer behavior literature has distinguished between donations of 
money and time (Liu and Aaker 2008; Macdonnell and White 2015; Reed, Aquino, and Levy 
2007), there is minimal work investigating goods donations. This gap is notable because donors 
frequently give in-kind donations of tangible goods such as medical supplies, food, water, and 
clothing (Charity Navigator 2017). Because of links between giving goods and communality, we 
propose that donating goods can increase the extent to which low-warmth donors’ contributions 
are viewed as communally motivated. 
Giving goods is often the norm within social or communal interactions (Heyman and 
Ariely 2004), such as in the realm of gift giving (Cheal 1987; Douglas and Isherwood 1979).  
Exchanges of goods are considered appropriate within close social relationships whereas 
comparable exchanges of money are viewed as taboo within these relationships (Belk and Coon 
1993; Webley et al. 1983). Although charities themselves tend to prefer monetary donations over 
other contributions because money is fully fungible and offers flexibility to cover a charity’s 
most pressing needs (Conan 2011), goods may be more consistent with psychological 
representations of communality and prosociality. The connection between goods and 
communality is further supported by research about incentives. In some cases, people are less 
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generous when a monetary incentive is offered for generous behavior compared to no incentive 
at all (Ariely, Bracha, and Meier 2007; Frey and Goette 1999), however, goods incentives such 
as T-shirts and lottery tickets, can have neutral or even positive effects on giving (Goette, 
Stutzer, and Frey 2010; Lacetera, Macis, and Slonim 2013). 
Research in a similar vein suggests that goods effectively signal communal norms 
(Gasiorowska et al. 2016; Jiang, Chen, and Wyer 2014; McGraw and Tetlock 2005). When 
offered a monetary reward, participants report a lower likelihood of helping a friend when the 
reward is small than when it is large, a pattern consistent with exchange norms whereby effort 
corresponds with incentive size. When offered a reward of goods, however, participants report an 
equal (and high) likelihood of helping a friend regardless of reward size, a pattern of non-
contingent helping that is consistent with communal norms (Clark and Mills 1979; 2011; 
Heyman and Ariely 2004). A related experiment by Kube and colleagues (2012) found that 
workers were more productive when given a small goods (vs. monetary) bonus by their 
employer. The authors concluded that employees responded favorably to the gift of goods 
because goods sent more credible signals of the employer’s caring and altruistic intent. 
Additional work on gift giving shows that although cash is often more valuable to recipients, 
gifts of goods can more effectively signal altruistic intent and yield higher esteem for the giver 
(Ellingsen and Johanneson 2011). 
Due to differing inferences that arise from goods versus monetary transactions, low-
warmth donors may boost signals of communal intent when they donate goods. Further, because 
goods donations signal positive regard for a recipient (Ellingsen and Johannesson 2011), goods 
donations may promote communal inferences above and beyond not only monetary donations, 
but unspecified donations as well.  
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1.2.3 Present Research 
 
We predict that low-warmth donors, but not high-warmth donors, will receive greater 
credit for donating goods compared to money due to differing inferences about communal intent. 
Because of links between trait warmth and communal intentions (Fiske et al. 2007), and because 
perceptions of good intentions are critical for gaining credit from charitable giving (Barasch et 
al. 2014; Newman and Cain 2014), we first hypothesize that trait warmth will play an important 
role in how much credit a donor receives for giving. Further, we predict that high-warmth donors 
may receive high credit for generous acts regardless of the substance of that act; any prosocial 
act reinforces a prior belief that the high-warmth giver was acting with others’ welfare in mind, 
making donation type less influential. Low-warmth donors, by contrast, may comparatively 
struggle to receive credit because people doubt the benevolence of their intent (Figure 1.1, 
Conceptual Model Step 1: Charitable Credit for an Unspecified Donation).  
Therefore, low-warmth donors may need to send stronger signals of their communal 
intent compared to their high-warmth counterparts in order to receive similar levels of charitable 
credit. Due to links between goods and communal norms, we predict that donations of goods (vs. 
money or unspecified donations) may allow low-warmth donors to strengthen the signal of their 
communal intent, and increase the amount of credit that they receive (Figure 1.1, Conceptual 
Model Step 2: Charitable Credit with Donation Type Specified). 
 
FIGURE 1.1 
CONCEPTUAL MODEL STEP 1: CHARITABLE CREDIT FOR AN UNSPECIFIED 
DONATION 
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Step 1: Conceptual model outlining the relationship between Donor Image, Judged Intent, and 
Charitable Credit based on generalized prosocial acts. 
 
CONCEPTUAL MODEL STEP 2: CHARITABLE CREDIT WITH DONATION TYPE 
SPECIFIED 
 
 
Step 2: Conceptual model outlining the relationship between the variables in Step 1 when 
Donation Type is specified. 
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1.2.4 Overview of Constructs and Studies 
Throughout our research, we focus on three primary psychological constructs: trait 
warmth, communal intent, and charitable credit. First, the construct of warmth refers to a 
character trait regarding how friendly, trustworthy, and good-natured someone is (Fiske 1999). 
We propose that trait warmth is a key predictor of the influence of donation type on charitable 
credit. Second, communal (vs. exchange-based) intentions serve as our mediating variable. 
Judgments of communal, or other-regarding, intentions have been identified as feeding into 
judgments about generosity (Barasch et al. 2014). Finally, “charitable credit,” or image-related 
benefits that accrue due to a prosocial act (Lin-Healy and Small 2012; Newman and Cain 2014) 
serves as our primary dependent variable of interest. Charitable credit is conceptualized as the 
credit received when someone acts benevolently (Lin-Healy and Small 2012).  
While all of these constructs are related, they also are clearly distinct from one another. 
Warmth refers to a broad and relatively stable trait-level evaluation of a person or organization. 
Communal intent, the proposed mediating construct, refers to perceptions of the donor’s motives 
behind the prosocial act, specifically the extent to which the generous act was done with the 
recipient’s welfare in mind. Although at times previous work uses warmth and communion 
interchangeably (e.g., Fiske et al. 2002), we distinguish here between a broad-level trait 
(warmth) and a judgment about the intentions that drive a particular act (communal intent). 
These two do not always match, as with our previous example of a parent providing for a child; a 
parent may be generally low-warmth, but provide for their child with only the child’s interests in 
mind, expecting nothing in return. Finally, charitable credit refers to the amount of credit or 
esteem a donor receives based on a particular prosocial act (though we note this does not 
necessarily change global trait perceptions of the donor; Lin-Healy and Small 2012). In the 
studies where these constructs are measured, we aim to specify in our measurement whether we 
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are asking participants to judge a stable trait (warmth), the motives behind the act (communal 
intent), or the generosity of the act (charitable credit). We also empirically distinguish these 
constructs in all studies in which they are measured via confirmatory factor analyses (all reported 
in appendix A).  
Six studies in the main text, as well as eight additional studies reported in the appendix, 
test key pieces of our conceptual model. Study 1 establishes the relationship between warmth, 
communal intent, and the amount of credit a donor receives, showing that consumers grant more 
charitable credit to high-warmth donors compared to low-warmth donors for unspecified 
donations, even when they perceive the donations to have equal value.  Studies 2A and 2B then 
demonstrate that low-warmth donors receive more credit for donating goods than equivalent 
monetary amounts or unspecified donations, and that this is due to differing perceptions of 
communal intent. Studies 3A and 3B, test the full conceptual model from Step 2 (Figure 1.1), 
finding that donor warmth moderates the increased credit for goods donations compared to 
monetary donations. When low-warmth donors give, they receive more credit for goods 
donations; when high-warmth donors give, they receive high charitable credit for all donation 
types. Finally, in Study 4, we show one way in which low-warmth donors can increase the 
charitable credit they receive for monetary donations (which charities typically prefer): low-
warmth donors can frame their monetary donations communally, specifically, as a gift. Eight 
studies in the Appendix replicate these patterns and rule out alternative explanations. 
Throughout these studies, we test multiple types of goods donations in addition to 
varying donation sizes. We also show this pattern when describing both corporate and individual 
donors. Further, the studies use multiple different manipulations of warmth —by considering 
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both characteristics of firms (caring vs. indifferent) and characteristics of individual donors (high 
vs. low-warmth professions). 
1.3 Study 1: The Impact of Donor Warmth on Charitable 
Credit 
Study 1 tests the relationship predicted by Step 1 of our conceptual model (Figure 1.1). 
We predict that low-warmth donors will be judged to have lower communal intent than high-
warmth donors, and that this will result in less charitable credit for low-warmth (vs. high-
warmth) donors. Previous research finds that for-profit companies tend to be viewed as low- 
warmth (Aaker et al. 2010), and, in this study the low-warmth donor is a for-profit company. 
Nevertheless, within companies judged warmth can still vary substantially, with some companies 
viewed as high-warmth (Kervyn et al. 2012). In the high-warmth condition, we describe the 
same company from the low-warmth condition, but portray the company as particularly high in 
warmth. Because in this study we are most interested in the general relationship between 
warmth, communal intent, and charitable credit, we do not specify donation type, however, 
donation type is a key element that we test in our remaining studies.   
1.3.1  Methods 
 
Pre-test Methods  
For all studies in this article, sample size and exclusion criteria were determined ex ante. 
Based on the exclusion criteria, we analyzed data only from those participants who completed 
the study and passed an instructional attention check designed to identify inattentive participants 
(Goodman, Cryder, and Cheema 2013; Oppenheimer, Meyvis, and Davidenko 2009; appendix B 
for specific checks used in all studies). Following recommendations from Simmons, Nelson, and 
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Simonsohn (2012), we report all data exclusions, all manipulations, and all measures for all 
studies.    
 We first conducted a pre-test in which we recruited 109 Mechanical Turk participants, 91 of 
whom met our inclusion criteria (MAge = 34.89, 52.75% female); nine participants were removed 
for failing to complete the study and nine for failing the attention check. In this pre-test, we 
manipulated donor warmth. In the low-warmth condition, participants read “Spades Hardware is 
a company that sells home improvement goods.” In the high-warmth condition, participants read, 
“Spades Hardware is a friendly company that sells home improvement goods. Spades Hardware 
is always warm and welcoming toward visitors.” Participants then rated the company on the six 
item perceived warmth scale (see correlational study in the introduction) with items presented in 
a randomized order. 
  
Pre-test Results 
The descriptions used in the pre-test successfully manipulated donor warmth. In the high-
warmth condition Spades Hardware was rated as warmer (MHigh-Warmth = 5.98, SD = 0.81) than in 
the low-warmth condition (MLow-Wamrth = 4.53, SD = 1.36, t(89) = 6.14, p < .001, d = 1.30).  
 
Main Study Methods 
We recruited 320 Mechanical Turk participants, 274 of whom met our inclusion criteria 
(MAge = 33.53, 52.31% female); 28 participants were removed for failing to complete the study 
and 18 for failing the attention check. Using the same descriptions of the low- and high-warmth 
companies from our pre-test, participants in both conditions, then read about an unspecified 
donation, specifically that, “This past weekend Spades Hardware made a donation.”  
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In all conditions, participants indicated the charitable credit that they would award to the 
donating company. Specifically, participants were asked, “How favorably do you view Spades 
Hardware on the characteristics below as a result of their donation?” Participants rated to what 
extent they viewed the company as generous, helpful, and charitable as a result of their donation; 
participants also rated how beneficial they believed the company is and to what extent the 
company makes the world a better place as a result of their donation (1 = Not at all, 7 = Very 
much so; all items adapted from Lin-Healy and Small 2012; Newman and Cain 2014; appendix 
B for all measures). Although we originally anticipated that the measures of charitable 
descriptors (generous, helpful, and charitable; Lin-Healy and Small 2012) and charitable benefit 
(how beneficial they believed the donation was and to what extent the donor made the world a 
better place; Newman and Cain 2014) would assess distinct constructs, responses to all items 
loaded onto a single factor that was highly reliable (α = .86). Therefore, we combined all five 
items to create a single and comprehensive “charitable credit” measure, which we use throughout 
the paper.  
To assess mediation of communal intent, we asked participants to rate the donor on the 
extent to which they signaled communal versus exchange-based intentions using the five item 
scale of communal intent described in the correlational study from this article’s introduction (see 
also appendix B). As a manipulation check, participants also rated the donor on trait warmth 
using the six item scale of warmth described in the introduction’s correlational study. 
Importantly, warmth judgments are often at odds with competence judgments; for example, 
while elderly individuals are viewed as high-warmth, they are also seen as low in competence; 
analogously, professionals are stereotyped to be low-warmth, but high in competence (Fiske et 
al. 2002). Additionally, perceived economic wealth correlates negatively with perceived warmth 
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(Cuddy et al. 2008), which may affect judgments of the two donors. We therefore measured both 
competence and perceived wealth in this study to ensure that they did not account for any 
findings. Competence judgments were measured using the competence scale from Fiske et al. 
(2002), which included the following items: competent, confident, capable, efficient, intelligent, 
and skillful (α = .93). We measured perceived wealth by asking, “How wealthy do you think 
Spades Hardware is?” (1=Not at all wealthy, 7=Extremely Wealthy). 
Because the donor was a company, we measured purchase likelihood to gauge 
correspondence between charitable credit and consumer choices. Participants read: “Please rate 
how likely you would be to go to Spades Hardware next time you need home improvement 
goods” (1 = Not at all likely, 7 = Very likely). The order of all dependent measures was 
counterbalanced. 
Finally, as a follow-up measure, we asked participants “How much would you estimate 
Spades Hardware's donation was worth?” to ensure that differences in donation value estimation 
did not account for any findings. Participants could enter any value that they wished. 
Please see appendix A for factor analysis results for measures in all studies. 
1.3.2 Results 
 
Main Study Results 
Warmth Manipulation Check. The manipulation check indicated that our manipulation 
was successful; the high-warmth company was rated as warmer (MHigh-Warmth = 5.79, SD = 0.87) 
than the low-warmth company (MLow-warmth = 4.99, SD = 1.19; t(272) = 6.01, p < .001, d = .73). 
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Charitable Credit. Participants awarded the high-warmth company more charitable credit 
(MHigh-Warmth = 5.54, SD = 0.84) than the low-warmth company (MLow-warmth = 5.21, SD = 1.07; 
t(272) = 2.80, p = .005, d = .32). 
Communal Intent. Participants also perceived the company which was explicitly 
described as warm to have higher communal intent (MHigh-Warmth = 4.71, SD = 1.02) than the low-
warmth company (MLow-warmth = 4.24, SD = 1.09; t(272) = 3.66, p < .001, d = .44). 
Purchase Likelihood. Participants reported greater purchase likelihood for the high-
warmth company (MHigh-warmth = 5.72, SD = 1.04) than for the low-warmth company (MLow-warmth 
= 5.10, SD = 1.35; t(268) = 4.21, p < .001, d = .51).  
 Competence. Participants perceived the high-warmth company as more competent (MHigh-
warmth = 5.37, SD = 1.00) than the low-warmth company (MLow-warmth = 4.94, SD = 1.19; t(272)= 
3.24, p=.001, d = .39). 
Perceived Wealth. We found no difference in wealth perceptions between conditions 
(MHigh-warmth = 5.12, SD = 0.90 vs. MLow-warmth = 5.04, SD = 1.10; t(269)= .65, p =.51). 
Estimated Donation Value. Using free response, participants estimated that the donation 
was worth a median value of $2,000 in both conditions (A Mann-Whitney test indicated that 
there was a non-significant difference between the two conditions; U = 9288.50, Z = - .04, p = 
.97). This implies that the donor warmth manipulation did not influence the perceived value of 
the donation. 
Mediation. The mediation analysis showed that perceptions of communal intent mediated 
the effect of manipulated donor warmth on charitable credit. Using methods prescribed by Hayes 
(2013 – Model 4) we tested the significance of communal (vs. exchange) intent as the mediator 
by calculating standardized indirect effects for 5,000 bootstrapped samples and found that 
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communal intent mediates the effect of donor warmth on charitable credit (Indirect effect = 0.25; 
95% CI [0.11, 0.39]; direct effect = 0.08; 95% CI [-0.11, 0.27]). This pattern remains significant 
when we control for competence and perceived wealth (indirect effect = 0.12; 95% CI [0.02, 
0.23]; direct effect = 0.02; 95% CI [-0.15, 0.19]; figure 1.2). We also find that communal intent 
partially mediated the effect of donor warmth on purchase likelihood (appendix A).  
FIGURE 1.2 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.2: The relationship between donor warmth and charitable credit for an 
unspecified donation, as mediated by communal intent.  
1.3.3 Discussion 
 
Consistent with Step 1 of our conceptual model, this study finds that people ascribe 
charitable credit differently based on who a donor is. In our findings, a high-warmth company 
received greater charitable credit for a donation than a low-warmth company because donations 
from high-warmth donors are viewed as more communal.  
Communal Intent 
Donor 
Warmth 
 
Charitable Credit 
0.33** (0.08) 
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These results set up our following studies, which test Step 2 of our conceptual model 
(Figure 1.1). Specifically, we first test whether goods donations increase the amount of credit 
that a low-warmth donor receives and second, we test how donor warmth interacts with donation 
type to influence the charitable credit a donor receives. 
 
1.4 Study 2A: Corporate Donations of Goods receive more 
Credit 
Study 2A begins to test Step 2 of our conceptual model (Figure 1.1) by testing whether 
consumers judge a low-warmth donor more favorably for a goods donation than for a monetary 
donation. We also include a control condition where the donation type is not specified.  We use 
the same description of a for-profit company from the “low-warmth” condition in Study 1 to 
operationalize a low-warmth donor in this study.  
1.4.1  Methods 
 
We recruited 450 Mechanical Turk participants, 406 of whom met our inclusion criteria 
(MAge = 34.51, 40.25% female); 30 participants were removed for failing to complete the study 
and 14 for failing the attention check. Participants read the same description of the donor from 
the “low-warmth” condition in Study 1: “Spades Hardware is a large corporation that sells home 
improvement goods.” Participants were assigned to one of three conditions: 1) Control condition 
– “This past weekend Spades Hardware donated to a food bank”, 2) Monetary donation 
condition – “This past weekend Spades Hardware donated $2,000 to a food bank”, or 3) Goods 
donation condition – “This past weekend Spades Hardware donated boxes of canned food to a 
food bank. (The donation cost the company $2,000 and it would have cost the food bank the 
19 
 
same amount to obtain those goods).” We did not include a donation value for the control 
condition, due to a concern that mentioning the value would lead participants to assume the 
company made a monetary donation. However, we described the donations in the other 
conditions to be worth $2,000 because that was the median estimated value of the unspecified 
donations in Study 1; we intended this value to approximate estimates of donation value for the 
control condition as well.  
We included information about the cost for the company and value of the donation for the 
food bank in the goods condition to ensure that participants would not assume the actual value 
for the charity was greater than $2,000 when the company donated goods.  
In all conditions, participants rated the company on the five item charitable credit scale.  
As in Study 1, we also measured purchase likelihood and asked participants in the control 
condition, “How much would you estimate Spades Hardware's donation was worth?” 
Participants could enter any value that they wished. Finally, we asked all participants “Who 
would get more canned food for $2,000?” 1) Spades Hardware, 2) The Food Bank, 3) They can 
get the same amount. This question was intended to confirm that participants did not assume that 
the donor could provide greater value by donating goods rather than money. (We note that in this 
initial test of the preference for goods donations from low-warmth donors, we did not measure 
communal intent, but do so in Studies 2B-4). 
1.4.2  Results 
 
Charitable Credit. Planned comparisons showed that participants awarded the company 
more charitable credit for donating goods (MGoods = 5.84, SD = .80) than money (MMoney = 5.48, 
SD = .92; t(270) = 3.48, p = .001, d = .42), or for making an unspecified donation (control 
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condition); MControl = 5.52, SD = .92; t(273) = 3.12, p = .002, d = .38). There was no difference in 
charitable credit between the monetary and unspecified (control) donation condition (t(263) = 
.31, p = .75; Figure 1.3). 
FIGURE 1.3 
STUDY 2A: CHARITABLE CREDIT AS A FUNCTION OF DONATION TYPE  
 
NOTE: Error bars represent standard errors of the mean 
 
Estimated Donation Value. Using free response, participants in the control condition 
estimated that the donation was worth a median value of $1,000. This is lower than the value we 
used for the other two conditions, so as an additional test, we looked at only participants who 
gave estimates in the top 50% (Median = $5,000) and found that this group still rated the 
donating company as marginally significantly less charitable (MControl = 5.62, SD = .86) than 
those in the goods donation condition (MGoods = 5.84, SD = .80; t(206) = 1.86, p =.065), 
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suggesting that lower assumed donation values in the control (unspecified donation) condition do 
not account for the low levels of charitable credit in that condition. 
Purchase Likelihood. Using planned comparisons, we found that participants indicated a 
non-significant, but directionally higher likelihood of purchasing from Spades Hardware when 
they donated goods (MGoods = 5.58, SD = .99) compared to when they donated money (MMoney = 
5.37, SD = .95; t(268)=1.76, p = .079). There was a non-significant difference in purchase 
likelihood between the goods donation and the control (unspecified) donation conditions (MControl 
= 5.46, SD = .93; t(271) = .90, p = .37) and between the monetary and control donation 
conditions (t(263) = .77, p = .44).  
 Donation Value Inferences. As a follow-up measure, participants in all conditions 
responded to the question “Who would be able to get the most canned food for $2,000”. 45.81% 
of participants responded that the food bank would be able to buy more canned food with $2,000 
and 48.28% believed that the food bank and hardware store could acquire the same amount of 
canned food for that amount of cash. Only 5.91% of participants believed that Spades Hardware 
would get the most bang for their buck. These patterns indicate that participants did not rate 
charitable credit higher for goods donations because they thought that the donor was able to 
acquire, and thus donate, more canned food than the charity could buy for the same amount. In 
fact, participants most frequently indicated that the charity could buy as much or more canned 
food as the donor, a pattern that is commonly true in the real world because nonprofits often 
receive discounts on the goods that assist their mission (Conan 2011; White 2015). 
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1.4.3  Discussion 
 
Consistent with our conceptual model, we observe a significant increase in the charitable 
credit that a low-warmth donor receives when donating goods versus money. Further, we 
observe that the boost in charitable credit for goods donations not only occurs in comparison to a 
monetary donation, but also in comparison to an unspecified donation. An additional study 
(appendix C – Study 1) found that while a goods donation from a low-warmth donor garnered 
more charitable credit than a monetary donation, both donations received more credit than a 
control condition in which the company made no donation. These results suggest that, for low-
warmth donors, donating goods results in a unique boost in charitable credit compared to other 
donation types, but that giving money also increases charitable credit compared to making no 
donation at all. In Study 2B, we test whether judgments about the communal nature of a goods 
donation is responsible for greater charitable credit received by low-warmth donors who give 
goods.   
One challenge in designing this study was holding the perceived value of the donations 
equivalent across conditions. Although food banks tend to receive discounts on food products 
(Conan 2011), we were concerned that participants may believe the company could buy these 
goods more cheaply than the food bank, and would therefore think that the value of $2,000 worth 
of goods would be more than $2,000 cash for the food bank. However, the vast majority of 
participants believed the food bank could get the same amount if not more food than the 
hardware store for the amount of money given, yet, we still find the company receives greater 
credit for giving goods rather than their equivalent cash value. As an especially conservative test 
of the image benefits of goods donations (Appendix C, Study 2) we compared three donations in 
a three-cell between-subjects experiment: 1) a monetary donation of $1,000, 2) an equivalent 
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goods donation - $1,000 worth of canned food, and 3) a smaller goods donation - $900 worth of 
canned food. We found that both goods donations received higher charitable credit (and purchase 
likelihood) than the monetary donation, and the two goods donations were perceived as equally 
charitable. These results showed that the charitable credit benefits of goods donations still 
emerge even when the goods donation has a substantially lower value than the monetary 
donation. We conclude that the benefits of goods donations for low-warmth donors cannot be 
explained by higher interpreted financial value of goods donations. 
Moving forward, in all studies, we continue to explicitly state a donation value in the 
goods condition that matches the donation amount in the monetary donation condition. Even 
though mentioning a monetary value has potential to dampen communality effects for goods 
transactions (Heyman and Ariely 2004), it is essential for us to hold donation value constant 
across conditions to ensure greater donation value is not inferred when donors give goods. Please 
also see appendix C, Study 3 for a description of an additional study that replicates these findings 
and compares a monetary donation to two goods donations, one with and one without a monetary 
value. While both goods donations were given more charitable credit than the monetary 
donation, this study finds that the effect is indeed stronger when the monetary value of a goods 
donation is absent.  
1.5 Study 2B: Communal (vs. Exchange) Intentions as 
Mediator 
Study 2B further explores consumer preferences for goods donations by low-warmth 
donors by testing mediating factors. We test whether goods versus monetary donations trigger 
inferences of communal versus exchange-based intentions, resulting in different levels of 
charitable credit.   
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We additionally test two other potential mediators behind the preference for corporate 
goods donations: perceptions of effort and sacrifice. Consumers may reasonably infer that 
companies exert more effort, more sacrifice, or both when donating tangible goods compared to 
simply writing a check to a charity (goods need to be chosen, procured, delivered, etc.). We 
therefore also measure and test perceived effort and sacrifice as potential contributors to the 
greater credit for goods donations by low-warmth donors.  
1.5.1  Methods 
 
For Study 2B, we recruited 240 Mechanical Turk participants, 212 of whom met our 
inclusion criteria (MAge = 32.93, 53.7% female); 17 participants were removed for failing to 
complete the study and 11 for failing the attention check. Participants were randomly assigned to 
either a monetary donation or goods donation condition and read the following scenario: “Spades 
Hardware is a large corporation that sells home improvement goods. This past weekend, Spades 
Hardware made a donation of $1,000,000 ($1,000,000 worth of medical supplies) to 
humanitarian aid efforts.” 
Participants next rated Spades Hardware on the charitable credit items from Study 1 (see 
also appendix B). To measure mediating factors, participants also rated Spades Hardware on the 
five item scale of communal intent described in the correlational study in this article’s 
introduction and Study 1 (see also appendix B). 
We additionally measured perceived effort and sacrifice related to the donation. 
Participants were asked to what extent they agree with the following statements: “Spades 
Hardware put a lot of effort into this donation”, “Spades Hardware worked hard on this 
donation”, and “Spades Hardware put thought into this donation” (Bechwati and Xia 2003). We 
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evaluated perceived sacrifice by asking the extent to which participants agreed that “Spades 
Hardware sacrificed when making this donation” as well as asking “How big was Spades 
Hardware’s sacrifice when making this donation?” While we planned to test effort and sacrifice 
as separate constructs, these two potential mediators loaded onto a single factor that was highly 
reliable (α = .92), and therefore items were combined to create a single effort/sacrifice measure.  
Finally, we measured purchase likelihood by asking participants, “How likely would you 
be to go to Spades Hardware next time you need home improvement goods?” (1 = not at all 
likely, 7 = very likely). 
The order of all dependent measures was counterbalanced. 
 
1.5.2  Results 
Charitable Credit. In line with Study 2A, participants awarded the company more 
charitable credit when the company donated goods rather than money (MGoods = 5.95, SD = .84 
vs. MMoney = 5.65, SD = .90; t(210) = 2.55, p = .01, d = .35).  
Purchase Likelihood. Participants reported a marginally higher likelihood of purchasing 
from the company following a goods donation (MGoods = 5.49, SD = 1.13) rather than a monetary 
donation (MMoney = 5.23, SD = 1.12; t(208) = 1.70, p = .09, d = .24).  
Communal Intent. Participants believed the company signaled communal (vs. exchange) 
intentions to a greater extent when they donated goods (in this case, medical supplies; MGoods = 
4.66, SD = 1.03) rather than money (MMoney = 4.34, SD = 1.23; t(210) = 2.07, p = .04, d = .29). 
Effort/Sacrifice. There was a non-significant difference in perceived effort and sacrifice 
for donations of goods versus money (MGoods = 5.04, SD = 1.36 vs. MMoney = 4.92, SD = 1.43; 
t(210) = .64, p = .52). 
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Mediation. The mediation analysis showed that perceptions of communal intent mediated 
the effect of donation type on charitable credit. Using methods prescribed by Hayes (2013 – 
model 4) we simultaneously tested the significance of both mediators by calculating standardized 
indirect effects for 5,000 bootstrapped samples and found that communal intent mediates the 
effect of donation type on charitable credit (Total indirect effect = 0.19; 95% CI [0.02, 0.36]; 
direct effect = 0.14; 95% CI [-0.04, 0.34]). We found a statistically significant indirect effect of 
perceived communal intent (0.15; 95% CI [0.01, 0.30]). The indirect effect of effort and sacrifice 
was not significant (0.04; 95% CI [-0.09, 0.17]; Figure 1.4). 
FIGURE 1.4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.4: The relationship between donation type and charitable credit for a low-
warmth donor as mediated by communal intent. 
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Charitable Credit 
0.30** (0.14) 
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1.5.3  Discussion 
Results from Study 2B show that differences in perceptions of communal intent based on 
goods versus monetary donations explain the effect of donation type on charitable credit for low-
warmth donors. These results suggest that consumers judge that low-warmth donors who donate 
goods have communal intentions for doing so whereas low-warmth donors who donate money 
have relatively exchange-based intentions for doing so; this communal versus exchange 
signaling in turn influences on the charitable credit received. Perceived effort and sacrifice, 
although almost certainly important in assessments of many donations, did not significantly 
differ due to donation type in this scenario. 
As a robustness check, we replicated these findings in an additional study (appendix C – 
Study 4). Participants imagined that a natural disaster impacted a neighboring town and Spades 
Hardware donated to the relief efforts. Participants read that the store donated either 1) $1,000, 
2) $1,000 worth of food, or 3) $1,000 worth of lumber to the cause; the latter two conditions 
were both included to test whether the “fit” between the donation and the company matters. (For 
Spades Hardware, lumber was pre-tested as a substantially “higher fit” donation than food (p < 
.001)). Once again in this study, companies that donated either type of goods received greater 
charitable credit (MFood = 5.76; MLumber = 5.54) than the company that donated money (MMoney = 
5.19; t(177) = 3.34, p = .001; t(175) = 1.96, p = .05, respectively). There was no significant 
difference between the “high fit” and “low fit” goods conditions for charitable credit received 
(t(178) = 1.46, p = .15)). In this study, both perceived communal intent and sacrifice/effort had 
significant and separate mediating effects; when simultaneously tested in the same mediation 
model, the two mediators fully accounted for the effect of donation type on charitable credit 
(Total indirect effect = 0.16; 95% CI [0.07, 0.26]; direct effect = 0.06; 95% CI [-0.05, 0.17]).  
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We also note that in this follow-up study, we tested a donation that was both relevant to 
the company, and thus potentially higher value to the charity when considering cost of goods 
(lumber from Spades Hardware) and, a donation that was somewhat irrelevant to the company 
and thus little benefit in terms of cost of goods (food from Spades Hardware). The finding that 
consumers considered both types of goods donations to be equally charitable when compared to 
each other, and both more charitable than the monetary donation, lead us to believe that 
consumers are not incorporating potential increases in financial benefit to the charitable cause 
when companies donate wholesale goods.  
Results from Study 2B demonstrate support for the mediating role of communal intent for 
this pattern; in the follow-up study, effort and sacrifice simultaneously mediated the effect of 
donation type on charitable credit alongside communal intent. Taken together, we interpret these 
mediation results to mean that increased perceptions of effort and sacrifice can contribute to 
increased charitable credit for goods donations, however, even when goods donations do not 
increase perceptions of effort and sacrifice (as in the main Study 2B), judgments of communal 
intent can drive the overall effect.  
In addition to providing insight about process, these studies also provide evidence about 
the robustness of the preference for goods donations by low-warmth donors by testing two new 
contexts (humanitarian aid efforts and a sudden disaster) and two new donations (medical 
supplies and lumber). We conclude that the increased credit given to low-warmth donors for 
donations of goods is not limited to a particular type of cause or specific type of goods donation.  
1.6 Studies 3A and 3B: The Interaction of Donor Warmth 
and Donation Type 
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Studies 3A and 3B were designed to test the full conceptual model (Figure 1.1; step 2), 
incorporating the moderating role of warmth in the preference for goods donations. In an early 
study for this project (appendix C – Study 5), we measured perceptions of charitable credit for a 
donation of either money or goods by two types of donors: a low-warmth for-profit company 
(Spades Hardware) and a high-warmth family (the Jones Family). We observed a significant 
interaction between donor warmth and donation type; the (low-warmth) company received more 
credit for a donation of goods than the monetary donation, while the (high-warmth) family 
received more credit for a donation of money. Although these results are consistent with the 
conceptual model, there are many differences between companies and families besides perceived 
warmth. In studies 3A and 3B, we attempt to build on this initial result and more precisely 
manipulate warmth.  
Thus far we have relied on for-profit companies as the operationalization of a low-
warmth donor. In Study 3A, we describe individual donors, and manipulate whether they are 
high- versus low-warmth. Past research shows that certain groups of individuals who tend to be 
viewed as subordinate and noncompetitive, for example elderly individuals and homemakers, 
tend to be viewed as high-warmth (Cuddy et al. 2004). In contrast, those who are high in status 
and/or competitive, for example, educated individuals, tend to be viewed as low-warmth (Fiske 
et al. 2002).  Previous research examines warmth and competence perceptions of individuals in a 
variety of professions and found that people’s perceived warmth varies significantly based on 
their profession (Imhoff et al. 2013). Based on this literature we operationalized a high-warmth 
donor as a nursery school teacher and a low-warmth donor as a corporate manager in Study 3A. 
We hypothesized that, consistent with our conceptual model, low-warmth donors will receive 
more charitable credit for goods donations due to increased perceptions of communal intent 
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whereas high-warmth donors will receive high charitable credit regardless of donation type 
(because of high communal intent inferred across donation type). Because, as in Study 1, the 
high-warmth and low-warmth donors may vary in perceived competence and wealth, we 
measure those factors as well to ensure that they do not account for any findings. 
1.7 Study 3A: The Moderating Role of Warmth – 
Individual Donors 
1.7.1  Methods 
 
Pre-test Methods 
 We recruited 110 Mechanical Turk participants, 105 of whom met our inclusion criteria 
(MAge = 35.63, 50% female); three participants were removed for failing to complete the study 
and two for failing the attention check. In this pre-test, we manipulated donor warmth. In a high-
warmth condition, participants read “Heather is a 41-year-old nursery school teacher.” In the 
low-warmth condition, participants read, “Heather is a 41-year-old corporate manager.” 
Participants were then asked to rate the target on the six item perceived warmth scale 
(correlational study in the introduction) with items presented in a randomized order. 
  
Pre-test Results 
The descriptions in the pre-test successfully manipulated donor warmth. Heather the 
nursery school teacher was rated as significantly warmer (MHigh-Warmth = 5.70, SD = .90) than 
Heather the corporate manager (MLow-Wamrth = 4.30, SD = 1.09, t(103) = 7.15, p < .001, d = 1.40).  
 
Main Study Methods 
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We recruited 675 Mechanical Turk participants, 599 of whom met our inclusion criteria 
(Mage =35.75, 60.77% female); 39 participants were removed for failing to complete the study 
and 37 for failing the attention check.  
As in the pre-test, participants in the high-warmth [low-warmth] condition, read the 
following donor descriptions “Heather is a 41-year-old nursery school teacher [corporate 
manager]. Participants were then informed that this past weekend, Heather contributed either 1) a 
monetary donation – “$100” or 2) a goods donation – “$100 worth of canned food” to her local 
food bank.  
We measured charitable credit, communal intent, perceived effort/sacrifice, and trait 
warmth (as a manipulation check). In addition, due to potential differences in perceived 
competence and wealth for high-warmth and low-warmth donors, we also measured these factors 
to ensure that they did not account for any findings. The order of all dependent measures was 
counterbalanced (appendix B).    
1.7.2 Results 
 
Main Study Results 
Warmth Manipulation Check. The high-warmth individual was perceived as significantly 
warmer (MHigh-Warmth = 6.01, SD = .88) than the low-warmth individual, (MLow-Warmth = 5.58, SD = 
.93; t(596) = 5.78, p < .001, d = .23). Based on a 2 x 2 ANOVA, we found a main effect of the 
warmth manipulation on perceived warmth (F(1, 598) = 33.63, p < .001); donation type did not 
exert a significant main effect on warmth (F(1, 598) = .11, p = .74). We observed a marginally 
significant interaction between donation type and manipulated donor warmth on measured 
warmth (F(1, 598) = 3.67, p = .06; please also see a similar analysis in Study 3B). 
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Charitable Credit. We observed a significant main effect of donor type on charitable 
credit; the high-warmth individual received more charitable credit for her donation than the low-
warmth individual (F(1, 599) = 41.70, p < .001, η2p = .07). Donation type also had a significant 
main effect; donations of goods received more credit than donations of money (F(1, 599) = 5.78, 
p = .017, η2p = .01). Most importantly, the 2 x 2 ANOVA revealed a significant interaction 
between donation type (goods/money) and donor warmth (low-warmth/high-warmth; (F(1, 599) 
= 5.29, p = .022, η2p = .01). Specifically, the low-warmth donor received more charitable credit 
for a goods donation than a monetary donation (MGoods = 5.75, SD = 1.00 vs. MMoney = 5.37, SD = 
1.24; t(304) = -2.96, p = .003 , d = .17). The high-warmth donor, however, received equal (and 
high) credit for both goods and monetary donations (MGoods = 6.09, SD = .98 vs. MMoney = 6.08, 
SD = .85; t(291) = -0.09, p = .93; Figure 1.5).  
FIGURE 1.5 
STUDY 3A: CHARITABLE CREDIT FOR INDIVIDUAL DONORS AS A FUNCTION OF 
DONOR WARMTH AND DONATION TYPE 
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NOTE: Error bars represent standard errors of the mean  
 
Communal Intent. The donor warmth manipulation had a significant main effect on 
communal intent; overall the high-warmth donor’s intent was perceived to be more communal 
than the low-warmth donor’s intent (F(1, 599) = 32.35, p < .001, η2p = .05). Donation type had a 
non-significant main effect; (F(1, 599) = 2.50, p = .11). Further, the 2 x 2 ANOVA revealed a 
marginally significant interaction between donation type (goods/money) and donor warmth (low-
warmth/high-warmth; F(1, 599) = 3.39, p = .066, η2p = .01) on communal intent. For the low-
warmth donor, a goods donation produced significantly higher perceptions of communal intent 
than a monetary donation (MGoods = 5.70, SD = .98 vs. MMoney = 5.42, SD = 1.25; t(304) = -2.20 , 
p = .027, d = .12). There was no difference in perceptions of communal intent by donation type 
for the high-warmth donor (MGoods = 6.05, SD = .90 vs. MMoney = 6.02, SD = .90; t(291) = .21, p = 
.84). 
Effort/Sacrifice. The donor warmth manipulation had a significant main effect on 
perceived effort and sacrifice; overall the high-warmth individual was seen as putting in more 
effort than the low-warmth individual (F(1, 599) = 77.09, p < .001, η2p = .12). Donation type, 
however, did not show a significant main effect; donations of goods and money were viewed as 
equally effortful (F(1, 599) = .26, p = .61). There was a non-significant interaction between 
donation type and donor warmth on effort/sacrifice, (F(1, 599) = 1.97, p = .16). There was no 
significant difference in perceptions of effort and sacrifice by donation type for the low-warmth 
individual (MGoods = 4.43, SD = 1.29 vs. MMoney = 4.25, SD = 1.23; t(304) = -1.26, p = .21), nor 
was there a significant difference in effort perceptions for the high-warmth individual (MGoods 
=5.13, SD = 1.10 vs. MMoney = 5.22, SD = 1.00; t(291) = .70, p = .49).  
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Competence. There was a non-significant main effect of manipulated donor warmth on 
perceived competence (F(1, 596) = 2.61, p = .11) and a non-significant main effect of donation 
type on perceived competence (F(1, 596) = 0.23, p = .63). The interaction between donor 
warmth and donation type on competence was also not significant, (F(1, 596) = .07, p = .79).  
Perceived Wealth. The donor warmth manipulation had a significant main effect on 
perceived wealth; the high-warmth individual was assumed to be less wealthy than the low-
warmth individual (F(1, 579) = 197.60, p < .001, η2p = .26). Donation type also had a significant 
main effect on perceived wealth (F(1, 579) = 6.49, p = .011, η2p = .01). There was a non-
significant interaction between donor warmth and donation type on perceived wealth, (F(1, 579) 
= 1.47, p = .23). 
Moderated Mediation. We conducted a moderated mediation analysis (Hayes 2013-
model 8) to test the predicted relationship of donation type by low or high-warmth donors on 
charitable credit, simultaneously testing both communal intent and effort/sacrifice as mediators. 
We tested the significance of both mediators by calculating standardized indirect effects for 
5,000 bootstrapped samples and found that the model mediates the effect of donation type on 
charitable credit (direct effect = 0.07; 95% CI [-0.01, 0.26]). More specifically, we found that 
donation type produced an indirect effect of communal intent on charitable credit that was 
conditional on individual warmth, but found no indirect effect of effort/sacrifice. As 
hypothesized, inferences about communal intent mediated the effect of donation type on 
charitable credit for the low-warmth individual (indirect effect = 0.12 (95% CI [0.02, 0.26])), but 
not for the high-warmth individual (indirect effect = -0.01 (95% CI [-0.10, 0.08])). Effort and 
sacrifice did not mediate the effect for the low-warmth individual (indirect effect = 0.05, 95% CI 
[-0.03, 0.14]), nor for the high-warmth individual (indirect effect = 0.02, 95% CI [-0.09, 0.04]). 
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The index of moderated mediation was not significant at the 95% level of confidence. However, 
at the 90% level of confidence, the index of moderated mediation was significant for communal 
intent (Index = -.13 (90% CI [-0.27, -0.02]) but not for effort/sacrifice (Index = -.07 (90% CI [-
0.16, 0.01]). We find a similar and significant pattern of results when controlling for both 
competence and perceived wealth (appendix A). Please see table 1 for descriptive results for all 
dependent variables measured in studies 3A and 3B. 
 
TABLE 1.1 
STUDY 3A AND 3B RESULTS 
Study 
3A 
 
Donor 
Warmth 
Condition 
Donation 
Type 
Charitable 
Credit° 
Communal 
Intent° 
Effort/ 
Sacrifice 
 
Warmth Purchase 
Likelihood 
Competence Perceived 
Wealth 
 Low 
Warmth 
Money 
 
5.37  
(1.24) 
5.42  
(1.25) 
4.25  
(1.23) 
5.52  
(.95) 
 5.32  
(.95) 
4.83  
(.85) 
Goods 5.75**  
(1.00) 
5.70*  
(.98) 
4.43  
(1.29) 
5.64  
(.91) 
 5.26  
(1.12) 
4.94  
(.92) 
High 
Warmth 
Money 
 
6.08  
(.85) 
6.05  
(.90) 
5.22  
(1.00) 
6.09  
(.83) 
 5.16  
(1.06) 
3.52 
(1.22) 
Goods 
 
6.09  
(.80) 
6.02  
(.90) 
5.13  
(1.10) 
5.92  
(.92) 
 5.14  
(1.16) 
3.84* 
(1.11) 
Study 
3B 
Donor 
Warmth 
Condition 
Donation 
Type 
Charitable 
Credit° 
Communal 
Intent° 
Effort/ 
Sacrifice° 
 
Warmth Purchase 
Likelihood 
Competence Perceived 
Wealth 
 Low 
Warmth  
Money 
 
4.77  
(1.21) 
4.02  
(1.31) 
3.48 
(1.44) 
3.92 
(1.41) 
4.23 
(1.59) 
  
Goods 5.05†   
(1.23) 
4.37*  
(1.33)  
3.94** 
(1.40) 
4.07 
(1.36) 
4.54† 
(1.49 
  
High 
Warmth 
Money 
 
5.77  
(1.00) 
5.15  
(0.86) 
4.81 
(1.17) 
5.97 
(1.09) 
5.81 
(1.11) 
  
Goods 5.89 
(0.86) 
5.25  
(1.19) 
4.89 
(1.21) 
6.08 
(0.87) 
5.82 
(1.08) 
  
 
† p<.10, *p < .05, **p < .01; these significance notations refer to differences in mean 
evaluations for monetary donations compared to goods donations with standard deviations in 
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parentheses. A° symbol next to the variable name indicates that there is a significant interaction 
between donor warmth and donation type on this variable at a p < .05 level. 
1.7.3 Discussion 
Results from Study 3A replicate the pattern of preferences from Studies 2A and 2B for 
donations of goods, but only when the donor is perceived as low-warmth. In contrast to low-
warmth donors who receive more credit for goods donations, high-warmth donors receive the 
same amount of (high) charitable credit regardless of donation type. This pattern provides insight 
into the role of warmth in the preference for donations of goods (vs. money); when perceived 
warmth is high, communal intentions are assumed and are less likely to fluctuate based on the 
donation’s substance. When perceived warmth is low, however, judgments of communal intent 
are more sensitive to donation type; specifically, low-warmth donors receive a boost in charitable 
credit for goods donations.  
1.8 Study 3A: The Moderating Role of Warmth – 
Corporate Donors 
 
In Study 3B, we aim to replicate the patterns from Study 3A when studying corporate 
donors and using a new, and more direct, manipulation of warmth.  
1.8.1  Methods 
  
Pre-test Methods  
 We first conducted a pre-test in which we recruited 120 Mechanical Turk participants, 
102 of whom met our inclusion criteria (MAge = 34.96, 56% female); 13 participants were 
removed for failing to complete the study and five for failing the attention check. In this pre-test, 
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we manipulated company warmth using a manipulation similar to the one used in Study 1. In a 
high-warmth condition, participants read “Spades Hardware is a small, friendly hardware store 
that is always competent and also warm and welcoming toward visitors.” In the low-warmth 
condition, participants read, “Spades Hardware is a small, corporate hardware store that is 
always competent though also cold and indifferent toward visitors.” Participants then rated the 
company on the six items from the perceived warmth scale used in Study 3A, presented in a 
randomized order. 
  
Pre-test Results  
The descriptions used in the pre-test successfully manipulated donor warmth. The high-
warmth donor was rated as warmer (MHigh-Warmth = 6.07, SD = .94) than the low-warmth donor 
(MLow-Wamrth = 3.42, SD = 1.46, t(99) = 10.69, p < .001, d = 2.15).  
 
Main Study Methods 
For Study 3B, we recruited 615 Mechanical Turk participants, 565 of whom met our 
inclusion criteria (MAge = 35.14, 58% female); 34 participants were removed for failing to 
complete the study and 16 for failing the attention check. The study used a 2 (donor warmth: 
high, low) x 2 (donation type: $1000, canned food worth $1000) between-subjects experimental 
design. For the low-warmth and high-warmth conditions, Spades Hardware was described in the 
same way as in the pre-test. Then, participants were told that the company donated either 
“$1,000” or “canned food worth $1,000” to their local food bank. Participants also rated the 
company on the five item scale of charitable credit to measure how favorably they viewed the 
company after the donation. In addition, participants rated the company on the five item scale of 
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communal intent and the effort/sacrifice scale from Study 2; patterns from these measures are 
reported in Table 1.1. As a manipulation check, trait warmth assessments were again collected. 
Participants also reported purchase likelihood for Spades Hardware. The order of all dependent 
measures was counterbalanced. 
1.8.2  Results 
 
Main Study Results  
Warmth Manipulation Check. The high-warmth company was perceived as warmer 
(MHigh-Warmth = 6.02, SD = .99) than the low-warmth company (MLow-Warmth = 3.99, SD = 1.39; 
t(563) = 20.06, p < .001, d = 1.69). When testing a 2 X 2 ANOVA, we observed a main effect of 
the warmth manipulation on perceived warmth (F(1, 561) = 402.33, p < .001, η2p = .42). Looking 
at additional patterns, we observe that donation type did not have a main effect on measured 
warmth (F(1, 561) = 1.82, p = .18) nor did we observe an interaction between donation type and 
manipulated donor warmth on measured warmth (F(1, 561) = 0.06, p = .80). Similar to Study 
3A, these patterns suggest that the warmth construct is a relatively stable trait that is minimally 
influenced by donation type from any one donation, exhibiting distinct patterns compared to the 
other constructs under study such as communal intent and charitable credit.   
Charitable Credit. The warmth manipulation had a significant main effect; overall the 
high-warmth company received more charitable credit for their donation than the low-warmth 
company (F(1, 563) = 102.2 , p < .001, η2p = .15). Donation type did not show a significant main 
effect (F(1, 561) = 0.66 , p = .42). Most importantly, the 2 x 2 ANOVA revealed a significant 
interaction between donation type (money/goods) and donor image (low-warmth/high-warmth), 
(F(1, 561) = 4.65, p = .03, η2p = .01). In line with the previous findings, when the company was 
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described as low-warmth, they received a marginally significant increase in charitable credit for 
a goods donation (MGoods = 5.05, SD = 1.23) compared to an equivalent monetary donation 
(MMoney = 4.77, SD = 1.21; t(274) = 1.92, p = .056, d = .23). However, when the company was 
described as having a high-warmth image, there was a non-significant difference in charitable 
credit between donation types (MGoods = 5.77, SD = 1.00 vs. MMoney = 5.89, SD = .86; t(287) = -
1.08, p = .28; Figure 1.6).  
FIGURE 1.6 
EXPERIMENT 3B: CHARITABLE CREDIT AS A FUNCTION OF DONOR WARMTH AND 
DONATION TYPE 
 
NOTE: Error bars represent standard errors of the mean 
Communal Intent. The donor manipulation had a significant main effect on communal 
intent; the high-warmth company’s donation was perceived as more communal than the low-
warmth company’s donation (F(1, 561) = 93.86, p < .001, η2p = .14). Donation type also had a 
significant main effect; goods donations were seen as more communal than donations of money 
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(F(1, 561) = 5.03, p = .025, η2p = .01). However, in this study we did not find a significant 
interaction between donation type (money/goods) and donor warmth (low-warmth/high-warmth; 
F(1, 561) = 1.66, p = .198. For the low-warmth company, a donation of goods produced 
significantly higher perceptions of communal intent (MGoods = 4.37, SD = 1.33 vs. MMoney = 4.02, 
SD = 1.31; t(274) = 2.21, p = .028, d = .27). There was no difference in perceptions of communal 
intent by donation type for the high-warmth company (MGoods = 5.25, SD = 1.19 vs. MMoney = 
5.15, SD = 1.12; t(287) = .75, p = .45). 
Effort/Sacrifice. The donor warmth manipulation had a significant main effect on 
perceived effort and sacrifice; the high-warmth company was seen as putting in more effort than 
the low-warmth company (F(1, 561) = 108.70, p < .001, η2p = .16). Furthermore, there was a 
marginally significant main effect of donation type; the donation of goods was viewed as 
marginally more effortful than the donation of money (F(1, 561) = 2.80, p = .095). We also 
observed a significant interaction between donation type and donor warmth (F(1, 561) = 5.90, p 
< .02, η2p = .01). There was a significant difference in perceptions of effort and sacrifice by 
donation type for the low-warmth company (MGoods = 3.94, SD = 1.44 vs. MMoney = 3.48, SD = 
1.39; t(274) = 2.71, p = .007, d = .33), and we did not observe a difference in effort perceptions 
for the high-warmth company (MGoods = 4.81, SD = 1.17 vs. MMoney = 4.89, SD = 1.21; t(287) = 
.55, p = .58). 
Moderated Mediation. We conducted a moderated mediation analysis (Hayes 2013-
model 8) to test the predicted relationship of donation type by low or high-warmth companies on 
charitable credit received, with communal intent and effort/sacrifice simultaneously tested as 
mediators. By calculating standardized indirect effects for 5,000 bootstrapped samples, we found 
an indirect effect of both communal intent and effort/sacrifice conditional on company warmth 
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when tested simultaneously. As hypothesized, inferences about communal intent mediated the 
effect of donation type on charitable credit for the low warmth company (indirect effect = 0.12 
(95% CI [0.02, 0.22])), but not the high-warmth company (indirect effect = 0.03 (95% CI [-0.05, 
0.12])). Likewise, effort and sacrifice mediated the effect for the low-warmth company (indirect 
effect = 0.16 (95% CI [0.05, 0.29])), but not for the high-warmth company (indirect effect = -
0.03 (95% CI [-0.13, 0.07])). The index of moderated mediation was not significant at the 95% 
level of confidence. However, at the 90% level of confidence, the index of moderated mediation 
was significant for both communal intent (Index = -.08 (90% CI [-0.19, -.02]) and for 
effort/sacrifice (Index = -.19 (90% CI [-0.32, -0.06]). 
Purchase Likelihood. A similar, although non-significant pattern emerged for purchase 
likelihood. For the low-warmth company, participants reported a marginally significantly higher 
likelihood of purchasing when they read about a goods donation (MGoods = 4.54, SD = 1.49) than 
a monetary donation (MMoney = 4.23, SD = 1.59; t(274) = 1.66, p = .097), whereas donation type 
had no effect on purchase likelihood for the high-warmth company (MGoods = 5.82, SD = 1.08 vs. 
MMoney= 5.81, SD = 1.11; t(287) = .04, p = .97). While the pattern was consistent with the 
charitable credit dependent variable, the interaction between donation type (goods/money) and 
company image (low-warmth/high-warmth) was not significant (F(1, 561) = 1.80, p = .18). 
1.8.3 Discussion 
 
Results from Study 3B replicate the pattern observed in Study 3A; people prefer 
donations of goods from low-warmth donors, but do not show this preference for high-warmth 
donors. Judgments of communal intentions mediate this pattern, and in this study, effort and 
sacrifice also simultaneously mediated this effect.  
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In two additional studies (for full results see appendix C – Studies 6 and 7), we replicate 
these patterns. In appendix study 6, we manipulate perceived warmth by using two real-world 
companies: a company that is perceived as relatively low in warmth, Pepsi Co., and a company 
selling similar products that is perceived as relatively high-warmth, Bolthouse Farms. In this 
study, there was a significant interaction between donor warmth and donation type on charitable 
credit (F(1, 471) = 6.50, p = .01, η2p = .02). Pepsi (low-warmth) received more charitable credit 
(measured on a 1-5 scale in this study) when donating goods compared to money (MGoods = 3.41, 
SD = 0.87, MMoney = 3.05, SD = .95; t(226) = 2.98, p =.002, d = .40), whereas Bolthouse Farms 
(high-warmth) received equal (high) amounts of charitable credit for both donation types (MGoods 
= 3.97, SD = 0.74 vs. MMoney = 3.98, SD = .67; t(246) = .20, p = .84). We found the same pattern 
for purchase likelihood. 
Due to the many potential differences besides perceived warmth between the individuals 
in Study 3A (nursery school teacher and corporate manager), in appendix study 7, we also tested 
an additional manipulation of warmth that described an individual donor as warm versus cold (in 
a manipulation similar to Study 3B). We found the same pattern of results using this 
manipulation. There was a significant interaction between donor warmth and donation type on 
charitable credit (F(1, 718) = 4.95, p < .03, η2p = .01). The low-warmth individual received more 
charitable credit when donating goods compared to money (MGoods = 5.28, SD = .97 vs. MMoney = 
4.91, SD = 1.09; t(351) = 3.32, p < .001, d = .35). The high-warmth individual donor, however, 
received equal (high) credit for donations of money and goods (MGoods = 6.10, SD = .72 vs. 
MMoney = 6.02, SD = 0.72; t(367) = .94, p = .35). 
Studies 3A and 3B and their replication studies show that when a donor is viewed as low-
warmth, they receive more charitable credit for a goods donation than for equivalent monetary 
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donations. However, donors who are seen as high in warmth do not show this effect; they receive 
equal (and high) charitable credit for donations of money or goods. This pattern fits with the 
notion that judgments of warmth are used to predict intentions, with greater warmth indicating 
that an actor has better, or more communal, intentions (Fiske et al. 2002). When warmth is low, 
goods donations can send an additional signal of communal intent, boosting charitable credit 
received.  
 
1.9 Study 4: Monetary Donations can be Communal 
The preference for goods donations from low-warmth donors documented in Studies 1-
3B is somewhat unfortunate because for many charities, monetary donations are superior to 
equivalent in-kind or goods donations. Monetary contributions are typically preferred because 
cash donations provide charities with the flexibility to purchase exactly what they need when 
they need it, reducing waste from unneeded or untimely goods donations (Charity Navigator 
2017; Conan 2011; USAID 2017).  
In Study 4, we test whether framing a monetary donation as communal increases 
charitable credit for low-warmth donors in an analogous way to goods donations.  We 
specifically test whether framing a monetary donation as a gift increases perceptions of 
communal intent, and subsequently, charitable credit.  As opposed to other commodity 
exchanges, gifting is valued as a symbolic gesture of caring and commitment (Belk and Coon 
1993). If money can be described as a gift in a compelling way, it has the potential to be seen as 
more communal and creditworthy. 
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1.9.1 Methods 
 
 We recruited 650 Mechanical Turk participants, 567 of whom met our inclusion criteria 
(MAge = 34.24, 61.85% female); 56 participants were removed for failing to complete the study 
and 27 for failing the attention check. The study included a 2(Donation type: Goods vs. Money) 
x 2(Communal frame: Control vs. Communal (Gift)) between-subjects experimental design. In 
all conditions, participants read about the low-warmth donor Spades Hardware. They read that 
“Spades Hardware is a large corporation that sells home improvement goods.” They then read 
either 1) Money condition – “This past weekend, Spades Hardware donated $10,000 to a 
humanitarian aid charity. (The charity purchased medical supplies with the $10,000)” or 2) 
Goods condition – “This past weekend, Spades Hardware donated medical supplies (worth a 
total of $10,000) to a humanitarian aid charity.” In the communal frame conditions, participants 
also read that “The company carefully packaged the gift of $10,000 [medical supplies] and hand-
delivered it.” (We note that in this study, even in the monetary donation conditions we explained 
that the donation was ultimately used for medical supplies to hold information about donation 
use constant across conditions). 
We measured charitable credit, purchase likelihood, warmth, communal intent, and 
effort/sacrifice. The order of all measures was counterbalanced.   
 
1.9.2 Results 
  
Charitable Credit. The framing manipulation had a significant main effect; the company 
whose donation was framed as a gift received more charitable credit than did the company whose 
donation was not framed as a gift (F(1, 562) = 7.65, p < .01, η2p = .01). There was also a 
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significant main effect for donation type; goods donations increased charitable credit (F(1, 562) 
= 6.81 , p < .01, η2p = .01). Most importantly, the 2 x 2 analysis of variance revealed a significant 
interaction between donation type (goods/money) and the communal frame, (F(1, 562) = 18.01, 
p < .001, η2p = .03). In the control condition, the low-warmth donor received more charitable 
credit for a goods donation (MGoods = 5.85, SD = .65) than an equivalent monetary donation 
(MMoney = 4.36, SD = .85; t(277) = 5.33, p < .001, d = .64). However, when the donation was 
framed communally, the low-warmth donor received equal credit for both donation types (MGoods 
= 5.73, SD = .95 vs. MMoney = 5.86, SD = .84; t(285) = 1.20, p = .23; Figure 1.7).  
FIGURE 1.7 
 
EXPERIMENT 4: CHARITABLE CREDIT AS A FUNCTION OF COMMUNAL FRAMING 
AND DONATION TYPE 
 
NOTE: Error bars represent standard errors of the mean 
Communal Intent. The communal frame had a significant main effect on communal 
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condition counterpart (F(1, 561) = 23.36, p < .001, η2p = .04). Donation type had a marginally 
significant effect; goods donations were seen as marginally more communal than donations of 
money (F(1, 561) = 2.91, p = .09, η2p = .01). There was also a significant interaction between 
donation type (goods/money) and the communal frame (F(1, 561) = 4.05, p < .05, η2p = .01). In 
the control frame, a donation of goods versus money produced significantly higher perceptions 
of communal intent (MGoods = 4.72, SD = .88 vs. MMoney = 4.39, SD = 1.02; t(275) = 2.94, p < .01, 
d = .35). There was no difference in perceptions of communal intent in the communal frame 
condition (MGoods = 4.97, SD = 1.19 vs. MMoney = 4.99, SD = 1.13; t(286) = -.18, p = .86). 
Effort/Sacrifice. The gift-giving manipulation had a significant main effect on perceived 
effort and sacrifice; the communal frame increased perceptions of effort and sacrifice compared 
to the control frame (F(1, 560) = 18.78, p < .001, η2p = .03). Donation type also showed a 
significant main effect; donations of goods were viewed as more effortful (F(1, 560) = 5.28, p = 
.022, η2p = .01). However, we did not observe a significant interaction between donation type and 
the communal frame (F(1, 560) = .13, p = .72). There was no difference in perceptions of effort 
and sacrifice by donation type for the control condition (MGoods = 4.67, SD = .99 vs. MMoney = 
4.49, SD = 1.11; t(275) = 1.44, p = .15), and there was a marginally significant difference in 
effort perceptions for the communal-frame (gift) condition (MGoods = 5.10, SD = 1.16 vs. MMoney 
= 4.86, SD = 1.21; t(285) = 1.71, p = .09). 
Purchase Likelihood. There was a significant main effect of the donor manipulation on 
purchase likelihood; overall participants were more likely to purchase from the company whose 
donation was framed communally (F(1, 555) = 4.60, p =.03, η2p = .01). Donation type also had a 
significant main effect; donations of goods led to higher purchase likelihood (F(1, 555) = 7.24, p 
< .01, η2p = .01). There was a marginally significant interaction between donation type and the 
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gift-giving manipulation on purchase likelihood (F(1, 555) = 3.53, p = .06, η2p = .01). In the 
control frame condition, participants were more likely to purchase from Spades Hardware after a 
donation of goods (MGoods = 5.60, SD = .91) versus money (MMoney = 5.20, SD = 1.05; t(271) = 
3.40, p < .001, d = .41). By contrast, in the communal frame condition, we found no difference in 
purchase intentions based on donation type (MGoods = 5.60, SD = 1.06 vs. MMoney= 5.56, SD = 
1.11; t(284) = .30, p = .76). 
Measured Warmth. We found a main effect of the communal frame on perceived warmth 
(F(1, 566) = 15.02, p < .001, η2p = .03), but a non-significant main effect of donation type on 
warmth (F(1, 566) = .167, p = .68). There was no significant interaction between communal 
framing and donation type on measured warmth (F(1, 566) = 1.96, p = .16).  
Moderated Mediation. We conducted a moderated mediation analysis (Hayes 2013-
model 8) to test the predicted relationship of donation type by companies who do or do not hand-
deliver their gifts on charitable credit received, with communal intent and effort/sacrifice as 
mediators. We simultaneously tested the significance of both mediators by calculating 
standardized indirect effects for 5,000 bootstrapped samples and found that the model mediates 
the effect of donation type on charitable credit (Direct effect = 0.08; 95% CI [-0.04, 0.20]). We 
found that donation type produced an indirect effect of communal intent conditional on 
communal frame. As hypothesized, inferences about communal intent mediated the effect of 
donation type on charitable credit for the control condition (indirect effect = 0.09 (95% CI [0.03, 
0.16])), but not for the communal-frame (gift) condition (indirect effect = -0.01 (95% CI [-0.09, 
0.06])). Effort and sacrifice did not mediate the effect for the control condition (indirect effect = 
0.05 (95% CI [-0.02, 0.12])), nor for the gift condition (indirect effect = 0.07 (95% CI [-0.004, 
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0.14])).  The index of moderated mediation was significant for communal intent (Index = -.10 
(95% CI [-0.21, -0.01]), but not significant for effort/sacrifice (Index = .02 (95% CI [-0.09, 0.11]. 
1.9.3 Discussion 
 
In Study 4, we found once again that a low-warmth donor (Spades Hardware) received 
more credit for a donation of goods than a donation of money. However, when the donations 
were framed as communal (i.e., a gift), both donations were perceived to be motivated by 
communal intentions and therefore creditworthy. By increasing the perceived communality of 
the monetary donation, the low-warmth donor was able to receive high levels of charitable credit 
for making a cash donation.   
 
1.10 General Discussion 
This research finds that donors receive charitable credit based on who they are and what 
they give. High-warmth donors often receive more credit for being generous than low-warmth 
donors. However, low-warmth donors can boost the charitable credit they receive by donating 
goods. This article documents a novel interaction between donor traits (high- vs. low-warmth) 
and donation types (goods vs. money) and is among the first to study goods donations. 
 Across our studies, when low-warmth donors give goods, their intentions are presumed to 
be more communal, or other-oriented, than when they donate equivalent monetary amounts (or 
make an unspecified donation, e.g., Study 2A). This inference about increased communal intent 
boosts charitable credit, and for corporate donors, can have a positive impact on purchase 
intentions as well. High-warmth donors, on the other hand, receive equal and high credit for 
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either type of donation. Because high-warmth donors are presumed to have good intentions, any 
act of giving is consistent with those prior assumptions.  
Throughout, we additionally tested a potential role of effort and sacrifice in driving the 
preference for goods donations from low-warmth donors with the rationale that consumers may 
infer that donors spend more energy procuring and donating tangible goods than simply writing a 
check. But, while perceptions of effort and sacrifice are sometimes important for influencing 
charitable credit, in this context, they do not appear necessary for the preference for goods 
donations to occur (e.g., studies 2B, 3A, and 4). 
 The conceptualization that trait warmth triggers strong assumptions about the nature of a 
donor’s intent generates numerous predictions about the level of credit donors will receive. For 
example, although we did not find a consistent effect of donation type on effort perceptions, 
donation effort likely has independent effects on charitable credit when varied through other 
means. If people assume that high-warmth donors have good intentions, then, similar to donation 
type, donation effort may minimally impact charitable credit for high-warmth donors; high-
warmth donors are likely to receive high levels of charitable credit for any magnitude of 
donation effort. In contrast, low-warmth donors, whose intentions are more subject to skepticism, 
may receive minimal credit for a low-effort donation, but receive more credit for sending a 
stronger signal of good intentions via a high-effort donation.  
These predictions are analogous to other findings in the literature in which individuals 
with different traits are judged differently for the same act. For example, prior research finds that 
donors with good reputations (i.e., social workers) are viewed as equally altruistic whether they 
brag about their good deed or not, whereas donors with less altruistic reputations (i.e., investment 
bankers) are viewed as even less altruistic when they brag about a good deed (Berman et al. 
50 
 
2015, study 2). Future research should further examine these and related patterns regarding 
donor warmth and assumptions about communal intent. 
 Throughout our studies, we find that when low-warmth donors donate goods, they are 
viewed as having greater communal intent and receive greater charitable credit, however, goods 
donations do not similarly improve judgments of warmth. This pattern fits with the notion that 
warmth is a stable construct that varies minimally due to subtle changes or contextual factors 
(Kenworthy and Tausch 2008). We do predict, however, that consistently donating goods and/or 
sending other sustained signals of communal intent may improve perceptions of a donor’s trait 
warmth over time.  
 One interesting, and perplexing, implication of the current findings is that for image 
reasons, low-warmth donors may benefit from donating goods rather than money, even though 
charities can often do more good with monetary donations (Conan 2011; USAID 2017). In fact, 
in appendix C – study 8, we find that participants appear aware that nonprofits generally prefer 
monetary donations, and yet we still frequently find more favorable evaluations of donors who 
make goods donations. For low-warmth donors, such as most for-profit companies, who wish to 
maximize both their impact and credit received, we propose two potential solutions. First, as in 
Study 4, low-warmth donors can describe a monetary donation as a gift, and thus frame it more 
communally. Alternatively, low-warmth donors can coordinate closely with charities to identify 
their most pressing tangible needs, and fund those needs quickly and directly via goods 
donations. Indeed, working closely with nonprofits to identify and meet their greatest needs may 
serve as an additional signal to consumers of a donor’s communal intentions. 
In summary, despite the fact that monetary donations are the most frequent donation type 
(usa.gov 2012), and the type that charities often prefer, we find that low-warmth donors who 
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donate goods receive more credit for their generosity than those who make equivalent monetary 
donations. We conclude that low-warmth donors aiming to maximize both charitable credit and 
actual impact may benefit from spending their philanthropic funds on donations of goods that are 
coordinated with a charity’s needs, or alternatively, describing a monetary donation communally. 
Future research should continue to explore our differing judgments of low-warmth versus high-
warmth donors and the implications for charitable credit and sustained giving. 
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Chapter 2: Why Prosocial Referral 
Incentives Work: Reputational Benefits 
versus Action Costs 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
From evolutionary biology to neoclassical economics, many theories of human behavior 
posit that humans are driven primarily by self-interest. The most effective incentives should 
therefore be those that maximize material payoff to the decision maker. Indeed, self-benefiting 
incentives outperform prosocial (or “other-benefiting”) incentives in many contexts: for most 
reward magnitudes people exert more effort when offered selfish incentives compared to 
prosocial incentives that go to charity (DellaVigna and Pope 2016; Imas 2014; Schwartz, 
Keenan, Imas, and Gneezy, 2018).  
However, people also frequently display significant other-regarding behavior. In dictator 
games, even when there is no consequence for selfish behavior, people share on average about 
25% of a given endowment (Forsythe et al. 1994). Consumers often pay more for charity-linked 
products (Elfenbein and McManus 2010; Jung et al. 2017), or choose brands that make a 
donation over those that provide equivalent discounts (Strahilevitz 1999).  
A desire to appear generous to others is one important driver of such prosocial acts. When 
generous behavior is public, people are more likely to give than when it is private (Andreoni and 
Petrie 2004; Bereczkei, Birkas, and Kerekes 2007) and anonymous donations are rare (Glazer 
and Konrad 1996). Reputational benefits for generous behavior have the potential to loom largest 
within one’s social network. People are more generous in contexts involving their close social 
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connections (Moore 2009; Small and Simonsohn 2007) potentially in part because reputation 
matters most to those who know you well.  
In this project, we examine how reputational concerns alter the dynamics of incentivized 
behavior. For important theoretical reasons, academic research typically examines prosocial 
incentives by offering rewards that aid anonymous individuals or charities (DellaVigna and Pope 
2016; Eckel and Grossman 1996; Imas 2014; Yang, Hsee, and Urminsky 2014). However, when 
people consider prosocial acts in the real world, the benefits often go to people whom they know. 
In this research, we propose that incorporating reputational concerns into the context of incentive 
design substantially alters behavior, and does so in ways that are not obvious to incentive 
architects. Specifically, we examine the context of customer referral programs where companies 
incentivize customers to refer others to become new customers.    
 
2.2 Conceptual Background  
2.2.1  Customer Referral Incentives 
We study the role of reputational concerns in incentivized behavior within the context of 
customer referrals. In referral programs, companies typically offer incentives to existing 
customers for recruiting new customers. For example, Google Apps currently offers $15 to 
customers for each new user they recruit, and the videogame World of Warcraft offers current 
users a free month of gaming if they successfully refer their friends to buy a subscription (Gains 
2017). Referral programs can be a cost-efficient method for gaining new customers (Ryu and 
Feik 2007; Schmitt, Skiera, and Van den Bulte 2011); referral programs not only recruit new 
customers, but referred customers tend to be of value because they feel greater trust and a 
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stronger bond with firms when a friend or acquaintance is already a customer (Castilla 2005; 
Fernandez, Castilla, and Moore 2000; Schmitt et al. 2011).  
A critical feature to consider when creating referral incentive programs is that a new 
customer conversion involves two separate decisions: the referral decision and the uptake 
decision. Sender-benefiting incentives may appear superior because they directly incentivize the 
first decision-maker, and the process has no chance to begin if there is no referral (Bapna et al. 
2014). Indeed, many firms focus on this feature. We asked a hypothesis-blind research assistant 
to first, find 300 current referral incentive programs online and then, to categorize them based on 
how the incentive was designed (who received the reward). This research assistant documented 
351 existing referral incentive programs with the following breakdown: 40.5% offered sender-
benefiting referrals while only 2.6% offered recipient-benefiting referrals (55% offered rewards 
that were shared between the referrer and recipient). Note: while we are primarily interested in 
comparing the recipient-benefiting and sender-benefiting incentives, because they offer a clean 
conceptual separation, we also test the effectiveness of the shared incentive in two of our studies 
due to the popularity of this incentive in the marketplace. Past work on referral incentives 
provides further evidence that marketers tend to predict that fully recipient-benefiting referral 
incentives will be ineffective. For example, Hong et al. (2017) compared fair incentives ($5 for 
both referrer and recipient) to unfair incentives ($7/$3) or ($3/$7) in a field experiment with a 
corporate partner. They explained this choice, stating, “We used (7, 3), (3, 7) split because we 
wanted to test a bonus split that is practically relevant and is likely to be used by firms in 
practice. The corporate sponsor stated that the (0, 10), (10, 0) split would be extremely harsh on 
both sides and will be unlikely to be accepted by the responder and even to be spent by the 
proposer” (Hong et al, 2017, p. 797).  
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The current popularity of sender-benefiting referral programs indicates that incentive 
architects tend to focus heavily on encouraging current customers to refer. However, we posit 
that this strategy ignores two critical facets of the psychology of incentive design and prosocial 
behavior. First, people care about their reputation (Fehr 2004); thus, recipient-benefiting 
referrals, in providing the recipient an opportunity to earn something of value, may confer 
reputational benefits to the referrer – a benefit that sender-benefiting referrals do not confer upon 
the referrer. Second, action costs matter; all else equal, relative to un-incentivized behavior 
change, incentives are particularly effective at prompting action when behavior change is 
difficult (i.e., by increasing the impetus to shift behavior). We show that recipient-benefiting 
referral programs, because they address these two important aspects of the psychology of 
incentives and prosocial behavior, can outperform sender-benefiting referral programs. In the 
following sections, we develop our theory through a review of prior research. We then outline 
our predictions and provide an overview of our empirical work.  
2.2.2  Prosocial Incentives Offer Reputational Benefits 
 
There are numerous examples of self-benefiting financial incentives that effectively motivate 
behavior. Self-benefiting financial incentives increase gym attendance (Acland and Levy 2015), 
improve immunization coverage (Banerjee et al. 2010), and motivate weight loss (John et al. 
2011). In direct comparisons, selfish incentives (particularly those above $2) more effectively 
motivate effort than equivalent prosocial incentives that benefit charity (Imas 2014; Schwartz et 
al. 2018). Similarly, people report greater happiness when they receive a selfish incentive 
compared to when an equivalent donation is made in their name (i.e., when they receive a 
prosocial incentive; Berman and Small 2012). 
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However, as Miller (1999) states, “Homo economicus, it should not be forgotten, inhabits a 
social world.” When people behave generously, they may sacrifice at a material level, but they 
often receive social rewards in return such as higher status or respect (Berman et al. 2015; Flynn 
2003; Flynn et al. 2006; Price 2006). Reputational rewards motivate people to behave generously 
due to a strong desire for social approval (Ariely, Bracha, and Meier 2009; Grant and Gino 2010) 
and a fundamental human need to belong and maintain close personal relationships (Baumeister 
and Leary 1995). Considerable experimental evidence suggests that prosocial behavior is 
frequently driven by such reputational concerns (Fehr and Fichbacher 2002). For example, 
generosity increases when donors are promised recognition for their contributions (Alpizar, 
Carlsson, and Johansson-Stenman 2008; Andreoni and Petrie 2004; Fisher and Ackerman 1997; 
Lacetera and Macis 2010), potentially explaining why anonymous donations are rare (Glazer and 
Konrad 1996). Church donations increase when anonymity is reduced (and reputational benefits 
are enhanced), such as when closed donation bags are replaced with open baskets (Soetevent 
2005). In a related vein, charitable appeals that emphasize benefits to others are more effective 
when concerns about one’s reputation are high (White and Peloza 2009).   
Reputational benefits for prosociality are likely to be especially strong motivators in contexts 
where people interact with members of their social network. Indeed, people tend to be more 
motivated to help friends than strangers (Moore 2009; Schlenker and Britt 1999). For example, 
on online dictator games involving participants’ social networks, adult participants sent 
significantly more money to their close friends than to strangers (Leider et al. 2009). Individuals 
are also more likely to be generous (e.g., volunteer) for a cause when they have a close personal 
relationship with someone affected by that cause (Small and Simonsohn 2008). Even young 
children are willing to sacrifice (receive one sticker instead of two) to benefit a friend, but will 
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not similarly sacrifice to benefit a stranger (Moore 2009; see also Fehr, Bernhard, and 
Rockenbach 2008). While their motives may not be purely altruistic – people expect a benefit, 
though it is reputational rather than material – the outcome is other-benefiting behavior 
nonetheless. Because people care deeply about the judgments of those with whom they have 
personal relationships, prosocial incentives have the potential to perform well when offered 
within customer referral programs. 
2.2.3  Prosocial Referral Incentives address Action Costs where they are 
Highest 
An important feature of the two-step referral process is that there tends to be an asymmetry in 
action costs between the referrer and the recipient. We define action costs as the monetary or 
non-monetary (i.e., effort or time) cost necessary to comply with the task that the marketer is 
requesting of you at the given stage of the referral. For the referrer, this is the cost of making the 
referral; and for the recipient it is the cost of following through on the referral. The act of 
referring tends to be low effort and low cost: the referrer simply sends their friend a code or 
submits an email address. Recipients, however, tend to incur higher burdens; to complete a 
referral, recipients must spend money on a product, download an app, or join a service (and 
receive the accompanying e-mails, notifications, etc.; see Figure 2.1). 
FIGURE 2.1: REFERRAL PROCESS 
 
 
This difference in action costs has implications for how referral programs perform at the two 
decision stages in the referral process. Logically, the incentive structure of a referral program is 
Referral Choice 
(low action costs) 
Recipient Uptake 
(high action costs) 
Successful 
Conversions + = 
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likely to affect the extent to which referrers and recipients a) anticipate reputational benefits, as 
well as b) are directly incented to act. Specifically, in recipient-benefiting referral programs, 
referrers may anticipate the recipients to be pleased with them for providing the opportunity to 
obtain a reward. Likewise, in sender-benefiting referral programs, recipients may anticipate the 
referrer to be pleased with them for following through on the referral (thereby enabling the 
referrer to realize the reward). However, in sender-benefiting referral programs, these anticipated 
reputational benefits may be insufficient to overcome the substantial action costs faced by the 
recipient. As a result, sender-benefiting referral programs may be ineffective at spurring uptake. 
By the same logic, recipient-benefiting referrals may be effective at spurring uptake, because by 
directly incenting uptake, they offer recipients sufficient incentive to act.  
 
2.2.4  The Current Research 
While selfish incentives have proven highly effective at motivating behavior across many 
contexts, we predict that offering referrers a prosocial incentive (i.e., recipient-benefiting 
referrals) will result in more new customers than offer referrers a selfish benefit (i.e., sender-
benefiting referrals). We predict this pattern because: 1) at the referral stage, the cost of action is 
low and customers who refer friends receive reputational benefits when making recipient-
benefiting referrals, and 2) at the uptake stage, the cost of action is relatively high; therefore, 
referral recipients will be more likely to require a direct incentive to follow through. We posit 
that both reputational benefits and action costs affect incentivized behavior, such that referrals 
designed to incentivize the recipient will result in the greatest number of new customers.  
Indeed, recently published work provides suggestive evidence that recipient-benefiting 
referrals can result in more new customer conversions relative to sender-benefiting referrals 
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(Hong, Pavlou, Shi, & Wang, 2017; Bapna, Gupta, & Sen, 2014) – suggestive, as opposed to 
definitive, because in these studies, it is unclear whether the effect is a result of the incentive 
structure or selection effects. In the present paper, we show that the effect holds when 
randomizing participants to role (i.e., either referrer or recipient), documenting that indeed the 
division of referral incentives – to sender versus recipient – impacts their effectiveness.  
However, our primary contribution is in providing a comprehensive account of when and 
why these recipient-benefiting referral programs outperform those that benefit the sender. Up 
until now, researchers have not uncovered an explanation for why, in this particular context, 
prosocial incentives are superior to selfish incentives. The only published demonstrations of the 
superiority of recipient-benefiting referral programs have been outcome-focused – either 
assessing the effectiveness of recipient-benefiting programs at the referral stage (Ryu & Feick, 
2007), or only testing the conversion rate of these programs (i.e., the number of new customers; 
Hong et al., 2017; Bapna et al., 2014) – stopping short of testing why these effects occur. In 
addressing both steps in the referral process – i.e., the referral stage and the uptake stage – we are 
equipped to address this knowledge gap. Specifically, we provide an account of when and why 
recipient benefiting referral programs outperform sender-benefiting programs by examining both 
stages of the referral process, which invoke two countervailing forces: reputational benefits 
versus action costs. As such, we add to scholarly research, offering a comprehensive account of 
seemingly disparate findings in the emergent literature of customer referral programs, as well as 
the literature on prosocial behavior and incentive design more generally. Importantly, we also 
contribute to marketing practice, by offering evidence-based guidance on how marketers should 
structure their referral reward programs for maximal impact. 
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We test our account in eight studies (plus five additional studies in the appendix). The 
first three studies document the basic effect. Study 1 is a field experiment with a phone app 
company that varies incentive structure and measures new customer conversions. Recipient-
benefiting referrals recruited more new customers relative to sender-benefiting referrals. Study 2 
is another field experiment, this time with a video game rental company. Study 2 replicates the 
findings from Study 1 and also tracks behavior at each decision stage (both referral and uptake 
stages), showing that recipient-benefiting incentives perform as well as sender-benefiting 
incentives at the referral stage, and prosocial referrals (recipient-benefiting) substantially 
outperform selfish referrals (sender-benefiting) at the uptake stage. Study 3 examines the full 
referral process with participants randomly assigned to either the referrer or recipient role and 
begins to establish the role of asymmetric action costs in our process account. Five subsequent 
experiments focus on explaining when and why recipient-benefiting referrals outperform sender-
benefiting referrals. Studies 4A – 4C focus on the first stage in the process – where action costs 
are typically low – indicating that recipient-benefiting programs lead referrers to anticipate 
reputational benefits, in turn spurring them to act (i.e., to refer people). Studies 5A and 5B 
incorporate action costs, demonstrating that when action costs are low (as is typical in the 
referral stage), other-benefiting incentives are just as effective as self-benefiting incentives. 
However, when action costs are high (as is typical at the uptake stage), participants are more 
likely to act when they receive a direct incentive. 
Following recommendations from Simmons, Nelson, and Simonsohn (2012), we report 
all manipulations, all measures, and all data exclusion criteria for all studies.  
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2.3 Study 1: Recipient-Benefiting Referrals Increase 
Conversions 
 
Study 1 is a field experiment with a startup company called GiftAMeal that offers a food 
photo-sharing phone app. In this experiment, we test how various incentive structures influence 
new customer conversions.  
2.3.1  Methods  
The company e-mailed 6,364 current customers, asking if each customer would refer 
their friends to download the app. Customers were randomly assigned to one of four 
experimental conditions: 1) control: no monetary incentive2, 2) sender-benefiting: customers 
received a $5 Amazon gift card for each friend who downloaded the app, 3) recipient-benefiting: 
referred friends received a $5 gift card if they downloaded the app, 4) shared: referrer and their 
friend each received a $2.50 gift card if the friend downloaded the app or 5) donation: 
GiftAMeal donated $5 to Feeding America for each download.  
Current customers received a unique promotional code, which they could send to their 
friends. All emails additionally offered a suggestion for what customers could email or text their 
friends when sending the referral (for full emails in all conditions, see Appendix A), however the 
company does not track individual choices (whether a given consumer chooses to refer or 
follow-through on a referral). The promotion lasted two weeks, during which time referred 
individuals could download the app using their friend’s code. In this study, the company tracked 
new customer downloads by condition (i.e., conversions). The “conversion rate” in this, and 
                                                 
2 While there was no monetary incentive, in the control condition, the company donated a meal 
to a family in need. This is their standard reward for referrals.  
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future studies, describes the number of new customers as a percentage of the emails sent in that 
condition – or in other words, how many new customers did the company get by sending N 
original emails (if they send 100 emails and get 5 new customers, this would be a 5% conversion 
rate).  
2.3.2  Results 
Table 2.1 summarizes the results. Overall, the new customer conversion rate (i.e., 
percentage of new customers based on total referral emails sent) was low (less than 1% overall), 
not uncommon in field settings. Nevertheless, we detected significant differences between 
experimental conditions. Referrals were more successful (resulted in a higher new customer 
conversion rate) when the company offered a recipient-benefiting incentive (.94% conversion 
rate) than when they were offered no incentive (.08% conversion rate; χ2 (1) = 9.41, p =.002), or 
when they were offered a donation incentive; (.08%; χ2 (1) = 9.29, p = .002). The recipient-
benefiting referral also had a marginally significant advantage over the sender-benefiting referral 
(.39%; χ2 (1) = 2.92, p = .09). There was no difference in the conversion rate between the 
recipient-benefiting and shared referral conditions (.94%; χ2 (1) = .002, p = .99). Finally, the 
sender-benefiting referral performed marginally significantly better than the control condition (χ2 
(1) = 2.69, p = .10). 
TABLE 2.1: SUMMARY RESULTS OF ALL STUDIES 
Study # Study Type Experimental  
Conditions 
% Referral 
Choice 
% Uptake Choice % New Customer 
Conversions 
Study 1 Field Experiment 
N = 6,364 
Control   .08%a 
Sender-Benefiting   .39%ab† 
Recipient-Benefiting   .94%b†c 
Shared   .94%b†c 
Donation   .08%a 
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Study 2 Field Experiment 
N = 1,438 
Control 16.36%a 3.45%a .61%a 
Sender-Benefiting 23.77%b 6.61%a 1.71%a 
Recipient-Benefiting 21.37%b 16.91%b 4.77%b 
Study 3 MTurk Scenario 
Experiment 
N = 816 
Sender-Benefiting/ Referral 
Role 
82.21%a†   
Recipient-Benefiting/ Referral 
Role 
88.83%a†   
Sender-Benefiting/ Recipient 
Role 
 51.74%a  
Recipient-Benefiting/ 
Recipient Role 
 62.19%b  
Study 4A Incentivized Lab 
Experiment 
N = 369 
Control 26.37%a 24.00%a 6.52%a 
Sender-Benefiting 64.84%b 28.07%a 17.58%b 
Recipient-Benefiting 58.06%b 69.81%b 39.79%c 
Shared 56.99%b 64.71%b 35.48%c 
Study 4B MTurk Scenario 
Experiment 
N = 805 
Sender-Benefiting/ Named 85.29%a   
Recipient-Benefiting/ Named 87.32%a   
Sender-Benefiting/ 
Anonymous 
86.50%a   
Recipient-Benefiting/ 
Anonymous 
74.49%b   
Study 4C MTurk Scenario 
Experiment 
N = 583 
 
Average likelihood 
(not %) 
 
Sender-Benefiting 
5.22 (1.97)   
 
Recipient-Benefiting 
5.42 (1.79)   
Study 5A MTurk Scenario 
Experiment 
N = 824 
Sender-Benefiting/ Low Cost 73.63 a†bc†   
Recipient-Benefiting/ Low 
Cost 
63.82 c†   
Sender-Benefiting/ High Cost 72.38 a†bc†   
Recipient-Benefiting/ High 
Cost 
81.52 a†   
Study 5B 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MTurk Scenario 
Experiment 
N = 740 
Sender-Benefiting/ Low Cost  15.59%a  
Recipient-Benefiting/ Low 
Cost 
 32.20%b  
Sender-Benefiting/ High Cost  54.40%c  
Recipient-Benefiting/ High 
Cost 
 55.90%c  
Notes: Significant differences are denoted by superscript letters – condition proportions for each 
study in the same column that share a same letter are insignificant from each other at p < .05. A 
dagger symbol ([†]) indicates a statistically significant difference at a p < .10 level 
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2.3.3  Discussion  
Results from Study 1 support the prediction that recipient-benefiting referrals result in a 
higher conversion rate compared to offering either 1) no incentive or 2) a sender-benefiting 
referral. It is also noteworthy that the recipient-benefiting condition outperformed another 
version of an other-benefiting referral – a donation incentive, whereby an incentive is given to 
charity, yet offered no incentive for a member of one’s social network. This result is consistent 
with past research (Imas 2014; Schwartz et al. 2018) as well as our proposed process account: 
recipient-benefiting referrals are not necessarily successful because they offer referrers a chance 
to be altruistic, but rather, because they offer some kind of benefit to the referrer himself (we 
posit this benefit to be reputational, and explicitly test this idea in Studies 4A-4C). Finally, it is 
interesting to note that the shared incentive, which is the most commonly used referral reward 
offered, did not outperform the recipient-benefiting incentive. 
 Study 2 aims to replicate and extend these findings by tracking behavior at both the 
referral and uptake decision stages in addition to measuring total new customer conversions in 
another field experiment.  
2.4 Study 2: Sender-Benefiting and Recipient-Benefiting 
Incentives at the Referral and Recipient Stage 
Study 2 is another randomized field experiment, this time with an online video game 
subscription company called Game Access. This company tracks both the referral stage (i.e., the 
number of referrals made) and uptake stage (i.e., the number of referral recipients that sign up). 
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2.4.1  Methods 
The company randomly assigned 1,500 customers to receive one of three referral offers: 1) 
control: no incentive, 2) sender-benefiting: one month free, or 3) recipient-benefiting: one month 
free for the new customer. 1,438 emails were successfully delivered (4.1% bounced back, 
possibly due to invalid email addresses). Current members received an email asking if they 
would refer a friend to buy a membership to Game Access (See Appendix A for all emails used 
in this experiment).  
If a current customer chose to refer one or more friends, they clicked a link in the email 
labeled “Tell your friends about Game Access,” and then entered the name and email address of 
as many friends as they would like. Game Access then sent an email to each referred friend with 
the subject line “I just joined a cool new service.” By sending emails directly to referral 
recipients, the company could track both how many customers sent referrals as well as how 
many recipients chose to follow through on those referrals by signing up.  
2.4.2  Results 
Table 2.1 summarizes the results. 
Referral stage. At the referral stage,  more customers chose to make a referral in the 
sender-benefiting (23.77%) and recipient-benefiting (21.37%) conditions than in the control 
condition (16.36%, χ2 (1) = 8.20, p = .004 and χ2 (1) = 3.98, p = .046, respectively). The 
difference between the incentivized conditions was not significant χ2(1) = .78, p = .38). See 
Figure 2.2 for all results. 
Some customers chose to make multiple referrals, so next we look at the referral rate in 
each condition (the number of referrals made divided by the number of customers who received 
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the original email). There was a significantly higher referral rate in the sender-benefiting 
(25.91%) and recipient-benefiting (28.22%) conditions than in the control condition (17.79%, χ2 
(1) = 9.24, p < .01 and χ2 (1) = 14.91, p < .001, respectively). Again, there was no significant 
difference between the incentive conditions (χ2 (1) = .64, p = .42).  
Uptake stage. At the uptake stage, referral recipients were significantly more likely to 
sign up in the recipient-benefiting condition (16.91%, 23 out of 136 referral recipients) compared 
to the sender-benefiting condition (6.61%, 8 out of 121 referral recipients, χ2(1) = 6.38, p = .01) 
or control conditions (3.45%, 3 out of 87 referral recipients, χ2(1) = 9.29, p < .01). There was a 
non-significant difference in new customer uptake between the sender-benefiting and control 
conditions (χ2(1) = 1.00, p = .32). 
New customer conversions. As with the previous field experiment, the final new customer 
conversion rate (i.e., percentage of new customers based on total referral emails sent) was higher 
when the company offered a recipient-benefiting referral (4.77%) compared to a sender-
benefiting referral (1.71%, χ2(1) = 7.03, p = .008) or no incentive (.61%,  χ2(1) = 16.12, p < .001; 
see Figure 2). There was a non-significant, though directional, difference in conversion rate 
between the sender-benefiting and control conditions (χ2 (1) = 2.55, p = .11). 
One-month follow-up. Follow-up subscription renewal data showed that the new 
customer conversion rate patterns remained one month after the intervention. More new 
customers renewed their membership in the recipient-benefiting condition (3.52%) compared to 
the sender-benefiting condition (1.07%, χ2(1) = 6.29, p = .01) and the control condition (.35%, χ2 
(1) = 9.41, p < .001). There continued to be a non-significant difference between the sender-
benefiting and control conditions (χ2(1) = 1.78, p = .18). 
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FIGURE 2.2 
STUDY 2: REFERRAL CHOICE, UPTAKE CHOICE, AND OVERALL NEW CUSTOMER 
CONVERSION RATE BY CONDITION 
 
Figure 2.2. At the referral stage, recipient-benefiting and sender-benefiting incentives lead to 
more referrals than no incentive. There is no difference in referral choice between incentive 
conditions. At the uptake stage, Recipient-benefiting referral incentives lead to higher uptake 
than sender-benefiting incentives or no referral incentive. Overall, recipient-benefiting referrals 
lead to the most new customer conversions. 
 
2.4.3  Discussion  
Study 2 provided additional support for the hypothesis that recipient-benefiting referrals 
outperform sender-benefiting ones. This field experiment showed that, despite the tendency for 
selfish incentives to outperform prosocial incentives in most settings, the prosocial (recipient-
benefiting) incentives perform equally as well as selfish (sender-benefiting) incentives in this 
context at the referral stage. However, at the uptake stage, recipients are more likely to act when 
there is a selfish (recipient-benefiting) incentive offered. We propose that this pattern occurs 
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because, at the referral stage, the burden of referring is low and referrers anticipate reputational 
benefits from sending their friends an incentive opportunity. Therefore, we see that a recipient-
benefiting or sender-benefiting referral perform equally as well at the referral stage. At the 
uptake stage, however, there is a much higher burden (purchasing a $30/month membership) for 
the recipient to follow through on their friend’s request. Thus, at the uptake stage, recipients are 
significantly more likely to sign up when they themselves receive the incentive than when the 
incentive goes to the customer who sent the referral. Studies 3-5B explore the process behind 
these patterns. 
 
2.5 Study 3: Comparing Referral versus Recipient Stages 
 
We designed Study 3 to remove the potential for selection bias at the recipient stage by 
randomly assigning participants to be either a referrer or a recipient in the same context, and 
crossed that manipulation with a recipient-benefiting versus sender-benefiting referral incentive 
structure. We also measure action costs at each stage. We define action costs as the effort, time, 
and/or payment required to follow-through on an action. An interesting feature of the referral 
context is that decision makers at each stage (the referral and uptake stage) face similar decisions 
– whether to take action based on an incentive that is offered to you or to your friend; however, 
we see different decision patterns at the two different stages. At the referral stage, other-
benefiting incentives perform equally as well as self-benefiting incentives. At the recipient stage, 
by contrast, self-benefiting incentives outperform other-benefiting incentives (i.e., the recipient-
benefiting referral is more effective at this stage). We propose that the higher cost of taking 
action at the recipient stage drive the preference for self-benefiting incentives for recipients, and 
we test this proposition here.  
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Note that in this study only, we use labels that describe the incentive from the actor’s 
perspective. Specifically, participants in both conditions received incentives that are either self-
benefiting (the participant can receive a reward) or other-benefiting (the participant’s friend can 
receive a reward).  
 
2.5.1  Methods 
 
As outlined in our pre-registered research plan (available at https://bit.ly/2DORuhk), we  
recruited 800 MTurk participants (816 participants completed the study; MAge = 35.40, 61.81% 
female). The study used a 2(referral: self-benefiting vs. other-benefiting) x 2(role: referrer vs. 
recipient) between-subjects design. For this study, we described a (fictitious) food delivery 
service called Food2Me, that delivers from local restaurants. Participants provided their first 
name and the first name of a close friend. We manipulated whether participants were in the role 
of referrer or recipient within this paradigm. Participants were informed that they were part of a 
referral incentive opportunity that was structured either to financially benefit the referrer or 
financially benefit the recipient. In this study, the incentive was a free year of Food2Me. 
After reading about the service, participants were required to correctly identify who 
would receive an incentive (themselves or their friend) before they could move to the action 
decision to confirm that they understood the incentive structure. Participants were then told, 
“The Food2Me restaurant delivery service costs $50 per year.” They were asked if they wanted 
to take action; specifically, those in the referrer condition were asked, “Would you refer 
[Friend’s Name] to sign up for the Food2Me delivery service?” and those in the recipient 
condition were asked, “Would you sign up for the Food2Me delivery service?” Please see Table 
2 for a description of each experimental condition. 
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We additionally measured how costly participants believed it would be to take the given 
action. We measured “action costs” for all conditions using a three-item scale: “Referring my 
friend to Food2Me [Subscribing to Food2Me] would be…” Effortful, Burdensome, Costly (1 = 
Not at all, 7 = Very much so, α = .78). 
 
2.5.2  Results 
 
Action Costs. As expected, there was a significant main effect of participant role 
(referrer/recipient) on action costs; recipients perceived the cost of taking action as higher than 
referrers ((F(1, 812) = 108.72, p < .001). There was a non-significant effect of referral incentive 
type on action costs (F(1, 812) = .004, p = .95). There was a significant interaction of participant 
role and incentive type (F(1, 812) = 19.40, p < .001). Surprisingly, in the referrer condition, 
perceived action costs were significantly higher for the self-benefiting condition (MSelf = 2.67, 
SD = 1.46) than the other-benefiting referral (MOther = 2.24, SD = 1.31; t(411) = 3.17, p = .002). 
However, in the recipient condition, perceived action costs were significantly higher in the other-
benefiting condition (MSelf = 3.28, SD = 1.49 vs. MOther = 3.72, SD = 1.43; t(398) = 3.06, p = 
.002). 
Action Choice. Table 2.1 summarizes the results. We performed a binary logistic 
regression on choice to act as a function of participant role (referrer/recipient) and incentive type 
(self-benefiting/other-benefiting). This analysis yielded a significant interaction between 
participant role and incentive type (χ2(1) = 7.67, p = .006). Marginally significantly more 
referrers chose to refer when their friend received the reward (other-benefiting referral; 88.83%) 
than when they themselves received the reward (self-benefiting referral; 82.21%; (χ2(1) = 3.61, p 
=.058). However, significantly fewer recipients chose to sign up when their friend received the 
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reward (other-benefiting referral; 51.74%) compared to when they themselves received the 
reward (self-benefiting referral; 62.19%; 2(1) = 4.46, p =.035; See Figure 2.3).  
FIGURE 2.3 
STUDY 3: CHOICE TO ACT BY ROLE AND REFERRAL TYPE  
 
 
Figure 2.3. Recipient-Benefiting incentives lead to marginally significantly higher referral 
choice and significantly higher uptake choice. 
 
 
 
2.5.3  Discussion 
 
Study 3 replicates the pattern found in the prior field experiment and additionally begins 
to demonstrate the moderating role of action costs on the effectiveness of other-benefiting and 
self-benefiting incentives. Within the same referral context and design, consumers are similarly 
likely (in this study, marginally significantly more likely) to take action at the referral stage, 
where action costs are low, when they are offered an other-benefiting (prosocial) incentive 
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compared to a self-benefiting (selfish) incentive. At the recipient stage, however, where action 
costs are high, recipients are more likely to require an incentive themselves to act.   
In an additional study (Appendix C, Study 1), we conceptually replicated this pattern of 
referral and uptake. In this replication, we also measured the reputational benefits participants 
expected to receive for taking action (referral/uptake). Consistent with our account, both referrers 
and recipients believed they would receive higher reputational benefits for taking action when 
offered an other-benefiting incentive compared to a self-benefiting incentive. Specifically, there 
was a significant main effect of incentive type on expected reputational benefits, but participant 
role did not have an effect on expected reputational benefits (the interaction was also not 
significant). Therefore, even though consumers expected high reputational benefits for taking 
action when offered an other-benefiting incentive regardless of referrer versus recipient role, 
recipients who faced high action costs still showed a preference for the self-benefiting incentive.I 
Next, we more thoroughly examine the roles of reputational benefits (Studies 4A-4C) and 
action costs (Studies 5A and 5B) in the performance of sender-benefiting and recipient-
benefiting referral incentives.  
2.6 Studies 4A-4C: The Role of Reputational Benefits 
In Studies 4A - 4C, we test the role of anticipated reputational benefits in the 
performance of prosocial (i.e., recipient-benefiting) incentives at the referral stage. Study 4A is 
an incentive compatible lab experiment in which we track behavior at both the referral and 
uptake stages, and test whether the reputational benefits that referrers anticipate mediate their 
propensity to refer. In addition, Study 4A tests two additional, complementary explanations for 
why recipient-benefiting referrals perform as well as sender-benefiting referrals at the referral 
stage. Specifically, Study 4A tests the role of psychological costs of sending sender-benefiting 
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referrals. That is, referrers might feel guilt or discomfort when gaining a reward for referring a 
friend in the sender-benefiting condition, which may in turn decrease likelihood of referring in 
this condition. We also test the role of perceived social obligations. That is, referrers might 
anticipate that recipients will find the referral burdensome or annoying. Such anticipated 
obligations might be especially high in the case of sender-benefiting referrals where the recipient 
receives no reward, once again driving down the likelihood of sending sender-benefiting 
referrals (making them equivalent in success to recipient-benefiting referrals). We measure each 
of these constructs at the referral stage in Study 4A, and test their relative importance in a 
simultaneous mediation model.   
Next, we demonstrate the role of anticipated reputational benefits at the referral stage via 
moderation. In Study 4B, we vary reputational benefits by manipulating whether the referral is 
made anonymously: half of the referrers are asked if they would like to send a referral in which 
they are identified, enabling them to anticipate reputational benefits, while the other half of the 
referrers are asked if they would like to send a referral in which they are anonymous, hindering 
their expectation of reputational benefits. In Study 4C, we measure individual differences in 
reputational concerns and show that they moderate the capacity for recipient-benefiting programs 
to spur referrals. 
2.7 Study 4A 
 
2.7.1  Methods 
At the referral stage, 369 undergraduate students participated (MAge = 19.64, 47.97% female). 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of four referral incentive conditions: control, sender-
benefiting, recipient-benefiting, or shared. We first asked participants to provide their first name. 
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Participants next completed a quick personality quiz, the Ten-Item Personality Inventory (TIPI; 
Gosling, Rentfrow, and Swann 2003). We next provided participants with a brief report of their 
real results regarding their extraversion/introversion scores (for full details see Appendix A). 
Participants were then told that they could refer one other student to take the personality quiz by 
providing the student’s university email address. Participants were given the following 
information based on incentive condition: 1) control: no incentive 2) sender-benefiting: “If your 
friend takes the survey you will receive a $3 electronic gift card to Starbucks,” 3) recipient-
benefiting: “If your friend takes the survey he or she will receive a $3 electronic gift card to 
Starbucks,” or 4) shared: “If your friend takes the survey you will each receive a $1.50 electronic 
gift card to Starbucks.”  
Participants then viewed the email that their friend would receive if they chose to refer. In the 
control and sender-benefiting conditions, the e-mail subject line was “[Participant First Name] 
thought you would enjoy this survey!” In the recipient-benefiting and shared conditions, the 
subject line stated, “[Participant First Name] thought you would enjoy this survey (plus get a 
Starbucks gift card)!” The email was identical in all conditions and explained that their friend 
had taken a quick personality quiz as part of a study and wanted to share the link with them. 
However, in the recipient-benefiting and shared conditions, it also stated, “If you take the quick 
survey, you will receive a $3 ($1.50) electronic gift card to Starbucks.”  
We then asked participants, “Would you like to refer a friend to take this personality quiz?” 
and told them that they would need to provide their own student ID (requested for accounting 
reasons), their own student email address, and one friend’s student email address, which they 
could look up in the online directory. Participants chose either “Yes, I would like to refer a 
friend” or “No, I would not like to refer a friend.” Participants who chose not to refer moved 
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directly to the follow-up questions, whereas participants who chose to refer filled out the 
information described above about their friend before continuing to the follow-up questions.  
We included several follow-up questions about reputational benefits, psychological costs, 
and social obligations to explore the process underlying these referral decisions. The reputational 
benefit questions included, “How would your friend view you if you made this referral?” 
(Generous, Helpful, Friendly, Well-Intentioned, Trustworthy, Warm, Good-natured, Likeable, 
Sincere; 1 = Not at all, 7 = Very much; α = .96) We also asked questions about psychological 
costs: “How would you feel if you made this referral?” (Selfish, Deceitful, Guilty, 
Uncomfortable, Sneaky, Conflicted; 1 = Not at all, 7 = Very much; α = .89). Finally, we 
measured perceptions of imposing a social obligation using the following items: “How much 
would you feel like you are imposing on [friend] by sending this referral?”, “How annoyed 
would [friend] be about receiving this referral?”, and “[Friend] would feel that I am taking 
advantage of him/her” (1 = Not at all, 7 = Very much so; α = .72). While we primarily discuss 
process results comparing the sender-benefiting (selfish) and recipient-benefiting (prosocial) 
referral conditions in the main text, process results for all conditions are reported in Appendix B. 
For the uptake stage, we sent the emails shown to the original participants to each of the 
referred friends (N = 186). Referred friends received the email and could choose whether to take 
the personality quiz. One week after sending out the emails, participants were compensated 
according to their condition and whether or not their referred friend took the survey.   
2.7.2  Results 
Table 2.1 summarizes the results. 
Referral stage. Consistent with Study 2, there was no significant difference in the choice 
to refer between the sender-benefiting (64.84%), recipient-benefiting (58.06%), and shared 
76 
 
conditions (56.99%; χ2 (2) = 1.38, p = .50). Participants were more likely to refer a friend in all 
incentive conditions compared to the control (no incentive) condition (26.37%; all ps < .001). 
Referral process items. The reputational benefits of referring were perceived to be higher 
in the recipient-benefiting condition (MRecipient-Benefiting = 4.41, SD = 1.33) relative to the sender-
benefiting condition (MSender-Benefiting = 3.69, SD = 1.34; t(182) = -3.64, p < .001). Similarly, 
psychological costs were perceived to be higher in the sender-benefiting condition (MSender-
Benefiting = 2.48, SD = 1.32) relative to the recipient-benefiting condition (MRecipient-Benefiting= 1.75, 
SD = 1.17; t(182) = 3.98, p < .001); and social obligation was perceived to be marginally 
significantly higher in the sender-benefiting condition (MSender-Benefiting = 2.98, SD = 1.34) relative 
to the recipient-benefiting  condition (MRecipient-Benefiting = 2.65, SD = 1.36; t(182) = 1.68, p = 
.096).  
Though the total effect of referral incentives on referral choice is not detectably different 
from zero (the sender- and recipient-benefiting incentives lead to equal referrals), mediation can 
still be present. As Hayes (2009) explains, a total effect is the sum of different paths of influence, 
and these paths may cancel each other out, producing a total effect that is not detectably different 
from zero (for more discussion on this topic, see: Zhao, Lynch, and Chen 2010). Therefore, 
while the direct financial incentive is likely increasing referrals for those in the sender-benefiting 
condition compared to the recipient-benefiting condition, we propose that there is an opposing 
influence of reputational benefits increasing referral choice for the recipient-benefiting condition. 
Using methods prescribed by Hayes (2009) we simultaneously tested the significance of all three 
measured mediators by calculating standardized indirect effects for 10,000 bootstrapped samples 
and found that reputational benefits mediate the effect of referral type on referral choice. We 
found a statistically significant indirect effect of reputational benefits (.34; 95% CI [.11, .71]). 
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The indirect effect of psychological costs was not significant (.09; 95% CI [-.45, .14]) nor was 
the indirect effect of imposing a social obligation (.25; 95% CI [-.03, .64]). These results are 
consistent with the notion that, while the lack of personal incentive likely decreases motivation 
to refer in the recipient-benefiting condition, recipient-benefiting (vs. sender-benefiting) referrals 
lead to an increased expectation of reputational benefits, which in turn increases referrals in the 
recipient-benefiting condition compared to what would be expected based on previous research 
about prosocial or other-benefiting incentives.  
Uptake stage. Recipients were significantly more likely to follow through on the referral 
in the recipient-benefiting condition (69.81%), compared to the sender-benefiting (28.07%, χ2(1) 
= 41.74, p < .001) or control conditions (24.00%, χ2(1) = 14.23, p < .001). There was a non-
significant difference in the propensity to comply between the recipient-benefiting and shared 
conditions (64.71%, χ2 (1) = .30, p = .58). There was also a non-significant difference between 
new customer uptake in the sender-benefiting and control conditions (χ2 (1) = .15, p = .70; 
recipients in the control and sender-benefiting conditions received identical e-mails in this study, 
so this lack of difference is unsurprising.  
New customer conversions. Consistent with Studies 1 and 2, the overall conversion rate 
was higher in the recipient-benefiting condition (39.79%) than the sender-benefiting condition 
(17.58%, χ2 (1) = 12.91, p < .001). There was a non-significant difference between the recipient-
benefiting and shared conditions (35.48%, χ2 (1) = .38, p = .54). The control condition was 
significantly less effective at bringing in new customers than any incentive condition (6.52%, χ2 
(3) = 35.78, p < .001). 
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2.7.3  Discussion 
Consistent with Studies 1 and 2, the recipient-benefiting referral was more effective than 
the sender-benefiting referral at converting new customers. Also consistent with Studies 2 and 3, 
sender-benefiting and recipient-benefiting incentives were equally effective at the referral stage. 
In support of our process account, the reputational benefits that referrers anticipated mediated 
their propensity to refer. Although other potential process constructs such as psychological costs 
and social obligations vary between sender-benefiting and recipient-benefiting referral 
conditions, they do not appear to account for the influence of referral type on referral choice. 
While this self-reported mediation study shows initial support, we seek stronger evidence for the 
role of anticipated reputational benefits at the referral stage via moderation in Studies 4B and 4C.  
 
  
 
2.8 Study 4B 
 
2.8.1  Methods 
As outlined in our pre-registered research plan (https://bit.ly/2XadyvB), we recruited 800 
MTurk participants (805 participants completed the study; MAge = 36.75, 53.18% female). The 
study used a 2(referral type: sender-benefiting vs. recipient-benefiting) x 2(referrer anonymity: 
identified vs. anonymous) between-subjects design. Participants were asked to give their first 
name and the first name of a close friend. We then asked participants to imagine the following 
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scenario, “Amazon has released a new, free loyalty program called Amazon BOLD that 
showcases new products to program members. You joined the program and think it has been 
great.” Participants were next told that Amazon has a referral program that gives either 1) a 
sender-benefiting incentive: Participants were told they will receive a $10 Visa gift card for each 
individual they refer to Amazon BOLD who then joins the program or 2) a recipient-benefiting 
incentive: participants were told that each individual they refer will receive a $10 Visa gift card 
if they join the program. However, in the anonymous condition, participants were also told that 
the referral would be anonymous and their friend would not be told who sent it (study materials 
in Appendix A). Participants were then required to correctly identify who would receive a 
reward for a successful referral (themselves or their friend) before they could move to the 
referral decision to confirm that they understood the incentive structure. Note: no participants 
were excluded at this step, but they had to answer correctly before continuing. Finally, we asked 
participants, “Would you refer your friend to Amazon BOLD”? (Yes/No).    
2.8.2  Results 
Table 2.1 summarizes the results. We performed a binary logistic regression on choice to 
refer as a function of referral type, referrer anonymity, and their interaction. This analysis 
yielded a significant interaction of referral type and anonymity (χ2(1) = 6.00, p = .014, Figure 5). 
When the referral was identified – i.e., recipients would know who referred them – the 
propensity to refer was equivalent across the recipient-benefiting (87.32%) and the sender-
benefiting conditions (85.29%; χ2(1) = .35, p = .55). However, when the referral was anonymous, 
the propensity to refer was higher in the sender-benefiting condition (86.50%) relative to the 
recipient-benefiting condition (74.49%; χ2(1) = 8.87, p = .003, Figure 2.4).  
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FIGURE 2.4 
STUDY 4B: REFERRAL CHOICE BY REFERRAL TYPE AND ANONYMITY 
 
 
Figure 2.4. Sender-benefiting and recipient-benefiting incentives lead to equal referral choice 
when the referral is not anonymous. When the referral is anonymous, sender-benefiting 
incentives lead to more referrals.  
 
 
2.8.3  Discussion 
Study 4B finds that prosocial referrals become less effective when the ability to inform 
friends of one’s prosocial act are reduced, providing evidence that reputational benefits are a key 
motivator at the referral stage. By contrast, if psychological costs (e.g., guilt from profiting from 
a friend with a selfish referral incentive) or concerns about social obligations (e.g., imposing 
upon one’s friend with a selfish request) drove the performance of prosocial incentives at the 
referral stage, we should see minimal change in recipient-benefiting referral decisions when the 
referral is anonymous. In other words, these mechanisms would still be active in an anonymous 
referral, and we therefore would not expect to see this interaction if they were driving the effect.  
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Further, if purely altruistic motivations (i.e., the desire to help others without any concern for 
personal benefit, reputational or otherwise) were responsible for the strong performance of other-
benefiting incentives at this referral stage, anonymity should also exert minimal influence on 
choices. 
Further attesting to the reputational benefit explanation for referrer behavior, in Appendix C 
(Study 3) we report a conceptual replication of Study 4B, in which we manipulate reputational 
benefits in different way. Specifically, we manipulated whether the referral recipient is a friend 
(allowing for high reputational benefits) or a stranger (allowing for minimal reputational 
benefits). Consistent with Study 4B, when referrers could anticipate reputational benefits – i.e., 
when asked to refer their friends – recipient-benefiting incentives were as effective as sender-
benefiting incentives. However, sender-benefiting incentives were more effective when referrers 
could not anticipate reputational benefits (i.e., when asked to refer a stranger). 
2.9 Study 4C 
 
2.9.1  Methods 
As outlined in our pre-registered research plan (available at https://bit.ly/2GwJ1mE), we 
recruited 600 MTurk participants; 583 met our pre-registered conditions of both completing the 
dependent variable and using a unique location (MAge = 39.85, 62.89% female). 
Participants were randomly assigned to a referral type condition (sender-benefiting or 
recipient-benefiting) in a between-subjects design. They then viewed the same referral scenario 
used in Study 4B (Amazon BOLD loyalty program) and were told that if they made a referral 
either they would receive a $10 Visa gift card (sender-benefiting) or their friend would receive a 
$10 Visa gift card (recipient-benefiting). After correctly identifying who would receive a reward 
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for a successful referral (themselves or their friend) they moved to a referral likelihood question, 
which asked “Would you refer your friend, [Friend’s name] to Amazon BOLD?” (1 = I definitely 
would not refer my friend, 7 = I definitely would refer my friend). 
Participants then completed a short distractor task in which they were asked to mentally 
rotate figures. Following this task, participants completed a trait measure of concern for 
reputation (the 7-item Concern for Reputation Scale; De Cremer and Tyler 2005; α = .85) which 
consists of the following items: 1) I am rarely concerned about my reputation (R-scored), 2) I do 
not consider what others say about me (R-scored), 3) I wish to have a good reputation, 4) If my 
reputation is not good, I feel very bad, 5) I find it important that others consider my reputation as 
a serious matter, 6) I try to work hard on my reputation (in my relationships with others), 7) I 
find it difficult if others paint an incorrect image of me (1 = Not at all characteristic for me, 7 = 
Extremely characteristic for me). 
2.9.2  Results 
Referral Likelihood. Table 2.1 summarizes the results. As with previous studies, there 
was no significant difference in referral likelihood as a function of referral type (MSender-Benefiting = 
5.22, SD = 1.97; MRecipient-Benefiting = 5.42, SD = 1.79; t(581) = 1.24, p = .22). 
Moderation by Reputation Concern. We measured trait reputational concern, which did 
not differ between conditions (MSender-Benefiting = 4.78, SD = 1.05; MRecipient-Benefiting = 4.87, SD = 
1.02; t(581) = 1.01, p = .31). We then examined referral likelihood as a function of referral type, 
trait concern for reputation, and their interaction. The interaction was marginally significant (β = 
.12, t(579) = 1.72, p = .086). To identify the range of Reputation Concern for which the simple 
effect of referral type was significant, we used the Johnson-Neman technique (floodlight 
analysis; Spiller et al. 2013). This analysis revealed a significant positive effect of referral type 
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on referral likelihood for any participants with reputational concern scores greater than 6.14 (β = 
.24, SE = .12, p = .05). 
2.9.3  Discussion 
Across three studies, we found evidence for the role of reputational benefits in the choice to 
send a recipient-benefiting (vs. sender-benefiting) referral. In an incentive compatible lab 
experiment, Study 4A indicated that anticipated reputational benefits mediate the effect of 
referral type on the propensity to make a referral. Studies 4B goes further, by experimentally 
manipulation anticipated reputational benefits, and showing that when referrals are anonymous, 
recipient-benefiting incentive programs no longer induce referrals. Finally, Study 4C also shows 
that the effectiveness of recipient-benefiting programs is moderated by reputational concerns: 
recipient-benefiting incentives induce those individuals who are generally concerned about their 
reputation to refer while sender-benefiting incentives are less effective with this population. 
2.10 Studies 5A and 5B: The Role of Action Costs 
Studies 5A and 5B test the role of action costs – defined as the effort, time, and/or 
payment required to comply – in the performance of self-benefiting versus other-benefiting 
incentives. We have posited that at the referral stage, recipient-benefiting incentives perform as 
well as self-benefiting incentives because 1) senders expect to receive reputational benefits when 
making a referral with other-benefiting rewards and 2) referring is a low-cost action. If this is the 
case, then increasing referrers’ action costs should render recipient-benefiting incentives less 
effective relative to self-benefiting incentives. We test this proposition in Study 5A. 
We have also posited that at the uptake stage, recipient-benefiting incentives outperform 
self-benefiting incentives because they provide sufficient incentive for recipients – who typically 
face high action costs – to act. If this is the case, then decreasing referrers’ action costs should 
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reduce the relative effectiveness of recipient-benefiting incentives vis-à-vis sender-benefiting 
incentives. We test this proposition in Study 5B. 
2.11 Study 5A 
 
2.11.1 Methods 
As outlined in our pre-registered research plan (available at https://bit.ly/2NbUAQF), we 
recruited 800 MTurk participants; 824 completed the survey (MAge = 36.47, 47.69% female). 
 Using the same referral scenario used in Study 4B, we had participants imagine that they 
were part of the Amazon BOLD loyalty program and could refer a friend to try it as well. Again, 
participants provided their own first name and the first name of a close friend. We manipulated 
whether they received a sender-benefiting or recipient-benefiting referral, with an incentive of 
$10 (Amazon gift card) in both conditions. In this study, we manipulated action costs by varying 
the effort required to refer their friend to the service. Specifically, participants in the low-cost 
condition read, “To verify that only one person uses this offer, you will need to click on the 
provided link and simply type in your friend's email address.” Those in the high-cost 
condition read, “to verify that only one person uses this offer, you will need to print out this 
email and mail it along with your friend's e-mail address. This should be sent to Amazon 
BOLD's address: 201039 5th Ave, Seattle, WA 98121. To make the effort required in the high-
cost condition even more salient, we additionally had these participants click through a step-by-
step process of what would be required to refer someone to the loyalty program. For emails used 
in all conditions, see Appendix A (full survey can be found at our open science link).  
Participants were required to correctly identify who would receive an incentive 
(themselves or their friend) and what was required in order to sign up (click a link or print out 
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documents and mail them in) before they could move to the referral decision to confirm that they 
understood the incentive structure and action costs. Participants then answered the question, 
“Would you refer your friend, [Friend’s Name] to Amazon BOLD?” Participants could respond 
either “Yes, I would refer my friend” or “No, I would not refer my friend.”  
We additionally measured reputational benefits (How would [Friend’s name] view you 
referred them to join Amazon BOLD through this referral?” - Generous, Helpful, Friendly, Well-
Intentioned, Trustworthy, Warm, Good-natured, Likeable, Sincere; 1 = Not at all, 7 = Very 
much; α = .97).  Finally, as a manipulation check, we measured action costs using the same 
action costs scale used in Study 3: “Referring my friend to Amazon BOLD would be…” 
Effortful, Burdensome, Costly” (α = .88). 
2.11.2 Results 
Manipulation Check. As expected, there was a significant main effect of the action cost 
manipulation; the high cost condition was perceived as having higher action costs than the low 
cost condition ((F(1, 823) = 53.28, p < .001). There was a non-significant effect of referral 
incentive type on action costs (F(1, 823) = .52, p = .47). There was a significant interaction of 
action cost and incentive type (F(1, 823) = 9.23, p = .002). In the high cost condition, perceived 
action costs were directionally, though not significantly, higher for the recipient-benefiting 
referral (MRecipient-Benefiting = 3.76, SD = 1.75) than the sender-benefiting referral (MSender-Benefiting = 
3.48, SD = 1.75; t(406) = -1.62, p = .11). Surprisingly, in the low-cost condition, perceived 
action costs were significantly higher in the sender-benefiting condition (MSender-Benefiting = 2.96, 
SD = 1.85 vs. MRecipient-Benefiting = 2.50, SD = 1.61; t(414) = 2.68, p = .008). 
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Referral choice. Table 2.1 summarizes the results. We performed a binary logistic 
regression on referral choice as a function of action cost (high/low) and referral type (sender-
benefiting/recipient-benefiting). This analysis yielded a significant interaction of action cost and 
incentive type (χ2 (1) = 6.24, p = .013, Figure 2.5). For participants in the low-cost condition, 
there was a marginally significantly higher rate of referrals in the recipient-benefiting condition 
(81.52%) compared to the sender-benefiting condition (72.38%, (χ2 (1) = 2.88, p = .09), 
However, when action cost was high, there was a marginally significantly higher rate of referrals 
in the sender-benefiting condition (73.63%) than the recipient-benefiting condition (63.82%, χ2 
(1) = 3.45, p = .06).  
 
FIGURE 2.5 
STUDY 5A: REFERRAL CHOICE BY REFERRAL TYPE AND ACTION COST 
 
Figure 2.5. When cost of taking action is low, there is no difference in the choice to refer for a 
sender-benefiting or recipient-benefiting incentive. When the cost of taking action is high, 
sender-benefiting incentives are marginally more effective for encouraging referrals. 
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Reputational Benefits. As in previous studies, there was a significant main effect of 
incentive type on ratings of reputational benefits; participants expected higher reputational 
benefits for sending their friend a recipient -benefiting referral (vs. a sender-benefiting) referral, 
(F(1, 824) = 58.11, p < .001). Action costs had no significant effect on reputational benefits, 
(F(1, 824) = .003, p = .96). There was a marginally significant interaction for cost and incentive 
type (F(1, 824) = 9.23, p = .08). In the high cost condition, reputational benefits were 
significantly higher for the recipient-benefiting referral (MRecipient-Benefiting = 5.40, SD = 1.27) than 
the sender-benefiting referral (MSender-Benefiting = 4.46, SD = 1.64; t(406) = 1.97, p = .05). 
Similarly, in the low-cost condition, reputational benefits were higher for the sender-benefiting 
(vs. recipient-benefiting) referral (MRecipient-Benefiting = 5.22, SD = 1.33 vs. MSender-Benefiting = 4.63, 
SD = 1.53; t(414) = 4.23, p < .001). 
2.11.3 Discussion 
Study 5A finds that when the cost of taking action is high, self-benefiting incentives 
outperform other-benefiting incentives at motivating consumers to make a referral. However, 
when the cost of taking action is low, as is often the case at the referral stage, there is no 
difference between the two incentive types (or in this case a marginally significant preference for 
other-benefiting incentives). 
2.12 Study 5B 
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2.12.1 Methods 
As outlined in our pre-registered research plan (available at https://bit.ly/2BHK8fj), we 
recruited 800 MTurk participants; 740 met our pre-registered conditions of both completing the 
dependent variable and using a unique location (MAge = 35.95, 56.22% female). 
 To understand the role of action costs at the uptake stage of the referral process, we had 
participants imagine that a friend sent them an email asking if they would like to try Food2Me 
(the same fictitious food delivery service used in Study 3). Participants provided their own first 
name and the first name of a close friend. We manipulated whether they received a recipient-
benefiting referral or a sender-benefiting referral. In both conditions, the incentive was a $20 
Amazon gift card. We also manipulated action costs by varying the effort required to sign up for 
the service. Specifically, participants in the low-cost condition read, “This is an exclusive offer - 
to verify that only one person uses this offer, simply click this unique link to sign 
up: Food2Me.com/xyq6msp204.” Those in the high-cost condition read, “This is an exclusive 
offer - to verify that only one person uses this offer, print out the attached documents, fill 
them out, and mail them to the Food2Me headquarters with your unique 
code: xyq6msp204.” To make the effort required in the high-cost condition even more salient, 
we additionally had these participants click through a step-by-step process of what would be 
required to sign up for the service. For emails used in all conditions, see Appendix A (full survey 
can be found at our open science link). All participants were required to correctly identify who 
would receive an incentive (themselves or their friend) and what was required in order to sign up 
(click a link or print out documents and mail them in) before they could move to the uptake 
decision to confirm that they understood the incentive structure and action costs.   
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Participants then answered the question, “Would you sign up for the Food2Me delivery 
service?” Participants could respond either “Yes, I would sign up for the Food2Me delivery 
service” or “No, I would not sign up for the Food2Me delivery service.”  
Note that, as in Study 2, we told participants (recipients) in the sender-benefiting referral 
conditions that the friend who referred them would receive a reward if they followed through on 
the referral. We informed participants of this benefit to their friend to examine whether, even 
when recipients know that their friend will receive an incentive (which is not always the case in 
these incentive designs), prosocial sender-benefiting referrals have a minimal positive effect at 
the uptake stage due to the higher burden of follow-through. We additionally measured 
reputational benefits (How would your friend view you if you chose to join Food2Me through 
this referral?” - Generous, Helpful, Friendly, Well-Intentioned, Trustworthy, Warm, Good-
natured, Likeable, Sincere; 1 = Not at all, 7 = Very much; α = .96). Finally, as a manipulation 
check, we measured action costs using the same action costs scale used in Studies 3 and 5A: 
“Subscribing to Food2Me would be…” Effortful, Burdensome, Costly” (α = .81). 
2.12.2 Results 
Manipulation Check. As expected, there was a significant main effect of the action cost 
manipulation; the high cost condition was perceived as having higher action costs than the low 
cost condition ((F(1, 739) = 311.40, p < .001). There was also a significant main effect of referral 
incentive type (F(1, 739) = 5.26, p = .022). There was a non-significant interaction of action cost 
and incentive type (F(1, 739) = .19, p = .67). In the high cost condition, perceived action costs 
were significantly lower for the recipient-benefiting referral (MRecipient-Benefiting = 4.53, SD = 1.35) 
than the sender-benefiting referral (MSender-Benefiting = 4.83, SD = 1.43; t(361) = 1.97, p = .05). In 
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the low-cost condition, there was a non-significant difference in perceived action costs (MSender-
Benefiting = 2.92, SD = 1.56 vs. MRecipient-Benefiting = 2.72, SD = 1.37; t(375) = 1.29, p = .20). 
Uptake decision. Table 2.1 summarizes the results. We performed a binary logistic 
regression on uptake decision as a function of uptake cost (high/low) and referral type (sender-
benefiting/recipient-benefiting). This analysis yielded a significant interaction of action cost and 
incentive type, consistent with Study 5A (χ2 (1) = 9.21, p = .002, Figure 2.6). For participants in 
the high-cost condition, we observed more sign-ups for the recipient-benefiting referral (32.20%) 
than the sender-benefiting referral (15.59%, (χ2 (1) = 21.42, p < .001), consistent with Studies 2-
4A as well as typical incentivized behavior. However, when uptake cost was low, there was no 
difference in uptake choice by those in the recipient-benefiting condition (55.90%) versus the 
sender-benefiting condition (54.40%, χ2 (1) = .86, p = .77), consistent with referral choice in 
previous studies.  
FIGURE 2.6 
STUDY 5B: UPTAKE CHOICE BY REFERRAL TYPE AND ACTION COST 
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Figure 2.6. Recipient-Benefiting incentives are more effective when the cost of taking action 
(uptake) is high. When cost of taking action is low, there is no difference in the choice to 
following through for a sender-benefiting or recipient-benefiting incentive. 
 
 
Reputational Benefits. There was a significant main effect of incentive type on ratings of 
reputational benefits; participants expected higher reputational benefits for following through on 
a sender-benefiting (vs. recipient-benefiting) referral, (F(1, 739) = 19.90, p < .001). Action cost 
also had a marginally significant main effect on reputational benefits, (F(1, 739) = 3.64, p = 
.057). There was a non-significant interaction for cost and incentive type (F(1, 739) = 2.35, p = 
.13). In the high cost condition, reputational benefits were significantly higher for the sender-
benefiting referral (MSender-Benefiting = 5.01, SD = 1.38) than the recipient-benefiting referral 
(MRecipient-Benefiting = 4.72, SD = 1.35; t(361) = 1.97, p = .05). Similarly, in the low-cost condition, 
reputational benefits were higher for the sender-benefiting (vs. recipient-benefiting) referral 
(MSender-Benefiting = 5.34, SD = 1.25 vs. MRecipient-Benefiting = 4.76, SD = 1.26; t(375) = 4.46, p < 
.001). 
2.12.3 Discussion 
Study 5B finds that when the cost of taking action is high, as is often the case at the 
uptake stage, self-benefiting incentives are a more effective motivator despite recipients 
expecting higher reputational benefits for other-benefiting incentives. However, when action 
costs are low, there is no significant difference in the choice to act (follow-through on a referral) 
when offered a self-benefiting or other-benefiting incentive. An additional study replicated this 
pattern using the monetary cost of uptake (a $2 service vs. a $100 service) as an alternative 
manipulation of action costs; please see Appendix C –Study 4.  
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Studies 5A and 5B provide evidence for the predicted role of action costs on the 
effectiveness of prosocial and self-benefiting incentives. The results suggest that, in the context 
of one’s social network, when the cost of acting is low (e.g., simply referring a friend or clicking 
to sign up), consumers are equally motivated by prosocial and self-benefiting incentives. 
However, in the same context, when the cost of acting is high (e.g., following through on a 
typical referral), consumers are more motivated by self-benefiting incentives. Therefore, when 
uptake costs are high, which is often true at the recipient stage, companies may benefit from 
using recipient-benefiting referrals. Recipient-benefiting referrals provide a low-cost way for 
referrers to gain reputational benefits and for recipients to overcome the typically high cost of 
uptake with a personal incentive. 
 
2.13 General Discussion 
People commonly believe that behavior is strongly influenced by self-serving stakes (e.g., 
monetary incentives; Miller and Ratner 1996; 1998) and research has shown that such incentives 
can effectively motivate behavior (Schwartz et al. 2018). Much of this research demonstrating 
the effectiveness of selfish incentives relative to prosocial incentives compares self-benefiting 
incentives with a contribution to a charity or unknown individual (e.g., Eckel and Grossman 
1996; Imas 2014). We find that in the context of customer referrals, which directly involves 
one’s social ties, prosocial incentives are a powerful motivator and can be equally as powerful as 
self-benefiting incentives. The present research builds on related work on customer referral 
rewards, which primarily examines the first stage of the referral process (the customer’s choice 
to refer a friend) and the role of social distance at this stage (Hong et al. 2017; Ryu and Feick 
2007). This paper goes on to provide a comprehensive account for why these rarely used 
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recipient-benefiting referrals might outperform sender-benefiting referrals by independently 
assessing both stages of the process (and randomly assigning participants to both stages in 
multiple studies). Specifically, previous work finds that shared or recipient-benefiting incentives 
become more effective when the recipient is a strong social tie (Hong et al. 2017; Ryu and Feick 
2007). We extend this theoretical framework by examining the specific role of reputational 
benefits in motivating action at the referral stage – customers are motivated to refer because they 
want their social network to view them favorably. We additionally find evidence that the cost of 
action plays an important role in the effectiveness of prosocial incentives; when action costs are 
high (i.e., at the uptake stage), incentives that benefit social network members become relatively 
less effective than equivalent selfish incentives. By directly testing mechanisms at both stages of 
the referral process, we add to the understanding of the complex referral process. 
This work additionally builds on research designed to understand how people care about their 
own versus others’ outcomes (Andreoni, Rao and Trachtman 2017; Berman and Small 2012; 
Dana, Weber and Kuang 2007; DellaVigna, List and Malmendier 2012). We find that when it 
comes to decisions to refer a friend to a new product or service, people are just as likely to act 
when offered other-benefiting or self-benefiting incentives; however, this high value on the 
prosocial option is tenuous. If the recipient is not a friend, if the recipient friend does not know 
the source of the prosocial act, or if the costs of being generous to a friend are high, relative 
preference for the prosocial incentive declines. In some respects, the fragility of prosocial 
preferences in this domain reflects a dispiriting pattern, illustrating stark limits and self-serving 
boundaries of human generosity. However, we also note that in this context, the actors in the 
exchange have demonstrated no clear need for assistance. Recipient neediness is often cited as 
individuals’ highest prosocial priority (Cryder, Botti, and Simonyan 2017), and is likely to be 
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particularly motivating when occurring within one’s social circle (Small and Simonsohn 2007). 
Therefore, although we find prosocial preferences to exist only narrowly in this context, and 
potentially with minimal “pure” altruism (Andreoni 1988; Batson, Early and Salvarani 1997) 
toward the other person, we expect prosocial preferences to be substantially more robust in other 
contexts when a clear need for help exists.  
In Studies 2 and 3, we also examine the effectiveness of an incentive that is shared between 
the referrer and the recipient. We find that shared incentives perform equally as well as purely 
other-benefiting incentives at both the referral and uptake stages. Because multiple features 
change at once when offering a shared incentive, it remains unclear what drives the performance 
of the shared incentive. One possibility is that, at the referral stage, including any incentive 
component that rewards the recipient is sufficient to achieve the performance of the recipient-
only incentive, even if the size of the recipient’s incentive is small. Another possibility is that the 
smaller incentive size for the recipient pushes down performance of the shared incentive, but 
offering individuals an opportunity to have a shared experience (a shared incentive in this case) 
with a member of their social network exerts a positive force back upwards. Additional processes 
could be contributing to the performance of the shared incentive as well, and future research 
could attempt to understand exactly what drives the performance of the shared incentive.  
This work can be extended to several other interesting areas for future research. For example, 
all studies in this paper examine the effect of conditional referral incentives (participants are only 
rewarded for successful referrals). Future research might investigate unconditional referral 
incentives, which reward referrals regardless of recipient follow-through.  Further, while we find 
consistent results across a range of reasonable consumer incentive sizes (e.g., a $3 Starbucks gift 
card and a $50 food delivery service), it is possible that incentives of an even greater magnitude 
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would provide different results. Interestingly, some past research finds that reward magnitude 
moderates the effect of incentive type on effort, showing that other-benefiting incentives are 
more effective than self-benefiting incentives when the stakes are low (i.e., $0.50), but are 
relatively less effective when the stakes are high (i.e., $2.00; Imas 2014). According to this work, 
our range of incentives should all be high stakes, and therefore we might expect self-benefiting 
incentives to be more effective at both stages. However, this previous work looks at incentives 
that are given anonymously and therefore do not activate the anticipated reputational benefits 
that motivate action in the current context. It is still possible that there is a limit to the effect of 
these reputational benefits, and at a certain magnitude, a sender-benefiting incentive would 
consistently be more effective than recipient-benefiting incentives at the referral stage.  For 
example, employers and property owners may offer employee or tenant referral rewards valued 
at hundreds or even thousands of dollars. Future work might further test the role of incentive 
magnitude on the effectiveness of these incentives in a referral context. 
We additionally test our theory across a range of consumer products and services (e.g., 
photo-sharing app, videogame rentals, and food delivery service) and consistently show that 
recipient-benefiting referral incentives overall lead to a greater number of new customers than 
sender-benefiting referral incentives. However, we acknowledge that this paper does not cover 
all consumer contexts and that there may be other important moderators for companies to 
consider. Sender-benefiting referral incentives may be even more effective at the referral stage, 
for example, in social consumer contexts where the referrer has an additional incentive to get 
their friends to join (e.g., team sport leagues or collaborative online gaming).  The present 
studies also primarily focus on positive consumer experiences, but it would be interesting to 
explore referral choice for other consumption experiences. For example, do recipient-benefiting 
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incentives continue to outperform sender-benefiting incentives when the referrer had a bad 
experience with the product or when a company has received negative press? We tested the latter 
in an initial study and do not find an interaction of incentive type and negative press on the 
choice to refer (see Appendix C –Study 5). However, future work might further explore the 
boundaries of both incentive size and consumer context on the effectiveness of recipient-
benefiting (vs. sender-benefiting or shared) referral incentives. Finally, these studies suggest that 
customers choose to refer their friends when offered a recipient-benefiting referral incentive, 
because they anticipate that they will receive reputational benefits for making this type of 
referral. Future studies might examine actual responses to receiving these referrals – that is, do 
recipients truly view their friends more favorably when they send recipient-benefiting referrals?  
From a practical perspective, this research suggests that companies looking to get the largest 
possible return on their referral investment may want to adopt a partly or purely recipient-
benefiting referral incentive designs to recruit new customers. Despite consistent findings in this 
research that recipient-benefiting referrals outperform their sender-benefiting counterparts, 
sender-benefiting referral offers are more common in marketing practice (please see page 6). 
These patterns suggest that incentive architects do not have clear insights into the interplay of 
reputational benefits and action costs in this context. Future research could work to uncover the 
reasons why marketers do not accurately predict incentive dynamics in this, and other related 
contexts (e.g., competitor referrals; Blanchard, Hada, Carlson 2018), providing conceptual as 
well as practical insight about areas where incentive design can be improved. 
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Appendices 
3.1.1 Chapter 1: Appendix A  
Below we report additional findings that were not reported in the article 
 
Additional Results from correlational study in the Theoretical Background 
 
 Participants: Recruited 105 Mechanical Turk participants, 96 of whom met our 
inclusion criteria (MAge = 33.6, 57.3% female); five participants were removed for failing 
to complete the study (i.e., incomplete data) and four for failing the attention check. 
 
Company Average Trait 
Warmth 
Average 
Communal 
Intent 
Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) 
Amazon 5.30 4.10 0.402 p < .001 
Apple 4.16 3.94 0.222 p = .027 
Coca-Cola 4.70 3.75 0.415 p < .001 
General Electric 4.39 3.59 0.378 p < .001 
Google 4.74 3.55 0.151 p = .136 
IBM 4.39 3.75 0.262 p = .009 
Mercedes 4.15 3.46 0.358 p < .001 
Microsoft 4.31 3.79 0.489 p < .001 
Samsung 4.43 3.73 0.397 p < .001 
Toyota 4.58 3.74 0.333 p = .001 
Total 4.51 3.74 0.335 p < .001 
 
Additional Results from Study 1 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis. Factor analysis with varimax rotation confirmed that the items for 
charitable credit, warmth, communal intent, and competence loaded onto separate factors, each 
with eigenvalues greater than 1. The first factor loaded the six warmth traits (α = .96), the second 
factor loaded all six competence items (α = .94), the third factor loaded the five charitable credit 
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items (α = .91). In this analysis, two of the five communal intent items did not clearly load onto 
any of the factors, however the five items still formed a reliable scale (α = .80). 
 
Mediation. We also conducted a mediation analysis with purchase likelihood as the outcome 
variable and found that perceptions of communal intent partially mediated the effect of 
manipulated donor warmth on purchase likelihood. Using methods prescribed by Hayes (2013 – 
Model 4) we tested the significance of communal (vs. exchange) intent as the mediator by 
calculating standardized indirect effects for 5,000 bootstrapped samples and found that 
communal intent partially mediates the effect of donor warmth on purchase likelihood (Indirect 
effect = 0.26; 95% CI [0.13, 0.42]; direct effect = 0.36; 95% CI [0.10, 0.62]). This pattern 
remains significant when we control for competence and perceived wealth (indirect effect = 0.13; 
95% CI [0.03, 0.25]; direct effect = 0.31; 95% CI [0.03, 0.25]). 
 
Additional Results from Study 2A 
We were interested in what participants in the unspecified (control) condition assumed that the 
company donated. Therefore, in the control condition, we asked participants “What do you think 
Spades Hardware donated to the food bank” (1. Money, 2) Goods, or 3) I’m not sure; choices 
randomized). 55.97% guessed money, 29.85% guessed goods, and 14.18% selected that they 
were not sure.  
 
Additional Results from Study 2B 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis. Factor analysis with varimax rotation confirmed that the items for 
charitable credit, communal intent, and effort/sacrifice loaded onto 3 separate factors, each with 
eigenvalues greater than 1. The first factor loaded all five charitable credit measures (α = .90), 
the second factor loaded the five effort/sacrifice items (α = .92), and the third factor loaded all 
five communal intent items (α = .82). 
 
Additional Results from Study 3A 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis. Factor analysis with varimax rotation confirmed that the items for 
charitable credit, communal intent, effort/sacrifice, warmth, and competence loaded onto five 
separate factors, each with eigenvalues greater than 1. The first factor loaded all six competence 
measures (α = .94), the second factor loaded all six warmth items (α = .92), the third factor 
loaded all five charitable credit items (α = .89), the fourth factor loaded the five effort/sacrifice 
items (α = .88), and the fifth factor loaded the five communal intent items (α = .82) 
 
Moderated Mediation. We also conducted a moderated mediation analysis (Hayes 2013-model 8) 
controlling for both competence and perceived wealth and found a similar pattern. We tested the 
significance of both mediators by calculating standardized indirect effects for 5,000 bootstrapped 
samples and found that the model mediates the effect of donation type on charitable credit (direct 
effect = 0.12; 95% CI [-0.02, 0.25]). More specifically, we found that donation type produced an 
indirect effect of communal intent on charitable credit that was conditional on individual 
warmth, but found no indirect effect of effort/sacrifice. As hypothesized, inferences about 
communal intent mediated the effect of donation type on charitable credit for the low-warmth 
individual (indirect effect = 0.12 (95% CI [0.02, 0.25])), but not for the high-warmth individual 
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(indirect effect = 0.01 (95% CI [-0.08, 0.09])). Effort and sacrifice did not mediate the effect for 
the low-warmth individual (indirect effect = 0.06, 95% CI [-0.02, 0.14]), nor for the high-warmth 
individual (indirect effect <.001, 95% CI [-0.06, 0.06]). The index of moderated mediation was 
not significant at the 95% level of confidence. However, at the 90% level of confidence, the 
index of moderated mediation was significant for communal intent (Index = -.11 (90% CI [-0.24, 
-.01]) but not for effort/sacrifice (Index = -.05 (90% CI [-0.13, 0.02]). 
 
Additional Results from Study 3B 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis. Factor analysis with varimax rotation confirmed that the items for 
charitable credit, communal intent, warmth, and effort/sacrifice loaded onto four separate factors, 
each with eigenvalues greater than 1. The first factor loaded the six warmth traits (α = .96), the 
second factor loaded all five charitable credit items (α = .93), the third factor loaded the five 
effort/sacrifice items (α = .92), and the fourth factor loaded all five communal intent items (α = 
.88).   
 
Moderated Mediation. We also conducted a moderated mediation analysis (Hayes 2013-model 8) 
controlling for both competence and perceived wealth and found a similar pattern. We test the 
predicted relationship of donation type by low or high-warmth donors on charitable credit 
received, including both communality and effort/sacrifice as mediators. We tested the 
significance of both mediators by calculating standardized indirect effects for 5,000 bootstrapped 
samples and found that the model mediates the effect of donation type on charitable credit (direct 
effect = 0.11; 95% CI [-0.01, 0.24]). We found an indirect effect of communal intent conditional 
on warmth, but no indirect effect of effort/sacrifice. As hypothesized, inferences about 
communal intent mediated the effect of donation type on charitable credit for the low-warmth 
company (indirect effect = 0.16 (95% CI [0.07, 0.28])), but not for the high-warmth company 
(indirect effect = 0.02 (95% CI [-0.07, 0.11])). Effort/sacrifice did not mediate the effect for the 
low-warmth company (indirect effect = 0.05 (95% CI [-0.01, 0.11])), nor for the high-warmth 
company (indirect effect = -0.01 (95% CI [-0.07, 0.04])). The index of moderated mediation was 
significant for communality (Index = -.15 (95% CI [-0.30, -0.03]), but not significant for effort 
(Index = -.06 (95% CI [-0.15, 0.01].  
 
 
Additional Results from Study 4 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis. Factor analysis with varimax rotation confirmed that the items for 
charitable credit, warmth, and effort/sacrifice loaded onto separate factors, each with eigenvalues 
greater than 1. The first factor loaded the six warmth traits (α = .94), the second factor loaded all 
five charitable credit measures (α = .89), the third factor loaded the five effort/sacrifice items (α 
= .85). In this analysis, two of the communal intent items did not clearly load onto any of the 
factors, however the five items were still reliable (α = .80).   
 
 
3.1.2 Chapter 1: Appendix B  
Below we report all measures collected in each study: 
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Study 0 (in introduction) 
 Trait Warmth: “To what extent do the following traits describe (company) in general?” 
(1= Does not describe [company], 7 = Describes [company] very well) 
o Friendly 
o Well-intentioned 
o Trustworthy 
o Warm 
o Good-natured 
o Sincere 
 Communality “Please rate how strongly you agree with the following statements about 
[company]” (1 = Strongly disagree, 7 = Strongly agree)  
o The company did not expect to receive any benefits from helping 
o The company helped to respond to others' needs 
o The company has a genuine desire to help others  
o The company helped with hopes of benefiting themselves  
o The company helped in order to get ahead  
 Attention Check 
o Research in decision making shows that people, when making decisions and 
answering questions, prefer not to pay attention and minimize their effort as much 
as possible. Some studies show that over 50% of people don't carefully read 
questions.  If you are reading this question and have read all the other questions, 
please select the box marked 'other' and type 'decision making' in the box below. 
Do not select "company descriptions." Thank you for participating and taking the 
time to read through the questions carefully! What was this study about? 
 Company descriptions 
 Political preferences 
 Predictions of a friend’s behavior 
 Other ____________ 
 
Study 1 
 Charitable Credit: “How favorably do you view Spades Hardware on the characteristics 
below as a result of their donation?” (1 = Not at all, 7 = Very much so) 
o Generous 
o Helpful 
o Charitable 
o Beneficial 
o The extent to which they made the world a better place 
 Communality “Please rate how strongly you agree with the following statements about 
Spades’ motives:” 
 Trait Warmth 
 Competence traits: “To what extent do the following traits describe Spades Hardware in 
general?” (1= Does not describe [company], 7 = Describes [company] very well) 
o Capable 
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o Efficient 
o Skillful 
o Competent 
o Intelligent 
o Confident 
 Wealth Perception: “How wealthy do you think Spades Hardware is?” (1=Not at all 
wealthy, 7=Extremely Wealthy) 
 Purchase Likelihood “Imagine that you live near a Spades Hardware store. Please rate 
how likely would you be to go to Spades Hardware next time you need home 
improvement goods” (1 = Not at all likely, 7 = Very likely) 
 How much would you estimate Spades Hardware's donation was worth? (Free Response) 
 Attention Check (with “company donations” as option A) 
 
Study 2A 
 Charitable Credit: “How favorably do you view Spades Hardware on the characteristics 
below?” 
 Purchase Likelihood  
 Control condition only: What do you think Spades Hardware donate to the food bank?  
o Money 
o Goods 
o I’m not sure 
 Control condition only: How much would you estimate Spades Hardware's donation was 
worth? (Free Response) 
 Who would be able to get more canned food for $2,000? 
o Spades Hardware 
o The food bank 
o They can get the same amount 
 Attention Check (with “company donations” as option A) 
 
Study 2B 
 Charitable Credit: “How favorably do you view Spades Hardware on the characteristics 
below as a result of their donation?” (1 = Not at all, 7 = Very much so) 
 Communality  
 Effort 
o Spades Hardware put a lot of effort into this donation 
o Spades Hardware worked hard on this donation 
o Spades Hardware put thought into this donation 
 Sacrifice 
o How big was Spade Hardware’s sacrifice when making this donation? 
o Spades Hardware sacrificed when making this donation. 
 Purchase Likelihood 
 Attention check (with “company donations” as option A) 
 
Study 3A Pre-test 
 Trait Warmth 
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 Attention Check (with “people judgments” as option A”) 
 
Study 3A 
 Charitable Credit: “How favorably do you view Spades Hardware on the characteristics 
below as a result of their donation?” (1 = Not at all, 7 = Very much so) 
 Communality  
 Effort and Sacrifice 
 Trait Warmth 
 Competence traits 
 Wealth Perception 
 Attention Check (with “donations” as option A) 
 
Study 3B Pre-test 
 Trait Warmth 
 Attention Check (with “company descriptions” as option A) 
 
Study 3B 
 Charitable Credit: “How favorably do you view Spades Hardware on the characteristics 
below?” 
 Communality  
 Effort and Sacrifice 
 Purchase Likelihood 
 Trait Warmth 
 Attention check (with “company donations” as option A) 
 
Study 4 
 Charitable Credit “How favorably do you view Spades Hardware on the characteristics 
below as a result of their donation?” (1 = Not at all, 7 = Very much so). 
 Communality  
 Effort and Sacrifice 
 Purchase Likelihood 
 Trait Warmth 
 Attention check (with “company donations” as option A) 
 
3.1.3 Chapter 1: Appendix C  
Below are additional studies  
 
Appendix Study 1 – No donation, goods donation and monetary donation 
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This study tests whether consumers judge a low-warmth donor (a company) more 
favorably for a donation of goods than for a donation of money. We also compare donations of 
both money and goods to making no donation at all in a third “Control” condition. 
 
Methods 
We recruited 330 Mechanical Turk participants, 274 of whom met our inclusion criteria 
(MAge = 34.39, 48% female); 45 participants were removed for failing to complete the study (i.e., 
incomplete data) and 11 for failing the attention check. Participants were told to imagine the 
following scenario: “Spades Hardware is a small hardware chain. While Spades Hardware 
doesn't have the selection of larger chains, the prices are reasonable and they provide good 
service.” Participants were assigned to one of three conditions: 1) Control condition – no further 
information given, 2) Money donation condition – “This past weekend Spades Hardware donated 
$1,000 to a local foodbank”, or 3) Goods donation condition – “This past weekend Spades 
Hardware donated boxes of canned food (worth $1,000) to a local foodbank.”  
In all conditions, participants indicated the charitable credit that they would award to the 
donating company using the five item scale of charitable credit. We also measured purchase 
likelihood by asking participants “Please rate how likely you would be to go to Spades Hardware 
next time you need home improvement goods” (1 = Not at all likely, 7 = Very likely). 
 
Results 
Charitable Credit. Planned comparisons revealed that participants gave the company 
more charitable credit for donating goods (MGoods = 5.79, SD = .88) than for donating money 
(MMoney = 5.47, SD = .78; t(180) = 2.53, p = .01, d = .38). In addition, both treatments performed 
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better than the control (no donation) condition (MControl = 4.98, SD = .91), which provided the 
company with less charitable credit than either the goods (t(178) = 3.95, p = .001, d = .59) or the 
money donation conditions (t(182) = 6.14, p < .001, d = .91). 
 
APPENDIX STUDY 1: CHARITABLE CREDIT AS A FUNCTION OF DONATION 
TYPE 
 
NOTE: Error bars represent standard errors of the mean 
 
Purchase Likelihood. Using planned comparisons, we found that participants indicated a 
significantly higher likelihood of purchasing from Spades Hardware when they donated goods 
(MGoods = 5.78, SD = .98) compared to when they donated money (MMoney = 5.44, SD = 1.00; 
t(180) = 2.37, p = .02, d = .35) or made no donation (control condition; MControl = 5.34, SD = 
1.27; t(182) = 2.67, p = .008, d = .40). Interestingly, participants reported an equal likelihood of 
purchasing from Spades Hardware whether Spades donated money or made no donation at all 
(t(178) = .57, p = .57).   
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Discussion 
Consistent with our hypothesis, we observe a significant increase in the charitable credit 
that a company receives when donating goods versus money. Although consumers may 
sometimes assume that charities can buy goods cheaply through special deals or quantity 
discounts, we actually see that companies receive more credit for giving goods rather than their 
equivalent cash value. We also found that both types of donation resulted in more favorable 
evaluations than making no donation at all.  
 
Appendix Study 2: Donation Value 
While we explicitly state the value of the donations in the goods and monetary donation 
conditions in study 2A, it is possible that participants still feel a goods donation is worth more 
than a monetary donation. This study was designed to assess whether our results are explained by 
participants perceiving the goods donation to be of greater value than the monetary donation. 
Specifically, will we still find that goods donations receive more charitable credit than monetary 
donations when the goods donation has a lower value? 
 
Methods 
We recruited 300 Mechanical Turk participants, 262 of whom met our inclusion criteria 
(MAge = 34.55, 54.54% female); 27 participants were removed for failing to complete the study 
(i.e., incomplete data) and 11 for failing the attention check. Participants were told to imagine the 
following scenario: “Spades Hardware is a large corporation that sells home improvement 
goods.” Participants were then assigned to one of three conditions: 1) Monetary donation – “This 
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past weekend Spades Hardware donated $1,000 to a foodbank”, 2) equivalent goods donation – 
“This past weekend Spades Hardware donated $1,000 worth of canned food to a food bank,” or 
3) smaller goods donation – “This past weekend Spades Hardware donated $900 worth of 
canned food to a food bank.”  
In all conditions, participants indicated the charitable credit that they would award to the 
donating company using the five item scale of charitable credit. We also measured purchase 
likelihood by asking participants “Please rate how likely you would be to go to Spades Hardware 
next time you need home improvement goods” (1 = Not at all likely, 7 = Very likely). 
 
Results 
Charitable Credit. Planned comparisons revealed that participants gave the company 
equal charitable credit for donating $1,000 worth of goods (M = 5.69, SD = .77) compared to 
$900 worth of goods (M = 5.53, SD = 1.02; t(187)= 1.23, p = .22). However, both goods 
donations performed better than the monetary ($1,000) donation condition (M = 4.79, SD = 
1.00), which provided the company with less charitable credit than either the equivalent value 
($1,000) of goods (t(166)= 6.62, p < .001, d = 1.03) or the lower value ($900) of goods (t(165)= 
4.70, p < .001, d = .73). 
Purchase Likelihood. Planned comparisons revealed that participants reported equal 
likelihood of purchasing from the company that donated $1,000 worth of goods (M = 5.48, SD = 
1.12) compared to the company that donated $900 worth of goods (M = 5.46, SD = 1.17 t(186)= 
0.13, p = .896). Again, both goods donations performed better than the monetary donation 
condition (M = 5.04, SD = 1.19); participants were less likely to purchase in the monetary 
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donation condition than the equivalent value ($1,000) of goods condition (t(165)= 2.46, p < .02, 
d = .38) or the lower value ($900) of goods condition (t(163)= 2.28, p < .03, d = .36). 
 
Discussion 
This study finds that companies that make goods donations receive greater charitable 
credit (and purchase intentions) than monetary donations, even when the goods donation has a 
lower cash value than the monetary donation. This supports our theory that low-warmth donors 
receive greater charitable credit for donations of goods (vs. money) because goods signal 
communal intent, and not because the goods donations are perceived as having a higher value. 
 
Appendix Study 3: Mere Mention of Money  
Methods 
For this study we recruited 555 Mechanical Turk participants, 497 of whom met our 
inclusion criteria (MAge = 33.1, 41% female); 41 participants were removed for failing to 
complete the study (i.e., incomplete data) and 17 for failing the attention check. Participants were 
randomly assigned to one of three experimental conditions and told to imagine the following 
scenario about a fictional store: “Spades Hardware, a home improvement store, donated either 1) 
‘$50', 2) ‘$50 worth of canned food’, 3) or ‘a box of canned food’ to their local food bank”. The 
second and third conditions were both included to test whether simply mentioning the monetary 
value of the donation was sufficient to alter a preference for corporate donations of goods. 
In all conditions, participants indicated the charitable credit that they would award to the 
donating company along with purchase likelihoods. We also asked participants in the “box of 
canned food” condition to estimate what the box of canned food donation is worth. Participants 
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could enter any value that they wished, and also had an option to select “I have no idea” if they 
did not have an estimate.  
 
Results 
Charitable Credit. Spades Hardware received more charitable credit for donating goods 
than for donating money, regardless of whether the monetary value of the goods donation was 
specified or not. Planned comparisons revealed that participants gave the company more 
charitable credit for donating the box of goods (MBoxofGoods = 6.05, SD = 1.59) than for donating 
$50 (MMoney = 5.25, SD = 1.81; t(326)= 4.28, p < .001, d = .47). They also gave the company 
more charitable credit for donating $50 of goods (M$50ofGoods = 5.74, SD = 1.79) than for donating 
$50 (t(330) = 2.51, p < .02, d = .28). The donation of a “box of canned food” was viewed as 
directionally, but not significantly, more charitable than “$50 worth of canned food” (t(332) = 
1.67, p = .10). 
 
APPENDIX STUDY 3: CHARITABLE CREDIT AS A FUNCTION OF DONATION 
TYPE 
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NOTE: Error bars represent standard errors of the mean 
 
Goods-donation Value. When participants in the “Box of canned food” condition 
estimated how much the box was worth, 35/165 reported that they had no idea and 129/165 
estimated the value. Those who estimated the value reported a mean value of $50.45 and a 
median value of $30. These values tend to match or fall below the $50 value donated in the 
money condition, suggesting that higher perceived donation value could not account for the 
increase in charitable credit for corporate donations of goods between the $50 and “box of 
canned food” conditions. 
Purchase Likelihood: Participants reported equal likelihood of purchasing from Spades 
Hardware based on donation type (F(2, 494) = .55, p = .46). 
 
Discussion 
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Consistent with our hypothesis, we observe a significant increase in the charitable credit 
that a company receives when donating goods versus money. While there is evidence in the 
literature that simply mentioning monetary value highlights exchange norms (e.g., Heyman and 
Ariely 2004), we observe that this difference in charitable credit due to donation type persists 
even when the monetary value of a goods donation is specified. In addition, most participants in 
the “box of food” condition estimate the box’s value to be less than $50, allowing us to conclude 
that even when the donation amount was not specified, the preference for goods donations did 
not occur due to a high estimation of the goods-donation value.  
 
Appendix Study 4. Robustness Check: Communal (vs. Exchange) Orientation and 
Company-Donation Fit 
This appendix study was designed to replicate our findings from study 2B using a smaller 
donation amount ($1,000) and two additional goods donations (lumber and food). We also 
explored the robustness of the effect by changing cause urgency, shifting the donation recipient 
to natural disaster victims. In addition, we varied whether this effect strengthened, weakened, or 
remained constant when the donated goods were relevant to the company’s product offerings. 
Some previous research suggests that companies are evaluated more favorably for donating to a 
cause that fits their brand image (Chang and Chen 2009; Nan and Heo 2007). Here, we test if the 
same beneficial inferences occur when the type of goods donated fits closely with the brand or 
company.  
 
Pre-test Methods 
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We first conducted a pre-test in which we recruited 251 undergraduate students from a 
private Midwestern university 239 of whom met our inclusion criteria (MAge = 20.11, 47% 
female). Twelve participants were removed for failing to complete the study and there was no 
attention check in this pre-test. Participants were randomly assigned to one of three between-
subjects conditions and asked to imagine a scenario about the fictional company, Spades 
Hardware. The scenario stated that, “This past weekend, a tornado hit your neighboring town, 
causing destruction to homes and local businesses and leaving many injured and displaced.” It 
then stated that Spades Hardware store helped in the relief efforts by donating either 1) money 
donation – “$1,000”, 2) relevant goods donation – “$1,000 worth of lumber”, or 3) irrelevant 
goods donation – “$1,000 worth of canned food” to the cause. Participants rated company-
donation fit by indicating how strongly they agree with the following statements “The donation 
made sense coming from Spades Hardware” and “the donation was appropriate coming from 
Spades Hardware” (1 = Strongly disagree to 9 = Strongly agree). These two items were highly 
correlated (r = .88, p < .001), and were combined to create a company-donation fit measure.  
 
Pre-test Results 
The pre-test verified that participants believed the donation of lumber was more highly 
related to the donor (Spades Hardware) than the donation of canned food. Spades Hardware’s 
donation of lumber (MLumber = 6.59, SD = 2.15) scored higher on the company-donation fit 
measure compared to the donation of food MFood = 3.19, SD = 2.02; t(159) = 10.38, p < .001, d = 
1.65). 
 
Main Study Methods 
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For the main study, we recruited 307 Mechanical Turk participants, 268 of whom met our 
inclusion criteria (MAge = 37.64, 62% female). Seventeen participants were removed for failing to 
complete the study and 22 for failing the attention check. Participants were randomly assigned to 
one of the three conditions from the pre-test and were then asked to rate Spades Hardware on the 
same dimensions as in study 2B: charitable credit, communality, and perceived effort and 
sacrifice. Purchase likelihood was not measured in this study. The order of all of these measures 
was counterbalanced.  
 
Main Study Results 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis. Factor analysis with varimax rotation confirmed that the 
items for charitable credit, communality, and the effort/sacrifice constructs loaded onto three 
separate factors, each with eigenvalues greater than 1. The first factor loaded all five charitable 
credit measures (α = .92), the second factor loaded the five effort and sacrifice questions (α = 
.90), and the third factor loaded all five items related to communality (α = .78).  
 Charitable Credit. In this study we again found that the company received more 
charitable credit when donating goods than when donating an equivalent value of money, 
echoing the initial effect from our other studies. Planned comparisons revealed that participants 
attributed more charitable credit to Spades Hardware for donations of food (MFood= 5.76, SD = 
.95) than for donations of money (MMoney = 5.19, SD = 1.28; t(177) = 3.34, p = .001, d =.50). 
They also reported higher charitable credit for donations of lumber (MLumber= 5.54, SD = 1.05) 
than donations of money (t(175) = 1.96, p = .05, d =.30). The company-donation fit, however, 
seemed to have little influence on charitable credit, Spades Hardware received statistically 
equivalent levels of charitable credit when donating food and lumber (t(178) = 1.46, p = .15). 
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APPENDIX STUDY 4: CHARITABLE CREDIT AS A FUNCTION OF DONATION 
TYPE 
 
 
NOTE: Error bars represent standard errors of the mean 
 
Communal Intent. The donation of food (MFood = 5.27, SD = 1.04) was perceived to be 
directionally more motivated by communal norms than the equivalent monetary donation 
(MMoney = 4.93, SD = 1.16; t(177) = 1.40, p = .16 ). The other goods donation, lumber (MLumber = 
5.17, SD = 1.09) was judged as significantly more motivated by communal intentions than the 
monetary donation (t(175) = 2.05, p =.04, d=.31). There was a non-significant difference in the 
perceptions of communality between the two goods donations (t(178) = .62, p = .53). 
Effort and Sacrifice. The donation of food (MFood =4.54, SD = 1.42) was seen as 
significantly more effortful than the monetary donation (MMoney = 3.86, SD = 1.28; t(177) = 3.30, 
p =.001, d =.50). The other goods donation, lumber (MLumber = 4.32, SD = 1.47) was also rated 
more effortful than the monetary donation (t(175) = 2.18, p =.03, d = .33). However, there was a 
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non-significant difference in the perceptions of effort and sacrifice between the two goods 
donations (t(178) = -1.09, p = .28). 
Mediation. The mediation analysis revealed a significant mediating role of communal 
intent as well as effort on charitable credit. Due to insignificant differences on all three 
dependent variables between the two groups who evaluated goods donations, results from the 
lumber and food conditions were combined into one goods-donation category. We tested for 
significant mediation by calculating indirect effects for 5,000 bootstrapped samples (Hayes 
2013- model 4). When both mediators were tested in the same model, the model mediated the 
effect of donation type on charitable credit (Total indirect effect = 0.16; 95% CI [0.07, 0.26]; 
direct effect = 0.06; 95% CI [-0.05, 0.17]). We find a statistically significant indirect effect of 
communal intent (0.04; 95% CI [0.01, 0.10] and a statistically significant indirect effect of the 
effort and sacrifice measure (0.11; 95% CI [0.05, 0.20]).  
 
Discussion 
This study demonstrated further support for the mediating role of communality on the 
effect of donation type on charitable credit. In this study, effort/sacrifice also plays a significant 
mediating role. In short, we find that perceptions of effort and sacrifice can (but do not always) 
play a mediating role linking donations of goods to greater charitable credit. Perceptions of a 
company’s communality played a significant mediating role across studies.   
 
Appendix Study 5. Corporate (low-warmth) versus Individual (high-warmth) Donors 
This study begins to explore the notion that donor image, specifically the extent to which 
a donor is high versus low in warmth, influences the preference for goods donations. Study 2B 
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highlighted how perceptions that a donation is communal versus exchanged-based in nature 
underlies the preference for goods donations by low-warmth donors. In this study we propose 
that differences in donor warmth alternatively allows or inhibits this effect from emerging.  
For-profit companies are viewed as low in warmth, (Aaker, Vohs, and Mogilner 2010), a 
trait judgment that is linked with competitive and market-focused intentions (Fiske et al. 2007). 
Corporate donations of money may fit with existing assumptions that companies are donating to 
receive something in return, allowing minimal charitable credit to be received. By contrast, 
individuals are viewed as fundamentally social and warm (Haslam 2006), and thus more likely to 
be perceived as having genuine interest to help others when giving any type of donation. We 
therefore predict that while the preference for goods donations may emerge for corporate donors, 
individual donors will be less susceptible to image concerns when donating money, and thus will 
receive high levels of charitable credit regardless of donation type.   
 
Post-test Methods 
A post-test gauged whether judged warmth was indeed different for the company (Spades 
Hardware) and the individuals (the Jones Family) that were compared in the main study. 
Participants read the vignette for the company or individual without the description of the 
donation. We recruited 106 Mechanical Turk participants, 98 of whom met our inclusion criteria 
(MAge = 33.6, 45% female). Six participants were removed for failing to complete the study and 
two for failing the attention check. Participants were asked “to what extent do you think the 
following traits describe the Jones family (Spades Hardware) in general?” (1 = Does not describe 
the Jones family [Spades Hardware], 7 = Describes the Jones family [Spades Hardware] very 
well). To assess this construct, we used the warmth scale from Fiske et al. (2002), which 
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included the following items: friendly, well-intentioned, trustworthy, warm, good-natured, and 
sincere (α = .96). In a between-subjects design, participants rated either the Jones Family or 
Spades Hardware on these six items presented in a randomized order. 
 
Post-Test Results 
Participants considered the Jones Family to be significantly warmer (MIndividual = 5.03, SD 
= 1.00) than Spades Hardware (MCorporation = 4.56, SD = 1.13; t(97) = 2.20, p = .03, d =.45).  
 
Main Study Methods 
For study 3, we recruited 470 Mechanical Turk participants, 436 of whom met our 
inclusion criteria (MAge = 37.8, 48% female); 25 participants were removed for failing to 
complete the study and nine for failing the attention check. The study included a 2 (Donation 
type: Money vs. Goods) x 2 (Donor Type: Low-Warmth--Company vs. High-Warmth--
Individuals) between-subjects experimental design. All participants read a brief vignette 
describing either a fictional company (Spades Hardware) or a fictional set of individuals (the 
Jones family) that recently donated either 1) a monetary donation – “$50” or 2) a goods donation 
– “a box of canned food” to their local food bank.  
All participants then rated the donor (the company or individual) on charitable credit. 
Participants in the company conditions also reported purchase likelihood.  
 
Main Study Results 
Charitable Credit. The donor type manipulation had a significant main effect; overall the 
Jones family (high-warmth) received more charitable credit for their donation than did Spades 
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Hardware store (low-warmth; F(1, 432) = 65.51 , p < .001). Donation type did not show a 
significant main effect (F(1, 432) = .28 , p = .60). Most importantly, a 2 x 2 analysis of variance 
revealed a significant interaction between donor type (low-warmth—corporation vs. high-
warmth—individuals) and donation type (money vs. goods; F(1, 432) = 29.94, p < .001). 
Consistent with previous studies, Spades Hardware received significantly more charitable credit 
for donating goods (MCorporationGoods = 5.89, SD = 1.80) than for donating money (MCorporationMoney 
= 5.00, SD = 2.09; t(208) = 3.31, p < .001, d = .46). This pattern was not observed for the Jones 
family, however, who actually received significantly more charitable credit for donations of 
money (MIndividualsMoney = 7.18, SD = 1.40) compared to donations of goods (MIndividualsGoods = 
6.52, SD = 1.69; t(224) = 3.17, p < .001, d = .42).  
 
APPENDIX STUDY 5: CHARITABLE CREDIT AS A FUNCTION OF DONOR AND 
DONATION TYPE 
 
 
NOTE: Error bars represent standard errors of the mean 
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Purchase Likelihood. Participants reported marginally higher purchase likelihood for 
Spades Hardware when the company donated goods (MCorporationGoods = 5.73, SD = 1.97) 
compared to when the company donated money (MCorporationMoney = 5.23, SD = 2.03; t(206) = 
1.82, p = .07).  
 
Discussion 
Results from this study support the notion that the effect of donation type on charitable 
credit is more likely to occur for companies, who are typically viewed as low-warmth, than for 
individuals, who are generally viewed as high in warmth. Once again for a company, we find 
that donating goods (rather than money) results in higher regard for the company, as indicated 
both by measurements of charitable credit and purchase likelihood. This effect did not hold for 
individual donors, however. A post-test confirmed that the corporation in our study was judged 
as relatively low in warmth whereas the individuals were judged as relatively high in warmth.  
 
Appendix Study 6. Real-world Corporate Donors 
 This study was designed to replicate the findings from study 3B using real world low- 
and high-warmth corporate donors.  
 
Pre-test Methods 
Prior to the study, we pre-tested two companies, Bolthouse Farms and Pepsi—both of 
which are successful beverage corporations, on the extent to which they were viewed as warm. 
In a between-subjects study, 121 participants (recruited using Mechanical Turk) rated one of the 
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companies on the extent to which the 12 traits of warmth and corporate-ness describe the 
company.  
 
Pre-test Results 
Participants considered Bolthouse Farms (MBolthouse Farms = 5.23, SD = 1.20) to be 
significantly warmer than Pepsi (MPepsi = 4.02, SD =1.72; t(117) = 4.73, p < .001, d =.88).  
 
Main Study Methods 
The main study involved 475 participants (MAge = 31.3, 51% female; recruited 525, 24 
removed for incomplete date, 26 removed for failing attention check). The study was a 
2(Company: Pepsi Co. vs. Bolthouse Farms) x 2(Donation: Money vs. Goods) between-subjects 
experimental design. Participants were asked to imagine one of the following scenarios: “This 
past weekend, PepsiCo, a large multinational beverage corporation, donated $1,000 (“boxes of 
canned food worth $1000”) to the food bank by their headquarters” or “This past weekend, 
Bolthouse Farms, a farm-based fresh juice company, donated $1000 (“boxes of canned food 
worth $1,000”) to the food bank by their headquarters”.  
Participants were then asked to rate the two companies on the seven items of charitable 
credit used in all previous studies, purchase likelihood for the donating company, how large they 
believed the company is, and how familiar they are with the donating company (all on a 1-5 
scale).  
 
Main Study Results 
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Charitable Credit. The donor manipulation had a significant main effect; overall 
Bolthouse Farms, the high-warmth company received more charitable credit for their donation 
than Pepsi, the low-warmth company (F(1, 471) = 91.00 , p < .001). A 2 x 2 ANOVA revealed a 
significant interaction between donation type (money/goods) and donor image (low-
warmth/high-warmth; F(1, 471) = 6.50, p =.01). This interaction remains significant even when 
we control for both familiarity and perceived size of the two companies (F(1, 460) = 4.29, p = 
.04). Consistent with previous findings, the goods donation performed better than a monetary 
donation for the company with a low-warmth image, Pepsi (MGoods = 3.41, SD = .87, MMoney = 
3.05, SD = .95; t(226) = 2.98, p = .002, d = .40), but not for Bolthouse Farms, which has a high-
warmth image (MGoods = 3.97, SD = .74 vs. MMoney = 3.98, SD = .67; t(246) = .20, p = .84).  
 
APPENDIX STUDY 6: CHARITABLE CREDIT AS A FUNCTION OF DONOR AND 
DONATION TYPE 
 
 
NOTE: Error bars represent standard errors of the mean 
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Purchase Likelihood. There was also a significant interaction between donor and 
donation type on purchase likelihood (F(1, 469) = 34.47, p < .001). Participants were more likely 
to purchase Pepsi products after a donation of goods (MGoods = 3.23, SD = 1.17) versus money 
(MMoney = 2.92, SD = 1.13; t(223) = 2.03, p =.02, d = .27). We found no difference in purchase 
intentions for Bolthouse Farms based on donation type (MGoods = 3.74, SD = .81 vs. MMoney = 
3.67, SD = .82; t(244) = -.06, p = .56). 
 
Appendix Study 7. Replication of 3A  
 This appendix study was designed to replicate the findings of study 3A about individual 
donors using a manipulation similar to that from study 3B for companies.  
Pre-test Methods 
We first conducted a pre-test in which we recruited 100 Mechanical Turk participants, 87 
of whom met our inclusion criteria (MAge = 34.56, 66.7% female). Eight participants were 
removed for failing to complete the study (i.e. incomplete data) and five for failing the attention 
check. The pre-test measured the perceived warmth of an individual named Joe Jones. In the 
high-warmth condition, participants read, “Joe Jones is a friendly person. He is always warm 
and welcoming toward his neighbors and focuses on serving his community.” In the low-warmth 
condition, participants read, “Joe Jones is an unfriendly person. He is always cold and 
indifferent toward his neighbors and focuses on getting ahead.” Participants then rated Joe Jones 
on warmth.   
 
Pre-test Results 
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The descriptions used in the pre-test successfully manipulated donor image. Participants 
rated Joe Jones as warmer in the high-warmth condition (MHigh-Warmth = 6.30, SD = .70) compared 
to the low-warmth condition (MLow-Warmth = 2.07, SD = 1.00; t(85) = 20.03, p < .001). 
 
Main Study Methods 
We recruited 800 Mechanical Turk participants, 722 of whom met our inclusion criteria 
(MAge = 33.01, 49.5% female); 53 participants were removed for failing to complete the study 
and 25 for failing the attention check. We tested trait warmth as a moderator by describing the 
donor (now an individual, rather than a company) in each vignette as having either a low-warmth 
or high-warmth image, using the same wording as in the pre-test. Participants were then 
informed that this past weekend, Joe Jones donated either 1) a monetary donation – “$100” or 2) 
a goods donation – “a box of canned food worth $100” to his local food bank.  
We measured charitable credit and the perceived wealth of the donor. Participants also 
rated the donor on trait warmth. The order of all these measures was counterbalanced.    
 
Main Study Results 
Warmth Manipulation Check. The high-warmth individual (MHigh-Warmth = 6.07, SD = .83) 
was perceived as warmer than the low-warmth individual (MLow-Warmth = 3.36, SD = 1.24; t(720) 
= 34.56, p <.001). We find a main effect of the warmth descriptions on perceived warmth (F(1, 
718) = 1194.20, p < .001). We again observe that donation type did not exert a main effect on 
warmth (F(1, 718) = 1.45, p = .23) nor did we observe an interaction between donation type and 
manipulated donor warmth on measured warmth (F(1, 718) = .58, p = .45). This provides further 
evidence that warmth is a relatively stable trait which is not influenced by donation type, 
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exhibiting distinct patterns compared to the other constructs under study such as charitable 
credit. 
Charitable Credit. The donor manipulation had a significant main effect on charitable 
credit; the high-warmth individual received more charitable credit for his donation than the low-
warmth individual (F(1, 718) = 211.67, p < .001). Donation type also had a significant main 
effect; donations of goods were rated more favorably than donations of money (F(1, 718) = 
10.52, p = .001). Most importantly, a 2 x 2 ANOVA revealed a significant interaction between 
donation type (money/goods) and donor warmth (low-warmth/high-warmth), F(1, 718) = 4.95, p 
< .03. When the individual donor was described as having a low-warmth image, he received 
more charitable credit for a donation of goods than a donation of money (MGoods = 5.28, SD = .97 
vs. MMoney = 4.91, SD = 1.09; t(351) = 3.32, p < .001, d = .35). The high-warmth individual 
donor, however, received equal credit for donations money and goods (MGoods = 6.10, SD = .72 
vs. MMoney = 6.02, SD = .72; t(367) = .94, p = .35).  
 
APPENDIX STUDY 7: CHARITABLE CREDIT FOR INDIVIDUAL DONORS AS A 
FUNCTION OF DONATION TYPE AND DONOR WARMTH 
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NOTE: Error bars represent standard errors of the mean  
 
Appendix Study 8: Signaling Communal Intentions with Monetary Donations 
Methods 
We recruited 800 Mechanical Turk participants, 730 of whom met our inclusion criteria 
(MAge = 38.31, 55.3% female); 48 participants were removed for failing to complete the study 
and 22 for failing the attention check. The study included a 2 (Donation: Money vs. Goods) x 2 
(Control vs. Monetary Donations Preference) between-subjects experimental design. In the 
control conditions, participants read that PepsiCo, a large multinational beverage corporation, 
recently made a monetary donation of $10,000 (or medical supplies worth $10,000) to an 
international humanitarian aid charity.” In the experimental conditions, participants first read that 
“An international humanitarian aid charity recently made the following request: ‘Although 
donations of items such as food, blankets, or medical supplies are appreciated, monetary 
donations are the best way to help us help people the most. Monetary donations allow us 
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to purchase exactly what is needed when it is needed.’” They then read that PepsiCo donated 
either $10,000 or medical supplies worth $10,000 to the charity.  
We measured charitable credit and purchase likelihood in this study as well as warmth 
items. We also measured communality and effort and sacrifice. The order of all these measures 
was counterbalanced. Finally, participants responded to a manipulation check. First we asked 
“Do you think the charity in this study prefers to receive donations of money or donations of 
goods?” (1= Strongly prefers donations of Money, 7 = Strongly prefers donations of Goods). We 
then asked “Do you think charities in general prefer to receive donations of money or donations 
of goods?” (1= Charities strongly prefer donations of Money, 7 = Charities strongly prefer 
donations of Goods). This second question was used to measure participants’ assumptions about 
donation type in a more general sense, and also see if this varied by condition.  
 
Results 
Manipulation Check. Confirming the manipulation, in response to the question “Do you 
think the charity in this study prefers to receive donations of money or donations of goods?” (1 = 
Strongly prefers donations of Money, 7 = Strongly prefers donations of Goods) participants who 
read the nonprofit statement requesting money reported a stronger preference for money than 
those in the control group (MControl= 2.99, SD =1.49 vs. MStatement = 1.84, SD = 1.27; t(700) = 
9.93, p < .001, d = .75). The manipulation had a directional, though non-significant, effect on the 
perception that charities in general prefer monetary donations to goods donations (MControl= 2.54, 
SD = 1.30 vs. MStatement = 2.36, SD = 1.35; t(697) = 1.63, p = .10). It is also interesting to note 
that for both the charity mentioned in the study and charities in general, participants in the 
control condition rated that charities prefer donations of money compared to goods (In 
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comparison to scale midpoint of 4, specific charity: M = 2.99, SD = 1.57; t(336) = 12.28, p < 
.001, d = 1.34; charities in general: M = 2.54, SD = 1.46; t(343) = 19.05, p < .001, d = 2.06). 
Charitable Credit. The nonprofit statement manipulation had a significant main effect on 
charitable credit; adding the nonprofit statement that they prefer monetary donations 
interestingly led to higher levels of charitable credit overall (F(1, 729) = 29.55, p < .001). This 
main effect may have occurred because both goods and money were mentioned as being helpful 
in the charity statement. Donation type did not have a significant main effect (F(1, 729) = .001, p 
= .98). Most importantly, a 2 x 2 ANOVA revealed a significant interaction between donation 
type (money/goods) and presence of the money-preferred statement (absent/present; F(1, 729) = 
10.31, p < .001). Consistent with our previous studies, in the control condition, PepsiCo received 
more charitable credit for a donation of goods than a donation of money (MGoods = 4.81, SD = 
1.39 vs. MMoney = 4.50, SD = 1.32; t(360) = 2.18, p = .03, d =.23). However, when participants 
first read the nonprofit’s request for monetary (rather than goods) donations, PepsiCo received 
more credit for donations of money (MMoney-Statement = 5.32, SD = 1.14) than donations of goods 
(MGoods-Statement = 5.02, SD = 1.28; t(369) = 2.38, p = .018, d = .25). 
 
APPENDIX STUDY 8: CHARITABLE CREDIT FOR PEPSI AS A FUNCTION OF 
DONATION TYPE AND NONPROFIT STATEMENT 
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NOTE: Error bars represent standard errors of the mean  
Purchase Likelihood. We found no main effect of nonprofit statement on purchase 
likelihood (F(1, 720) = .67, p = .41), nor was there a main effect of donation type on purchase 
likelihood (F(1, 720) = 2.02, p = .16). There was also no significant interaction between the 
presence of a nonprofit statement and donation type on purchase likelihood (F(1, 720) = .76, p = 
.39). In the control condition, the monetary donation (MMoney = 3.79, SD = 1.88) showed 
marginally lower purchase likelihood than the donation of goods (MGoods = 4.22, SD = 1.83; 
t(356) = 1.62, p =.10). There was a non-significant difference between the two donation types 
following the nonprofit statement (MMoney-Statement = 4.04, SD = 1.78 vs. MGoods-Statement = 4.11, SD 
= 1.93; t(364) = .40, p = .69).  
Discussion 
We found that the company (PepsiCo) received more credit for a donation of goods than 
a donation of money, in line with our previous findings. However, this was no longer the case 
when participants first read that the charity in question requested a monetary donation. Following 
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an explicit request for monetary donations, PepsiCo received more credit for responding to the 
charity’s needs directly and sending money instead. By increasing the perception that the 
company was responding to a charity’s needs, we saw an increase in the positive evaluation that 
the company received for donating. We also found a main effect of the nonprofit statement, 
suggesting that any interaction with the nonprofit (responding to their request for donations) 
improved the overall evaluations of the company.  
It is also interesting to note that, based on our follow-up measures, participants generally 
believe that charities prefer donations of money to donations of goods. This acts as additional 
evidence that the results across our studies are not due to a widespread belief that donations of 
goods are preferred and therefore companies should receive more charitable credit for goods 
donations. Instead, despite the understanding that charities typically prefer monetary donations, 
our studies have shown that low-warmth companies and individuals typically receive more credit 
for donations of goods.  Consistent with recent research (Berman et al. 2015; Lin-Healy and 
Small 2013; Newman and Cain 2014), the motivations behind a donation can be more important 
than the impact of the donation itself when granting charitable credit.  
 
3.2.1 Chapter 2: Appendix A  
Below we report study materials 
STUDY 1 
Control condition:     Sender-Benefiting referral condition: 
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Recipient-Benefiting referral condition:   Shared referral condition:
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Donation referral condition: 
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STUDY 2 
Control condition: 
 
Referrer email 
 
 
Recipient email 
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Sender-Benefiting condition: 
Referrer email 
 
Recipient email 
 
  
134 
 
Recipient-Benefiting condition: 
Referrer email 
 
Recipient email 
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STUDY 4A:  
Personality quiz test results: 
You are somewhat more Extroverted: 
  
This means you like getting energy from active involvement in events and having a lot of 
different activities. You are excited when you're around people and you like to energize other 
people. You like moving into action and making things happen. You generally feel at home in 
the world. You often understand a problem better when you can talk out loud about it. 
 
You are both Extroverted AND Introverted: 
  
You are a balance of both Extroversion and Introversion, sometimes referred to as an 
"Ambivert". Ambiverts have introverted and extroverted traits, but neither trait is dominant. As a 
result, they have more balanced or nuanced personalities. Ambiverts move between being social 
or being solitary, speaking up or listening carefully with greater ease than either extroverts or 
introverts. 
 
You are somewhat more Introverted: 
  
Don't confuse introversion with shyness or reclusiveness. They are not related. Being an introvert 
means that you like getting your energy from dealing with the ideas, pictures, memories, and 
reactions that are inside your head, in your inner world. You often prefer doing things alone or 
with a few people you feel comfortable with. You take time to reflect so that you have a clear 
idea of what you'll be doing when you decide to act. Ideas are almost solid things for you. 
Sometimes you like the idea of something better than the real thing. 
 
Note: These results were adapted from the Myers & Briggs Foundation 
(http://www.myersbriggs.org/my-mbti-personality-type/mbti-basics/extraversion-or-
introversion.htm) 
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Control and Sender-Benefitnig condition recipient e-mails: 
______________________________________________________________________________
_______ 
From: CBlabWUSTL@gmail.com 
Subject: _____________ thought you would enjoy this survey!  
 
  
Your friend, ______________, just took a quick personality quiz as part of a study at WashU and 
they wanted to share the link with you! You can take the survey by using this 
link www.linkwillgohere.com and entering this code _____________.  
  
______________________________________________________________________________
_______ 
 
Recipient-Benefiting condition recipient e-mail: 
______________________________________________________________________________
_______ 
From: CBlabWUSTL@gmail.com 
Subject: _____________ thought you would enjoy this survey (plus get a Starbucks gift card)!  
 
  
Your friend, ______________, just took a quick personality quiz as part of a study at WashU and 
they wanted to share the link with you! You can take the survey by using this 
link www.linkwillgohere.com and entering this code -------------. 
 
 
If you take the quick survey, you will receive a $3.00 electronic gift card to Starbucks. 
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______________________________________________________________________________
_______ 
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Shared condition recipient e-mail: 
______________________________________________________________________________
_______ 
From: CBlabWUSTL@gmail.com 
Subject: _____________ thought you would enjoy this survey (plus get a Starbucks gift card)!  
 
  
Your friend, ______________, just took a quick personality quiz as part of a study at WashU and 
they wanted to share the link with you! You can take the survey by using this 
link www.linkwillgohere.com and entering this code __________. 
 
If you take the quick survey, you will receive a $1.50 electronic gift card to Starbucks. 
  
______________________________________________________________________________
_______ 
 
  
139 
 
 
 
STUDY 5A  
 
High cost/Sender-Benefiting referral 
______________________________________________________________________________
__ 
From: Food2Me <Food2Me@delivery.com> 
To: [Participant] 
Subject: Download Food2Me! 
  
Dear [Participant],  
  
[Friend] has been using our new food delivery app, and thought you might like it too! Food2Me 
delivers food from your favorite local restaurants for an annual fee of $5.  Sign up 
today and [Friend] will receive a receive a $20 gift card to Amazon for referring you!  
 
This is an exclusive offer - to verify that only one person uses this offer, print out the attached 
documents, fill them out, and mail them to the Food2Me headquarters with your 
unique code: xyq6msp204.  
  
Food2Me address: 201039 5th Ave, Seattle, WA 98121 
 
______________________________________________________________________________
__ 
 
High cost/Recipient-Benefiting referral 
______________________________________________________________________________
__ 
140 
 
From: Food2Me <Food2Me@delivery.com> 
To: [Participant] 
Subject: Download Food2Me! 
  
Dear [Participant],  
  
[Friend] has been using our new food delivery app, and thought you might like it too! Food2Me 
delivers food from your favorite local restaurants for an annual fee of $5.  Sign up today 
and you will receive a $20 gift card to Amazon for joining!  
  
This is an exclusive offer - to verify that only one person uses this offer, print out the attached 
documents, fill them out, and mail them to the Food2Me headquarters with your 
unique code: xyq6msp204.  
  
Food2Me address: 201039 5th Ave, Seattle, WA 98121 
 
______________________________________________________________________________
__ 
 
Low cost/Sender-Benefiting referral 
______________________________________________________________________________
__ 
From: Food2Me <Food2Me@delivery.com> 
To: [Participant] 
Subject: Download Food2Me! 
  
Dear [Participant],  
  
[Friend] has been using our new food delivery app, and thought you might like it too! Food2Me 
delivers food from your favorite local restaurants for an annual fee of $5. 5. Sign up 
today and [Friend] will receive  a $20 gift card to Amazon for referring you!  
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This is an exclusive offer - to verify that only one person uses this offer, simply click this 
unique link to sign up: Food2Me.com/xyq6msp204.  
______________________________________________________________________________
__ 
 
Low cost/Recipient-Benefiting referral 
______________________________________________________________________________
__ 
From: Food2Me <Food2Me@delivery.com> 
To: [Participant] 
Subject: Download Food2Me! 
  
Dear [Participant],  
  
[Friend] has been using our new food delivery app, and thought you might like it too! Food2Me 
delivers food from your favorite local restaurants for an annual fee of $5.  Sign up 
today and you will receive a $20 gift card to Amazon for joining!  
  
This is an exclusive offer - to verify that only one person uses this offer, simply click this 
unique link to sign up: Food2Me.com/xyq6msp204.  
 
______________________________________________________________________________
__ 
 
STUDY 5B 
 
Referrer role/Sender-Benefiting referral 
You joined a food delivery service called Food2Me which delivers food from your favorite local 
restaurants for $50/year.  
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Food2Me sends you an email, asking if you would like to refer a friend to join the service. If 
your friend signs up, Food2Me will give you a free year of delivery. 
  
If you chose to refer your friend, [Friend], Food2Me would send [Friend] the following email: 
  
______________________________________________________________________________
__ 
From: Food2Me <Food2Me@delivery.com> 
To: [Friend] 
Subject: Download Food2Me! 
  
Dear [Friend], 
  
[Participant] might like it too! Food2Me delivers food from your favorite local restaurants for an 
annual fee of $50.  Download the app using this link and [Participant] will receive a free 
year of Food2Me deliveries!  
______________________________________________________________________________
__ 
 
Referrer role/Recipient-Benefiting referral 
You joined a food delivery service called Food2Me which delivers food from your favorite local 
restaurants for $50/year.  
 
Food2Me sends you an email, asking if you would like to refer a friend to join the service. If 
your friend signs up, Food2Me will give you a free year of delivery. 
  
If you chose to refer your friend, [Friend], Food2Me would send [Friend] the following email: 
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______________________________________________________________________________
__ 
From: Food2Me <Food2Me@delivery.com> 
To: [Friend] 
Subject: Download Food2Me and get a free year of delivery! 
  
Dear [Friend], 
  
[Participant] might like it too! Food2Me delivers food from your favorite local restaurants for an 
annual fee of $50.  Download the app using this link and you will receive a free year of 
Food2Me deliveries!  
______________________________________________________________________________
__ 
 
Recipient role/Sender-Benefiting referral 
______________________________________________________________________________
__ 
From: Food2Me <Food2Me@delivery.com> 
To: [Participant] 
Subject: Download Food2Me! 
  
Dear [Participant],  
  
[Friend] has been using our new food delivery app, and thought you might like it too! Food2Me 
delivers food from your favorite local restaurants for an annual fee of $50.  Download the app 
using this link and [Friend] will receive a free year of Food2Me deliveries!  
______________________________________________________________________________
__ 
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Recipient role/Recipient-Benefiting referral 
______________________________________________________________________________
__ 
From: Food2Me <Food2Me@delivery.com> 
To: [Participant] 
Subject: Download Food2Me and get a free year of delivery! 
  
Dear [Participant],  
  
[Friend] has been using our new food delivery app, and thought you might like it too! Food2Me 
delivers food from your favorite local restaurants for an annual fee of $50.  Download the app 
using this link and you will receive a free year of Food2Me deliveries!  
______________________________________________________________________________
__ 
 
3.2.2 Chapter 2: Appendix B  
Below we report additional analyses 
 
STUDY 4A: 
 
Referral Results: 
Condition N Referral 
Choice 
Reputational 
Benefits 
Psychological 
Costs 
Social 
Obligations 
Control 93 26.37% 3.56 (1.26) 2.43 (1.27) 3.49 (1.43) 
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Selfish 91 64.84% 3.69 (1.34) 2.48 (1.32) 2.98 (1.34) 
Prosocial 93 58.06% 4.41 (1.33) 1.75 (1.17) 2.65 (1.36) 
Shared 93 56.99% 4.14 (1.33) 2.07 (1.20) 2.71 (1.34) 
 
Shared referral vs. Sender-Benefiting referral results 
As with the recipient-benefiting incentive, participants felt that the reputational benefits 
of referring were higher in the shared condition (MShared = 4.14, SD = 1.33) than the sender-
benefiting condition (MSender = 3.69, SD = 1.34; t(182) = 2.29, p = .023). Participants also 
reported higher psychological costs in the sender-benefiting condition (MSender = 2.48, SD = 
1.32) compared to the shared condition (MShared = 2.07, SD = 1.20; t(182) = 2.21, p =.029). There 
was a non-significant difference in reported social obligation for the two conditions (MSender = 
2.98, SD = 1.34) compared to the prosocial condition (MShared = 2.71, SD = 1.36; t(182) = 1.36, p 
= .18). We simultaneously tested the significance of all three measured mediators by calculating 
standardized indirect effects for 10,000 bootstrapped samples (Hayes 2009) and found that 
reputational benefits mediate the effect of referral type on referral choice. We found a 
statistically significant indirect effect of reputational benefits (.19; 95% CI [.02, .47]). The 
indirect effect of psychological costs was not significant (-.09; 95% CI [-.37, .03]) nor was the 
indirect effect of imposing a social obligation (.21; 95% CI [-.07, .57]).  
 
Recipient Uptake: 
Condition N Recipient 
Uptake 
Imposing Annoyed Enjoy 
Control 6 24% 2.83 (2.32) 2 (1.27) 3.8 (1.30) 
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Selfish 16 28.07% 1.56 (1.50) 1.5 (1.51) 4.38 (1.31) 
Prosocial 37 69.81% 1.48 (.91) 1.45 (1.06) 4.41 (1.38) 
Shared 33 64.71% 1.35 (.63) 1.23 (.59) 4.81 (1.27) 
 
Follow up Questions: 
 How much did you feel like your friend was imposing on you by sending this quiz? (1 = 
Not at all, 7 = Very much so) 
 How annoyed were you about receiving this quiz from your friend? (1 = Not at all, 7 = 
Very much so) 
 How much did you enjoy this personality quiz (1 = Did not enjoy at all, 7 = Very much 
enjoyed it) 
 
3.2.3 Chapter 2: Appendix C  
Below we report additional studies 
 
APPENDIX STUDY 1 
 
This appendix study was designed to replicate Study 3. Note – as with Study 3, in this 
study we label the incentive from the participants’ perspective as either self-benefiting or other-
benefiting. 
 
Methods 
 We recruited 800 MTurk participants (803 participants took the survey; MAge = 36.90, 
66.29% female). This study involved a 2(incentive: self-benefiting vs. other-benefiting) x 2(role: 
referrer vs. recipient) between-subjects design. This study used the same materials as Study 3. In 
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addition to measuring action choice, we measured action costs (α = .81), expected reputational 
benefits (α = .96), relationship benefits (α = .87) and psychological costs (α = .94). 
 
Results 
Action Choice. We observed a significant interaction between participant role 
(referrer/recipient) and incentive type (self-benefiting/other-benefiting; χ 2 (1) = 11.51, p = .001). 
For participants in the referrer condition, we observed more participants choosing to refer for an 
other-benefiting incentive (90.59%) than a self-benefiting incentives (83.74%; (χ 2 (1) = 4.24, p 
=.038). For participants in the recipient condition, we observed more participants choosing to 
follow-through for a self-benefiting incentive (59.60%) than an other-benefiting incentive 
(46.23%; (χ 2 (1) = 7.12, p =.008). 
APPENDIX STUDY 1: CHOICE TO ACT BY INCENITVE (SELF-
BENEFITING/OTHER-BENEFITING) AND ROLE (REFERRER/RECIPIENT) 
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Action Costs. We observed a significant main effect of incentive type on ratings of action 
cost; other-benefiting incentives were viewed as a lower cost than self-benefiting incentives (F(1, 
791) = 13.41, p < .001). Participant role also has a significant main effect; taking action in the 
recipient role was perceived as a greater burden than taking action in the referrer role (F(1, 791) 
= 253.78, p < .001). There was also a significant interaction between incentive and role; F(1, 
796) = 14.21, p < .001). Specifically, in referrer condition, there was no difference in perceived 
cost of taking action (referring) between the two incentives (MSelf = 2.08, SD = 1.28 vs. MOther = 
2.07, SD = 1.28; t(397) = .08, p = .93). In the recipient condition, action cost was significantly 
higher when offered an other-benefiting incentive (MOther = 4.03, SD = 1.53) compared to a self-
benefiting incentive (MSelf = 3.29, SD = 1.50; t(391) = -4.84, p < .001). 
Reputational Benefits. There was a significant main effect of incentive type on ratings of 
reputational benefits; participants expected higher reputational benefits when offered an other-
benefiting (vs. self-benefiting) incentive (F(1, 792) = 34.56, p < .001). Participant role, however, 
did not have a significant main effect on reputational benefits (F(1, 792) = .42, p = .52). There 
was a non-significant interaction for role and incentive type (F(1, 792) = 1.14, p = .29). In the 
referrer condition, reputational benefits were significantly higher for the other-benefiting 
incentive (MOther = 5.44, SD = 1.49) than the self-benefiting incentive (MSelf = 4.79, SD = 1.29; 
t(398) = -3.87, p < .001). Similarly, in the recipient condition, reputational benefits were higher 
for the other-benefiting incentive (MOther = 5.40, SD = 1.16 vs. MSelf = 4.95, SD = 1.29; t(391) = -
3.64, p < .001). 
Relationship Benefits. We observed a significant main effect of incentive type on ratings 
of relationship benefits; following through with an other-benefiting referral resulted in higher 
relationship benefits than self-benefiting referrals (F(1, 795) = 30.15, p < .001). There was also a 
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significant effect of participant role on relationship benefits (F(1, 795) = 5.97, p = .015). 
However, there was a non-significant interaction between the incentive type and role (F(1, 795) 
= .09, p = .76). For participants in the referrer condition, relationship benefits were significantly 
higher for the other-benefiting incentive than the self-benefiting incentive (MOther = 4.62, SD = 
1.09 vs. MSelf = 4.22, SD = .95; t(399) = -4.64, p < .001). Similarly, participants in the recipient 
condition, believed that relationship benefits would be higher when offered an other-benefiting 
incentive (MOther = 4.76, SD = 1.00 vs. MSelf = 4.41, SD = .78; t(393) = -3.92, p <.001). 
Psychological Costs. There was a marginally significant main effect of incentive type on 
psychological costs (F(1, 791) = 2.84, p = .092) and a significant main effect of participant role 
on psychological costs (F(1, 791) = 10.52, p = .001). We also found a significant interaction 
between incentive and role; (F(1, 791) = 20.89, p < .001). For participants in the referrer 
condition, psychological costs were significantly higher for the self-benefiting incentive than the 
other-benefiting incentive (MSelfish = 2.45, SD = 1.61 vs. MProsocial = 1.85, SD = 1.41; t(392) = 
3.91, p <.001). For participants in the recipient condition, psychological costs for not following 
through were higher for the other-benefiting incentive (t(391) = -2.42, p = .016). 
 
APPENDIX STUDY 2 
This appendix study was designed to replicate Study 4B. 
 
Methods 
 The study used a 2(rewards: sender-benefiting vs. recipient-benefiting) x 2(control vs. 
anonymous) between-subjects design. 580 Mechanical Turk participants (MAge = 35.01, 58.72% 
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Female) completed the study. This study used the same materials as Study 4B. We additionally 
measured relationship benefits, psychological costs, and social obligations (see Appendix Table 
2 for follow-up results). We did not measure reputational benefits, because half of the 
participants made anonymous referrals.  
 
 
Results 
We found an interaction between referral condition (control/anonymous) and reward type 
(sender-benefiting /recipient-benefiting; X2 (1) = 6.58, p = .01). For participants in the control 
condition, we observed an equal number of referrals for the recipient-benefiting (88.74%) and 
the sender-benefiting  referral reward (89.26%; χ 2 (1) = .01, p = .89). However, when the referral 
was anonymous, the sender-benefiting reward (92.62%) was significantly more successful than 
the recipient-benefiting reward (75.57%; χ 2 (1) = 15.54, p < .001).  
 
APPENDIX STUDY 2: REFERRAL CHOICE BY REWARD AND ANONYMITY 
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APPENDIX TABLE 2 
Anonymity 
Condition 
Referral Reward 
Condition 
Relationship 
Benefits 
(1-7) 
Psychological 
Costs 
(1-7) 
Social 
Obligations 
(1-7) 
Named Sender-
Benefiting 
4.15 
(.69) 
2.42  
(1.56) 
3.08 
(1.67) 
Recipient-
Benefiting 
4.41** 
(.89) 
1.67***  
(.95) 
2.59**  
(1.59) 
Anonymous Sender-
Benefiting 
4.11  
(.72) 
2.23 
(1.47) 
2.83  
(1.73) 
Recipient-
Benefiting 
4.33*  
(.77) 
1.89*  
(1.28) 
2.81 
(1.67) 
† p<.10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p<.001; these significance notations refer to differences in mean 
evaluations for sender-benefiting referral rewards compared to recipient-benefiting referral rewards 
with standard deviations in parentheses. A° symbol next to the variable name indicates that there is a 
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significant interaction between anonymity condition and referral reward condition on this variable at 
a p < .05 level. 
 
APPENDIX STUDY 3 
As additional evidence for the role of reputational benefits in the choice to make a recipient-
benefiting (vs. sender-benefiting) referral, we manipulated the relationship between referrer and 
recipient. We expect that, because the potential for reputational benefits is substantially reduced 
when the recipient is a stranger (instead of a friend), the performance of recipient-benefiting 
referrals will decline relative to sender-benefiting referrals in this case.  
Methods 
As outlined in our pre-registered research plan (available at https://bit.ly/2V0j1De), we 
recruited 800 MTurk participants (810 participants completed the study; MAge = 35.91, 61.54% 
female). The study used a 2(referral: sender-benefiting vs. recipient-benefiting) x 2(referral 
recipient: friend vs. stranger) between-subjects experimental design. We used the same context 
as in Study 4A (Amazon BOLD referral), and the same incentive (a $10 Visa gift card). All 
participants were asked to give their first name and the first name of a close friend. We showed 
participants a sample referral email that Amazon was interested in sending to either 1) their close 
friend or 2) “a potential customer” (whom the participant does not know). In both conditions, we 
used the participant’s name in the sample email (e.g., One of our customers, Rosie, has been 
using our new loyalty program, Amazon BOLD, and wanted to share the savings with you!). 
Participants were then required to correctly identify who would receive a reward for a successful 
referral (themselves or the recipient) before they could move to the referral decision to confirm 
that they understood the incentive structure. We then asked, “Would you refer your friend [name 
of close friend inserted]/this potential customer, to Amazon BOLD”? (Yes/No).   
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Results  
A binary logistic regression was performed on the choice to refer as a function of referral 
recipient type (friend/stranger) and incentive type (sender-benefiting/recipient-benefiting). This 
analysis yielded a significant interaction of recipient and incentive type (χ2 (1) = 14.85, p < 
.001). For participants in the friend condition, we observed an equal number of referrals for the 
recipient-benefiting (87.75%) and the sender-benefiting referral (87.00%, χ2 (1) = 0.05, p = .82). 
This pattern is consistent with results from studies 2 and 3. However, when referring a stranger, 
the sender-benefiting incentive (82.76%) was significantly more successful than the recipient- 
benefiting incentive (54.73%, χ2 (1) =35.78, p < .001), consistent with standard incentivized 
behavior.  
APPENDIX STUDY 3: REFERRAL CHOICE BY REWARD AND RECIPIENT 
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APPENDIX STUDY 4 
This appendix study was designed to replicate Study 5B with an additional manipulation 
of action cost. 
 
Methods 
As outlined in our pre-registered research plan (available at https://bit.ly/2GQ33ru), we 
recruited 800 MTurk participants; 818 completed the study (MAge = 35.52, 50.86% female).  
 To further understand the uptake stage of the referral process, we had participants 
imagine that a friend sent them an email asking if they would like to try Food2Me (the same food 
delivery service described in Studies 3 and 5A). Participants provided their own first name and 
the first name of a close friend. We manipulated whether the referral was recipient-benefiting or 
sender-benefiting. We also manipulated action costs by directly varying the cost of uptake ($2 or 
$100 per year to join).  
Participants then read, “The Food2Me restaurant delivery service costs [$100/$2] per 
year and you may cancel at any time. Would you sign up for the Food2Me delivery service? 
Remember if you join, [you/Friend] get(s) a free year of deliveries!” Participants could respond 
either “Yes, I would sign up for the Food2Me delivery service” or “No, I would not sign up for 
the Food2Me delivery service.”  
Note that, as in Study 2, 3, 5A, and 5B, we told participants (recipients) in the sender-
benefiting referral conditions that the friend who referred them would be rewarded if they 
followed through on the referral. We informed participants of this benefit to their friend to 
examine whether, even when recipients know that their friend will receive an incentive (which is 
not always the case in these incentive designs), sender-benefiting referrals have a minimal 
positive effect at the uptake stage due to the higher burden of follow-through. Participants were 
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required to correctly identify who would receive an incentive (themselves or their friend) before 
they could move to the uptake decision to confirm that they understood the incentive structure 
before making their uptake choice. Finally, as a manipulation check, we measured action costs (α 
= .78). 
Results 
Manipulation Check. As expected, the high cost condition was perceived as having 
higher action costs than the low cost condition (MHigh-Cost = 3.83, SD = 1.39 vs. MLow-Cost = 2.41, 
SD = 1.46; t(816) = 1.431, p <.001). 
Uptake decision. We performed a binary logistic regression on uptake decision as a 
function of uptake cost (high/low) and referral type (sender-benefiting/recipient-benefiting). This 
analysis yielded a significant interaction of uptake cost and incentive type (χ2 (1) = 5.49, p = 
.019, Figure 8). For participants in the high-cost condition, we observed more sign-ups for the 
recipient-benefiting referral (51.94%) than the sender-benefiting referral (34.76%, (χ2 (1) = 
12.37, p < .001), consistent with Studies 2-3 as well as typical incentivized behavior. However, 
when uptake cost was low, there was no difference in uptake choice by those in the recipient-
benefiting condition (69.84%) versus the sender-benefiting condition (69.50%, χ2 (1) = .004, p = 
.95).  
APPENDIX STUDY 4: UPTAKE CHOICE BY ACTION COST (HIGH/LOW) AND 
INCENITVE (SENDER-BENEFITING/RECIPIENT-BENEFITING) 
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APPENDIX STUDY 5 
 This exploratory study was designed to test whether the attractiveness of a service 
moderates the effect of sender-benefiting and recipient-benefiting incentives on referral choice. 
Specifically, if a company has received negative press, do sender-benefiting incentives become 
more effective at motivating referrals, because the referring customer needs an additional nudge 
to refer? Alternatively, are recipient-benefiting incentives more effective for companies that have 
received negative press because the sender anticipates that the positive response from sending a 
reward will balance out the unfavorable response of referring a brand that is viewed negatively? 
To test this question, we varied the referred service using two rideshare companies: Lyft (the 
desirable company, reinforced by telling participants, truthfully, that the company had received 
widespread positive press) versus Uber (the undesirable company, reinforced by telling 
participants, truthfully, that the company had received widespread negative press). 
 
Methods 
We recruited 915 MTurk participants (MAge = 38.45, 55.25% female). The study used a 
2(referral: sender-benefiting vs. recipient-benefiting) x 2(service: negative press [Uber] vs. 
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positive press [Lyft]) between-subjects experimental design. All participants were asked to give 
their first name and the first name of a close friend. We had participants imagine the following: 
“You have been using Uber [Lyft], an alternative to taxicabs, which sends a driver directly to 
your location”. Participants in the Uber condition then read the following: “While Uber is a 
convenient service, lately they have received widespread negative press for having a toxic work 
culture and not offering their employees the same benefits that their competitors provide”. Those 
in the Lyft condition read, “Lyft is a convenient service and lately they have 
received widespread positive press for having a good work culture and offering their employees 
better benefits than their competitors”. Participants were then told that the service has a 
promotion that is either sender-benefiting (“gives you a $10 Visa gift card for every person that 
you refer to Uber [Lyft] who then takes their first Uber [Lyft] ride”) or recipient-benefiting 
(“gives a $10 Visa gift card to each individual that you refer to Uber [Lyft] who then takes their 
first [Uber] Lyft ride”).  Participants read a sample email that would be sent to their friend if they 
chose to refer. In both conditions, we used the participant’s name in the sample email (e.g., 
Rosie, has been riding with Lyft and thought you might enjoy it too. They then read, “Imagine 
that your friend, [Friend’s name], has never used Uber [Lyft] before. Would you refer [Friend’s 
name] to Lyft?” Participants could respond either “Yes, I would refer my friend” or “No, I would 
not refer my friend”.  
We used two additional measures to verify that our negative press manipulation was 
successful by asking “How do you feel about the driving app, Uber [Lyft]”, 1) “I would be proud 
to support Uber [Lyft]” and 2) “Uber [ Lyft] is a good company” (1 = Not at all, 7 = Very much 
so; α = .92).   
 
158 
 
Results  
Manipulation Check. As expected, there was a main effect of the negative press 
manipulation; Uber was viewed more negatively than Lyft ((F(1, 911) = 219.11, p < .001). There 
was no main effect for the incentive type on the evaluation of the company (F(1, 911) = .01, p = 
.92). There was a non-significant interaction of negative press and incentive type (F(1, 911) = 
.08, p = .78). In the Uber (negative press) condition, there was a non-significant difference in 
perception of the company between incentive types (MRecipient-Benefiting = 3.77, SD = 1.52 vs. 
MSender-Benefiting = 3.81, SD = 1.48; t(457) = .26, p = .79). In the Lyft (positive press) condition, 
there was also a non-significant difference between incentive types (MRecipient-Benefiting = 5.19, SD 
= 1.31 vs. MSender-Benefiting = 5.17, SD = 1.34; t(451) = -.14, p = .89). 
Referral decision. A binary logistic regression was performed on the choice to refer as a 
function of incentive type (sender-benefiting/recipient-benefiting) and the press manipulation 
(negative/positive. This analysis did not yield a significant interaction of incentive type and press 
manipulation (χ2 (1) = 2.20, p = .14). For participants in the Uber (negative press) condition, we 
did not observe a difference in referral choice for the recipient-benefiting (70.94%) and the 
sender-benefiting incentive (65.35%, χ2 (1) = 1.66, p = .20). When referring to a company with 
positive press (Lyft), the recipient-benefiting incentive (90.75%) was significantly more 
successful than the sender- benefiting incentive (81.86%, χ2 (1) = 7.33, p = .007). 
 
APPENDIX STUDY 5: REFERRAL CHOICE BY REWARD AND SERVICE 
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Discussion 
To summarize, this study found no interaction of incentive type and negative press on the 
choice to refer a friend to a company. Future work might continue to explore boundary 
conditions: Are there companies or products for which sender-benefiting incentives are more 
effective at motivating customers to refer than recipient-benefiting incentives? 
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